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NASA Fast Track Study
Executive Summary
The NASA Fast Track Study supports the efforts of a Special Study Group (SSG) made up of
members of the Advanced Project Management Class number 23 (APM-23) that met at the
Wallops Island Management Education Center from April 28 - May 8, 1996. Members of the
Class expressed interest to Mr. Vern Weyers in having an input to the NASA Policy Document
(NPD) 7120.4, that will replace NASA Management Institute (NMI) 7120.4, and the NASA
Program/Project Management Guide. The APM-23 SSG was tasked with assisting in
development of NASA policy on managing Fast Track Projects, defined as small projects under
$150 million and completed within three years.
The approach of the APM-23 SSG was to gather data on successful projects working in a
"Better, Faster, Cheaper" environment, within and outside of NASA and develop the Fast Track
Project section of the NASA Program/Project Management Guide. Fourteen interviews and four
other data gathering efforts were conducted by the SSG, and 16 were conducted by Strategic
Resources, Inc. (SKI), including five interviews at the Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) and one at
the Applied Physics Laboratory (APL). The interviews were compiled and analyzed for
techniques and approaches commonly used to meet severe cost and schedule constraints.
Strategic Resources, Inc. (SRI)
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Findings Summary
From the analysis, the following findings were derived:
Within an improved Product Development Cycle (PDC) process that compresses the time needed
to go from concept to operation, three primary project management applications were discovered
necessary for Fast Track Project success:
1. Thorough planning (including Risk Planning, metrics for management and use of
concurrent engineering).
2. Teamwork (including use of Integrated Product Teams).
3. Minimizing disruptive outside events and their potential for consuming time and resources
(including extra reviews and second guessing team decisions).
This study found that success was not achieved by omitting steps in the Life Cycle Development
(LCD) process, but by innovatively tailoring the process to fit the constraints of the specific
project.
Additionally, related management applications that should be considered for use by each project
manager as applicable: the use of Risk Management; the use of facilitating technology or tools,
such as Rapid Prototyping, Computer Aided Design software, and communication tools; and,
training for specific project management applications, team operations, and available supporting
management information resources.
From these findings, recommendations for Fast Track Projects were formulated:
l. Require and allow time for the actual project manager and team to plan at the front end of
Fast Track Projects (especially entering Phase C/D), to include Risk Management
Planning and Design-to-Cost, with the understanding of the importance of controlling
project technical and programmatic requirements throughout the life cycle.
. Use Program Commitment Agreement concept at all levels of the project as a series of
bilateral agreements, used to ensure common requirement understanding and to control
requirement creep.
3. Use metrics for each project that will measure progress and value.
4. Use team management and cross functional integration as a tool to achieve success.
5. Educate project managers in innovative techniques for managing reviews, documentation,
oversight and risk to minimize disruptions in a schedule constrained project.
Strategic Resources, Inc. (SRI)
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° Provide NASA Program/Project Managers access to an educational/corporate knowledge
information system addressing issues of Fast Track Project management, available as an
on-line resource to support both project management and career development.
Strategic Resources, Inc. (SRI)
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Fast Track Study Feedback
Was the information helpful to you?
Why/Why not?
If Yes, how will you use
the information?
[] Yes [] No
Was the arrangement of the
information helpful?
Why/Why not?
[] Yes [] No
Is there more information you
would like to see?
If Yes, please describe it.
[] Yes [] No
What would you like to see in an
information reference library?
I have ideas/experiences to share. Contact met
Name
e-mail
Phone
Office Address
Return form to: Dr. Edward Hoffman
Code FT
NASA Headquarters
300 E Street, SW
Washington, D.C. 20546
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NASA Fast Track Study
Introduction/Background
This study is a result of the thinking, concern and efforts of a number of members of the NASA
Advanced Project Management Class number 23 (APM-23), and the encouragement of Mr. Veto
Weyers and the Program/Project Management Working Group (PPMWG), charged with
developing NASA Policy Directive (NPD) 7120.4. The class convened at NASA's Management
Education Center, Wallops Island, Virginia from April 28 through May 8, 1996. Mr. Weyers, the
speaker for the graduation session as Chair of the PPMWG, discussed the issues surrounding new
approaches to smaller projects. Following Mr. Weyers' presentation, the class expressed their
concern for NASA to provide guidance, not only for smaller projects, but also for the accelerated
project structure needed to meet NASA's "Better, Faster, Cheaper" objectives. Mr. Weyers
challenged the class to provide their issues, concerns and recommendations to the full PPMWG.
The class met with the PPMWG on June 19, 1996, and recommended gathering information and
data from visionary managers within NASA on their experiences and ideas on how to do ''Better,
Faster, Cheaper" projects. The PPMWG chartered the class members as a Special Study Group
(SSG) and tasked them to research Fast Track Projects. The SSG was also tasked to produce a
Guide for Fast Track Projects as part of the NASA program/Project Management Guide. In
addition to looking within NASA, Code FT tasked Strategic Resources, Inc. (SKI) with
supplementing the SSG's findings by performing similar research with industry and non-NASA
government agencies that have successfully addressed compressing the development cycle.
The interest in ''Better, Faster, Cheaper" at NASA grew from studies performed in 1991 and 1992
showing that out of 29 programs evaluated, NASA had experienced approximately 65 percent
cost and schedule overruns, and programs averaged 12 years. NASA Administrator, Mr. Daniel
Goldin, focused on the concept of ''Better, Faster, Cheaper" for NASA in response to declining
federal finding. In light of this, sustaining exploration of the solar system, placing a Space
Station in orbit and developing a follow-on to the Space Shuttle, requires different approaches
throughout NASA than those of the programs referenced in the 1991/92 study.
NASA rewrote its basic program Management policy for Life Cycle Development, NASA
Management Instruction (NMI) 7120.4, in 1993 in response to the study's results. However,
much of the evidence applied only to traditional, large programs. The PPMWG is now rewriting
this document, as NASA Policy Directive (NPD) 7120.4 to apply to the broader range of
programs and projects, including relatively smaller projects defined as ''Better, Faster, Cheaper."
This directive will be accompanied by a new NASA Hand Book (N-HB) 7120.5 that will provide
guidance for Program/Project Management with the draft Fast Track Guide, produced in
conjunction with this study, addressing ''Better, Faster, Cheaper" projects.
Strategic Resources, Inc. (SRI)
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This study documents, summarizes and discusses the methodology, findings, conclusions and
recommendations of individuals within and outside NASA experienced in "Better, Faster,
Cheaper" projects. The findings are summarized below and discussed more thoroughly in the
body of this study. The draft Fast Track Guide is provided as Appendix A_ The compiled
interviews at Appendices B, C, and D, and Supplemental Information provided by interviewees is
at Appendix E.
Strategic Resources, Inc. (SRI)
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Methodology
The SSG was tasked to produce the Fast Track portion of the NASA Program/Project
Management Guide. The SSG determined that data for this effort should be based on the
experiences of managing projects that may be defined as Fast Track. These projects are usually
constrained by cost and/or schedule.
This study was designed as a compilation of interviews conducted at NASA's Centers or
coordinated by the members of the SSG. NASA/Code FT, responsible for NASA's
Program/Project Management Initiative, tasked SKI to support the SSG by compiling the SSG
interviews, coordinating the editing of the draft Guide, and researching Fast Track type projects in
industry and other government agencies. The objective of both the SSG and SRI research was to
examine a cross section of projects to provide a better understanding of how to manage cost and
schedule constrained projects.
The SSG and SKI developed interview protocols as a common framework for the study, however,
the actual interviews also included information outside the protocol. Although each project
manager interviewed differed with regard to what was important and what to focus on when
managing a Fast Track Project, several common elements emerged.
Strategic Resources, Inc. (SRI)
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NASA Interviews: The NASA interviews occurred at all Centers except Dryden and Ames.
There were a total of 14 project interviews and four related data gathering efforts focused on
defining what is needed for Fast Track Projects. These were compiled into the areas listed on the
following page, to provide a common basis for examining the data from all of the interviews.
Non-NASA Interviews: Identifying potential Non-NASA interviewees required research to
select candidate projects, an interview point of contact, and making appointments for conducting
the interviews. Of note were the Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) personnel, who were very
cooperative, as were those contacted at the Applied Physics Laboratory (APL) at Johns Hopkins
University. These interviews complemented data from the NASA Centers as several of the JPL
and APL projects are managed as '_Better, Faster, Cheaper."
The industry and other government agencies' projects also provided supporting evidence on
managing the development of new products from concept to operation. Although there is not a
one-for-one correspondence with NASA's efforts, many of the problems faced by these project
managers are very similar.
Compilation Format: The compilation format emerged from the common threads revealed in
both the NASA and non-NASA interviews. Each interview was evaluated for applicability to one
of the four areas: Practice Oriented Ideas, Policy Related Comments, Cultural Changes and
Technology/Tools. Points made that were determined as applicable to Fast Track Projects, but
which did not clearly fit into one of the four areas, were listed in Other Observations.
Strategic Resources, Inc. (SRI)
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Interview Compilation Format
A_ Practice Oriented Ideas
B. Policy Related Comments
C. Cultural Changes
D. Technology/Tools
E. Other Observations
Examples
• Use of Teams
• Use of Risk Management Practices vs. Risk
Avoidance
• Use of Metrics
• Use of Co-location/Partnering
• Reduction in Level of Oversight
• Reduction in Rigidity of Life Cycle Development
Process
• Increased Training Uniformity for New Personnel
• Evaluation of Hierarchy of project Management by
Cost, Risk, Size, etc.
• Reduction in Documentation Requirements
• Location of Program Manager and project Manager
• Use of Cross Functional Integration
• Use of Up-Front Agreements
• More Up-Front Planning
• Use of Concurrent Engineering
• Use of Rapid Prototyping
• Use of CAD/Simulation Software
• Use of Communication Tools
Strategic Resources, Inc. (SRI)
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Analysis, Findings, Conclusions, Recommendations: Once compiled, the interview data was
analyzed for commonality of concepts. This commonality was fitrther organized into areas that
project managers identify as those that must be managed. Conclusions were drawn, and
recommendations provided based on ensuring successful Fast Track Projects. The Draft Fast
Track Guide is supported by these Findings, Conclusions, and Recommendations.
Fast Track Guide Development: The Draft Guide used an evolutionary development process
that included a session at Wallops Island to consolidate ideas in a facilitated, focused
environment. Much discussion and reflection was invested in this Guide through cooperation and
involvement from all NASA Centers.
Strategic Resources, Inc. (SRI)
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Findings
The interviews and research process identified a wide variety of approaches to managing
development of new products in a cost and schedule constrained environment, but common
elements emerged among the managers interviewed. These included: the primacy of good
planning at the start of a project; the use of teams, such as Integrated Product Teams OPT); and
solid project management that adheres to the plan.
The interviews revealed that success is not achieved by omitting steps found in the conventional
Life Cycle Development Process, but is achieved by examining the entire process to:
a) minimize resource consuming activities that do not add value to the project;
b) move activities forward in the process where possible;
c) compress or shorten process steps; and
d) understand that cost and schedule constraints will affect design decisions.
Success is also achieved in projects by controlling project execution to minimiTe or eliminate
changes to original requirements, objectives and the project plan. This requires taking time to
develop understanding and ownership of the requirements and objectives, to develop a credible,
comprehensive management plan appropriate for the project size and complexity, and to adhere to
the plan.
Teamwork was seen by the project managers interviewed as a value-added approach that requires
an up-front investment over other non-team approaches, but pays dividends during project
execution, where both time is saved and product quality ensured.
The definition of team varies by project, but several notable examples, such as the Joint Direct
Attack Munition (JDAM) Program show that all individuals involved in a project add value to the
project when deliberately made part of the team.
The interviews revealed an array of approaches, even when using common techniques, as well
as varying levels of emphasis for each area. This reinforces the finding that there is no detectable,
one-size fits all way to manage Fast Track Projects, but that success will be achieved by tailoring
the management approach to the uniqueness of the project. One of the hallmarks of the
successful project is the use of innovative cost and schedule controls. Everything in the Life
Cycle Development Process is open for examination by the Fast Track Project Team to define
ways to maintain the schedule and control costs. In the Findings Summary that follows, the
concepts of Planning, Teamwork and Day-to-Day Management are discussed with attention given
to specific techniques or ideas provided from the interviews.
Strategic Resources, Inc. (SRI)
NASA Fast Track Study
1.0
1.1
1.2
1.3
Plannin_
Up Front Planning: Planning is the key to successful management of a Fast Track Project
constrained by cost and schedule. The time taken in the early stages to think through all
of the aspects of the project alleviates the potential for the project manager, in the later
stages, of having to redirect. The project managers who made this point referred to the
conventional attitude toward planning, which is based on the belief that there will be
sufficient time and other resources to react to any issues as they arise and to change the
course of the project as needed.
Resource Availability (i.e., project information library, lessons learned): For many project
managers, Fast Track is a new operational concept requiring training and sharing of
knowledge. While formal classes provide a foundation for Project Management, sources
of data and information on management approaches for Fast Track Projects, available on
demand, are also desired.
Planning Areas
1.3.1 Risk (Identification of Issues/Strategy to Manage): Many saw Risk Management
as a key planning activity. To be able to identify those potentially stressing aspects of a
project, arrive at an assessment of probability of occurrence, and determine the cost
impact to the project if a risk event occurred allows a project team to plan mitigation
strategies. Many felt that conventional projects avoided risk by simply spending more
money. For the cost constrained Fast Track Project, this is not an option and risk must be
aggressively managed in ways other than avoidance.
1.3.2 Design (Design-to-Cost): The need to understand the nature of cost driven'
activities is fundamental. Several project managers mentioned that few seem to
understand the concept of Design-to-Cost (DTC) as it relates to the technical-scientific
environment. Successful application of DTC within NASA will be necessary to support
Fast Track Projects.
1.3.3 Schedule (Design-to-Schedule): Similar to DTC, it is critical for project managers
to understand that in the Fast Track environment, cost and schedule are independent
variables and must be controlled. This means that, while flexl_bility must be available in the
technical design, it should be built into the project plan from the beginning.
Strategic Resources, Inc. (SRI)
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1.4
1.3.4 Test (Design-to-Test): While not addressed as strongly, many found this to be an
area that can provide both cost and schedule savings. By asking questions about what
needs to be tested during the design phase, testing may be accomplished earlier in the
process, leading to earlier, less costly and less schedule-disruptive testing. Incremental
testing is a key approach allowing users to gain insight into design assumptions and how
they impact the satisfaction of user requirements.
1.3.5 Manufacturing/Production (Design for Manufacturing): Several project managers
indicated that costs could be controlled very effectively by involving those responsible for
manufaetming in the initial design and planning phases. This allows the team to identify
opportunities for design decisions that allow earlier selection of alternatives, thereby
lessening or shortening the manufacturing schedule. Cost controlling efforts in the area of
single process engineering in factories was also revealed as a significant cost saving
methodology.
1.3.6 Decision Points (Reviews, Tailoring of Life Cycle Development Process): An area
discussed by almost all interviewees was the need to manage disruptive, outside
influences. Most elected to incorporate review processes into the project and to not allow
them to be seen as being accomplished for only the benefit of individuals outside of the
project, such as upper-level management. Instead, reviews are conducted as
communication events, or 'peer reviews' to foster team knowledge and to encourage team
synergism. Where interface with mandated reviews occurred, it was managed so that the
oversight panels or board reviews were conducted as part of the planned reviews and
scheduled based on the project's requirements. Minimal time was spent on producing
documentation for reviews as well, using only those management products actually used
by the team
1.3.7 Metrics (Earned Value, Performance Measurement, etc.): All stressed the
importance of being able to know how the project is progressing. This means that for most
project managers, a well thought-out set of project metrics, sometimes unique for each
project team, must be identified during planning. The metrics should answer the questions,
'_What will we have?" and "How will we know it?" They should always be used for high
probability, high impact risk management areas. Many mentioned using Earned Value and
Performance Measurement methods.
Requirements Definition: The understanding and management of requirements in the
constrained environment of Fast Track Projects is absolutely key to success. The project
team must have a common understanding of requirements before planning begins. The
customer must also understand that planning will 'freeze' requirements, as cost and
schedule constraints will not allow course corrections, unless the customer is willing to
pay for the changes and/or accept schedule realignment. The team, including the
customer, should understand that the requirements at the end of the project, should match
the requirements identified at the start of the project.
Strategic Resources, Inc. (SRI)
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1.5 Operations: Operations must not be neglected during the development process. Decisions
made in the design and development phases will have cost impacts on the operations
phase. In addition, several interviewees pointed out that significant schedule and cost
savings are available for most projects when transitioning to operations. Consideration
must be given to the entire life-cycle for a true understanding of potential schedule and
cost savings.
2.0 Teamwork
2.1 Teamwork: Teams and teamwork is a developing area in government project
management. The overall project management structure as a team, and the IPT concepts
have been used on many successful Fast Track Projects. These team concepts are
characterized by openness, concern for each other, and loyalty to team objectives. Less
visible, but equally important, is the team's understanding of the project and its goals.
2.2 Why Teamwork (Rationale): Teamwork was mentioned by many interviewees as one of
the most important areas for project management of cost and schedule constrained
projects. Many also mentioned that all on the team, including the project leadership, must
understand the benefits of teams in order to accept the up front costs associated with team
management versus the more traditional, leader-decision maker management style. Some
of these benefits follow.
2.2.1 Cross-Functional Integration-Functional Synergism: The most obvious benefits
identified are in the area of empowering all project participants with insight and input in
the planning and design phases. The interfaces, interactions and integration activities are
much more effective and efficient. All individuals that may impact the project are
candidates for inclusion on the team, as all must be part of the effort of staying on cost and
schedule. All team members must understand the goals of the project and be encouraged
to provide innovative ideas on meeting those goals. The Fast Track environment cannot be
supported by stove-piped organizations that simply throw the product over the fence to
the next function in the process.
2.2.1.1 Eliminate Problems Early Rather than Late: Many of the savings in cost
and schedule occur because problems are identified early and can be solved before sunk
costs accumulate and schedule redirection is needed.
2.2.1.2 Save Money and Time by Fixing when it's Cheaper/Easier: This approach
allows the project team to make any necessary changes in design before design is frozen or
before bending metal. It is much less expensive to make corrections early in the process.
2.2.1.3 Better Design through User/Other: By involving the user on the team,
insight into user-peculiarities and perceptions may be gained to provide a better product
from the start and prevent the need for late stage corrections.
Strategic Resources, Inc. (SRI)
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2.3
3.2
Making It Work: A team environment is new for many managers, requiring a new set of
skills and abilities. Many project managers emphasized that training to lead teams or be a
team member is absolutely essential.
2.3.1 Culture Change (Badgeless Environment): In the environment characteristic of
many NASA projects, there will be both in-house and contractor/ subcontractor
involvement throughout the life of the project. An environment of trust and openness
must exist between project members. For example, Near Earth Asteroid Rendezvous
(NEAR) Project used the idea of a badgeless environment to describe the working
relationship they created where all team members were encouraged to share openly.
2.3.2 Selecting the Right Members: Many interviewees pointed out that selecting both
government team members and corporate partners able and willing to work in a team
environment is a must. It is very easy to break trust and difficult to get it back.
Procedures to obtain government members and contractor selection must be well thought
out and planned from the beginning.
2.3.3 Cross-Functional Integration (Working Agreements): The idea of working
agreements for lower level teams and for the overall team as a way of focusing everyone
on the goals and boundaries has proven effective.
2.3.4 Communication (Technology/Process): Communication between team members is
a must. The project leadership must do whatever it takes to make this happen. Electronic
forms of communication seem to be effective if supported by existing equipment. Several
interviewees mentioned that the payoff of good communication was so evident that the
purchase of common equipment was a good, essential investment.
2.3.5 Co-Location: Communication on a daily basis is desired for effective cross-
functional integration, and several interviewees indicated that co-location should be a
requirement.
Day-to-Day Management
Day-to-Day Management: Ability to manage to the plan is another key to success. In a
constrained environment, there will be little opporttmity to conduct reactive management
and redirect the project.
Risk Management: Managing risk during the project is essentially staying on top of those
things identified during risk planning through the effective use of metrics. The idea
mentioned by many is being able to see things occurring as they start and initiating
mitigation activities as early as possible. The activities may be tailored to the situation by
the tea_L
Strategic Resources, Inc. (SRI)
11
NASA Fast Track Study
3.3 Oversight: Insight vs. Oversight was an idea put forward by several of the interviewees.
This means that project management must work with oversight boards to create a climate
of confidence in the team and in the project leadership. The project manager/program
manager must strive to develop the same open atmosphere for the team as well.
3.4 Continuous Improvement: Each team member is a potential source of cost and schedule
savings, and project managers must establish an environment conducive to fostering ideas
from all team members.
3.5 Reviews: As mentioned above, reviews in a Fast Track environment should be minimally
disruptive. They should address only open issues and be well planned. The idea
mentioned by Motorola regarding the use of reviews to manage the white spaces between
different activities or different teams within the project seemed to be an effective
approach. The idea of having reviews when the project is ready for them, and not at times
determined artificially outside of the project, was also emphasized.
3.6 Documentation: In keeping with the theme that time is a limited resource on Fast Track
Projects, all potentially time extending activities must be held to a minimum.
Documentation was singled out as a management tool that may needlessly consume time.
Only the documentation planned for use by the team for specific project activities, or
required to proceed to subsequent stages, should be produced.
Strategic Resources, Inc. (SRI)
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Conclusions
Successful project management within the cost and schedule constrained world of "Better, Faster,
Cheaper" requires an experienced project manager and the ability to manage to the plan. There is
tittle, if any time, for major changes in requirements or to the established plan during project
execution in this new focus for space mission science and spacecrat_ development projects.
Managers must clearly understand the structure in the Life-Cycle Development model used by
NASA and how to use this model to create a comprehensive project plan. Planning skills, along
with the ability to communicate the understanding of requirements to the ultimate customer and
project management team, are critical.
Team structure and teamwork are essential to the successful Fast Track Life Cycle Development
process. Teamwork is associated with cross-functional integration and elimination of the stove-
piping of disciplines of past approaches. A variety of disciplines must work together to be able to
shorten the development cycle. Teamwork provides the ability to achieve that compression, and
to identify and eliminate problems early, rather than late, in the project development process.
Team leadership and team management are very important for the project manager to be
successful in the Fast Track environment.
Since there is little time to recover from false starts or mid-project redirections in this time
constrained '`Better, Faster, Cheaper" management era, trust becomes very important. For trust
to exist, the fight project management team, whether in-house or contracted, must be selected and
given authority and responsibility for the project. This requires the ability of the team selected to
demonstrate from past experience that the capability to work in this environment exists, and that
the necessary and appropriate management tools are assembled for the challenges of the project.
Working closely with procurement personnel and the ability to manage the contractor selection
effort are absolute requirements.
Risk must be identified and risk mitigation planned, along with a reporting system that allows the
project management team to implement risk management. Oversight must be as least disruptive
as possible. For this reason, documentation and project reviews should only be those that are
used by the team to actively manage the project. Higher level reviews should accommodate the
project team by allowing those required reviews to fit the project team's plans and to present
status reports from the project team's management tools and metrics.
Innovation must be encouraged, both in technical and managerial approaches. For the technical
team, cost and schedule will drive the design. This does not mean that science needs to take a
back seat, but management must recognize early what good enough will be and use better as a
design margin. Simplicity and industry-standard design plus off-the-shelf must be used wherever
possible. Design-to-Cost and Design-to-Schedule must be taught as a way of life for the "Better,
Faster, Cheaper" project teanL
On the managerial side of the project, the entire team must look for opportunities to perform
activities in parallel, to help each other identify opportunities, to begin work as early as possible in
Strategic Resources, Inc. (SRI)
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each functional area, and to identify and minimize disruptive but necessary activities. In other
words, approaches such as concurrent engineering will also become a way of life and must be well
understood. Communication of information is more important than ever and innovation here can
provide significant benefits in time and cost savings as well. For this reason, meeting and review
management are also key skills for the "Better, Faster, Cheaper" project manager.
Strategic Resources, Inc. (SRI)
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Recommendations
Require and allow time for the actual project manager and team to plan at the front end of
Fast Track Projects (especially entering Phase C/D), to include Risk Management
Planning and Design-to-Cost, with the understanding of the importance of controlling
project technical and programmatic requirements throughout the life cycle.
Use the Program Commitment Agreement concept at all levels of the project as a series of
bilateral agreements, to ensure common requirement understanding and control
requirement creep.
Use metrics for each project that will measure progress and value.
Use team management and cross functional integration as a tool to achieve success.
Educate project managers in innovative techniques for managing reviews, documentation,
oversight and risk to minimize disruption in schedule constrained projects.
Provide NASA Program/Project Managers access to an educational/corporate knowledge
information system addressing issues of Fast Track Project management, available as an
on-line resource to support both project management and career development.
Strategic Resources, Inc. (SRI)
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Appendix A
NASA Program/Project Management Guide for Fast Track Projects
Provided under separate cover.
Strategic Resources, Inc. (SRI)
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Appendix B
APM-23 SSG Interview Compilations
L
IL
Proieet Interviews
1. X-CRV
2. LANDSAT
3. Earth Orbiting Satellite (EOS) (Christopher J. Scolese)
4. Explorers
5. Marshall Space Center (MSC) Interviews
a. Optical Transient Detector
b. AXAF
c. SAIL
d. Transient Pressure Test Article (TPTA)
e. STABLE
6. Advanced Rocket Motor (ASRM)
7. Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV) (Stephen C. Nunez)
8. Halogen Occultation Experiment (HALOE)
9. In Space Technology Experiment Program (INSTEP)
(Lenwood G. Clark)
10. Lidar In Space Technology Experiment (LITE) Instntments
Non-Interview Data Gatherin2
1. Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC) Senior Group Fast Track
Brainstorming Ideas
2. GSFC Junior Group Fast Track Brainstorming Ideas
3. Lewis Research Center (LeRC) Pyramid Team Pare Down
of NI-IB 7120.5
4. LeRC Clean Sheet Team
B-2
B-4
B-7
B-9
B-13
B-21
B-23
B-25
B-28
B-31
B-34
B-37
B-40
B-42
Strategic Resources, Inc. (SRI)
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L Interviews
1. X-CRV Prelect Back_ound: The X-CRV is a six-passenger liRing body reentry
vehicle that is to remain docked with the space station. In the event of a life threatening
emergency, the space station crew would board the vehicle and reenter for a parachute landing.
A) Practice Oriented: The X-CRV project will proceed through the development of a
flying prototype using civil servants for the project staff.. Research and development,
experimental, or ill-defined projects are well-suited for development by civil servants.
Operational production, and other well-defined projects are good candidates for total
delegation to contractors. Competitive procurement will be initiated for the production
phase of the X-CRV project.
The X-CRV team is housed in a small building isolated from the main buildings at Johnson
Space Center (JSC) and they use a hands-on hardware approach to development. The
manufacturing team is sitting with the design team and working issues and problems one-
on-one on a daily basis. Rapid communication occurs because everyone is collocated.
The project manager must continually communicate the importance of completing the
project as planned
B) Policy Related: Because of the sensitivity of human space flight, NASA people should
negotiate, manage, and make decisions on human space flight projects.
A big project should be built as a set of individual smaller projects working towards
accomplishment of incremental milestones. The key is to set up 'deliverables'
(performance milestones) to show progress. A core set of team members decide how to
divide up the project and build up milestones. This type of plan must be done by the
program or project team
The project philosophy is to "build things small throw them away, and move on" to the
next phase of the project.
Progressive formalization should be used to build the project plan and conduct the project.
Using progressive formalization, you minimize the amount of documentation up front and
put more emphasis on documenting as built.
ISO 9000 is important for production organizations; but, it does not apply for rapid
prototyping, Skunk Works TM type projects. Instead of written specifications and
processes, the project manager ensures the technician and designer work together to build
the project.
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C) Cultural Changes: The procurement process tends to treat all procurements the
same. A Fast Track project team should include dedicated procurement and business
personnel. As part of the team, they are dedicated to the project, not the procurement
process. They need to understand that the biggest risk is the failure of the project, not of
the procurement.
The best way to reduce cost is to understand the technical details that are required and
how much it costs to implement them. Once the technical decisions have been made,
'ignore the rules and go get it done".
D) Technology/Tools: All announcement and selection work on the X-CRV project is
done electronically. This minimiTes paperwork and gives competitors instant access to the
data they need, and the project team has instant access to contractor proposals.
Minimize the project plan. The X-CRV project plan is graphically depicted, in five stages
on a poster. The X-CRV original written project plan was a one page document with
about a dozen top level goals. It has evolved to about five pages, but is still minimal.
NASA middle managers are the "keepers of the culture". Most resistance to getting
things done smaller, faster, cheaper has occurred in middle management. The failure of
most projects is usually due to a "gap in leadership." Projects with strong
leaders----succeed; and projects without strong leaders--fail. The project manager must be
totally, personally committed to the success of the project.
E) Other Observations from Interviewee: None
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2. LANDSAT Proiect: NASA took LANDSAT over from the Air Force midway between
Pre "hminary Design Review (PDR) and Critical Design Review (CDR). As an existing contract, it
had less flexibility in terms of "new ways of doing business" than a new start program would
have. Nonetheless, significant changes to the management and implementation style of the
LANDSAT project makes it a non-traditional Goddard project.
Three management principles are: communicate, communicate, communicate. Beyond that, the
project manager's most important responsibilities are: (1) technical and programmatic
performance, and (2) staff development.
A) Practice Oriented Ideas: The original 150 CDRL items in LANDSAT were reduced
to five by asking the civil servants and the two contractors to identify the minimum
documented information needed to do the job, dropping all preconceptions for "how we
always did it."
NASA should play the role of referee, not overseer.
LANDSAT has a dedicated person to keep the Risk Management Plan relevant and risk
assessment meetings are held every two weeks among all senior managers.
There must be an Action Plan for every problem. If you've got a problem and no
recommendation, a solution can be found driven solely by cost and schedule constraints,
which you may not like.
Growing people is the most important non-project role of the manager. To avoid burnout,
the project manager must make sure each player:
• Has a job they can complete
• Gets a sense of satisfaction
• Has a means to avoid frustration
• Understands the constraints and limits, knows which are pushbacks
• Owns the problem or task, is part of its definition, isn't a sniper at meetings
• Knows the project manager's constraints and limits - what can be changed and
what can't
A good Peformance Measurement System is a must, but it has to be flexible. It should
rigidly track analysis tasks early in the program and be less rigid during implementation
and test to allow creative solutions for emerging events.
If the reporting format doesn't match your internal tracking format, keep two sets of
books: one to manage from and one to present. Don't get bogged down in awkward or
inappropriate formats. Work from one preferred format and translate to another as
needed.
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Cost models are for scholars and research. They are completely relevant to the resource
Analysis Office (RAO), but not applicable at the project level. Comparing project
estimates against the RAO is an excellent sanity check, a way to identify
misunderstandings and shortcomings, and to identify tall pole cost drivers. Detailed
historical tracking of costs from many missions is not relevant to execution of the specific
project.
B) Policy Related: The most significant constructive change management could make is
to hold individuals responsible for their own work. Reward excellence and penalize
stupidity.
Procurement rules can be changed to secure contracts faster with less formal approval at
each evaluation step, while still maintaining fair and open competition.
Teams and people need to be rewarded for completing their jobs.
A whole new Center could result from rotating the directorate-level office staff laterally
among the nine Codes, independent ofbackgrotmd, interest, or skills.
The new project management NMIs don't really apply to LANDSAT because of its mid-
project transfer to NASA; however, the NMI management principles still apply.
The travel budget must be enough to support site visits.
There is absolutely no chance for a budget increase in LANDSAT. The best way to
handle this is to allocate budget performance to responsible levels, and replace those who
can't perform to budget.
C) Cultural Change: There needs to be fewer "empires" at the Center, making track
teams function-specific with minimal people and fixed project lifetimes.
Independent Annual Reviews (lAP,) can be very productive, depending on who is on the
panel. People proud of their cleverness in finding fault will make you jump through a lot
of hoops with no value added. People who understand the project limits, who are tough
but fair, and who are interested in the mission, will provide a meaningful review.
Generally, the problem with selling new ideas and getting innovations approved is not with
senior management anyway, but with all the layers in between. A clever manager can brief
red and yellow issues with complete disclosure, adhering absolutely to the Monthly Status
report (MSK) style and content, yet never really addressing the project issues that affect
mission success. It is very hard to be forthright in this kind of review environment.
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D) TeclmologT/Tools: It would be valuable to set up a structure to capture lessons
learned from all projects to learn what works, what doesn't, and the reasons why. Besides
providing practical advice and insight, this would also present a "report card" on project
managers, so their performance could be seen by the general staff in terms of applied
management abilities, not just word of mouth and formal newsletter articles.
Home pages and electronic data transfer are tools that allow team members to
communicate and update the general knowledge pool quickly and accurately, as long as
they don't take a lot of resources to set up and maintain.
E) Other Observations: In terms of new Fast Track thinking, new approaches and ideas
won't come out of traditional hierarchies and empires. Radically stressing the
organization, maybe even by moving key people across directorate boundaries, could
shake out inefficiencies and result in new ideas.
The lack of constructive stress makes it too easy to rely on old solutions (Le., more
people, more money) and too difficult to recognize the real problems and to see new
solutions. Old solutions are usually not valid in today's environment; new insights can
best be gained from challenging the norms.
If Fast Track means making rapid progress, then the existing obstacles are the
procurement rules, documentation, and contractor interfaces. Here are three ways to Fast
Track:
• Run a minimally-staffed project (i.e., four heads and a fixed-price, hands-off
contract).
Partner with the contractor - exclude government oversight. Rely on sharing
the workload where one side does specific tasks for the other in a role like a
subcontractor, with task definition, schedule, completeness criteria, etc.,
defining the task envelope. Don't allow duplication of work.
Put a small, focused staffon a short (three-year) mission. The project manager
decides how it will be staffed even if the total headoount is predefined by the
Directorate, (Le., the Project Manager decides on the evolving need for project
support, software manager, Deputy Project Manager, Resources (D/PMR),
Integration and Test (I&T) and all other roles).
If the budget doesn't support the mission, make it clear to management what you can do
for the budget - accepting $100 million to push a rope will end up with an stationary rope
and all the money spent.
Strategic Resources, Inc. (SRI)
B-6
NASA Fast Track Study
3. Earth OrbitingSatellite(EOS): The EOS Ante Meridian (AM) Project has
proceeded through all project life cycle phases, (i.e., A, B, C/D) but has done so within a number
ofditferent Projects and Programs. The Life Cycle Cost of EOS AM, which was originally set at
$2 billion, was reduced twice during Phase C; first to $1.3 billion and later to $1 billion.
Originally, the EOS AM Project was expected to be an Integration and Test (I&T) Project,
receiving a spacecraft bus from the Space Station Work Package C Polar Orbiting Platform
Project, instnmaents from the EOS Instruments Project, and a ground system from the Earth
Science Data and Information System (ESDIS) Project.
The launch vehicle was not determined until early 1995, around Critical Design Review (CDR),
and resulted in significant additional cost due to carrying the flexibility to fly on a number of
different launch vehicles all the way to CDR, Additionally, mergers/restructuring of the
spacecraft contractor, a major instrument contractor, and the solar array contractor caused
substantial problems for the project. These included loss of key technical personnel, changes in
accounting systems, rate increases and government payment of Restructuring Fee Agreements.
A) Practice Oriented Ideas: A project plan for the EOS AM Project was written and
approved, but not until long after the project had started. In this case, it might have been
better to use the Phase B work, culminating in the Preliminary Design Review (PDR), to
replace the project plan. Documentation requirements for the Prime Contractor, LMMS,
were reduced to approximately 100 CDRLs, with only ten requiring government approval;
a decrease of more than 800 CDKLs.
Two key goals of the risk management activities were:
(1) To significantly reduce the amount of new design hardware in the
program, replacing much of it with heritage hardware from other
programs.
(2) To integrate civil servants into the IFFs giving the government
better insight into EOS AM- 1 development.
A Performance Measurement System is probably most useful for initial planning,
identifying forgotten items, and replanning at the end of CDR. In a development program
the linkage between cost, schedule and performance is difficult to predict a priori;
however, as copies are produced, a valid PMS with strong coupling between cost,
schedule and performance is possible and would be a useful tool. Probably the most
significant lesson learned is to not duplicate work. Every task should be done once, by
whoever is most appropriate to do it (whether government or contractor) with
participation by all appropriate personnel Nothing should be undertaken from scratch
unless it is specifically necessary to achieve mission objectives. Use heritage designs
wherever they will achieve mission objectives, rather than going to new designs. New
Strategic Resources, Inc. (SRI)
B-7
NASA Fast Track Study
design efforts which typically increase cost and risk should be pursued to meet mission of
programmatic goals.
B) Policy Related Comments: Eliminate the Program Operating Plan (POP) review and
use the Independent Annual Review (IAR) to replace it, or combine the two reviews.
A massive three day PDR or CDR does not add value to the project. For reviewers to be
helpful, they should be involved in the subsystem PDKs and CDRs, working with the
technical team to improve the designs.
The system-level PDR and CDR should be more of a summary review, with most of the
issues worked out with the review team before hand. The Center Flight Assurance
Directorate, refused to structure the EOS AM-1 reviews in this manner, although they
have subsequently changed to this structure for LANDSAT 7 and other missions.
NASA needs an exemption or flexa'bility t_om the FAR to respond to the Research and
Development (R&D) nature of our activities. Often it is desirable to accomplish tasks in a
more streamlined fashion, or by forging partnerships with industry and academia or
between companies.
NASA should pursue Phase B/C/D efforts that allow the science team, industry and
government to develop an early understanding of the goals, risks and methodologies to
accomplish the mission. This will reduce the risk and time required for detailed design and
build. The NASA procurement system should support this type of an activity.
C) Cultural Changes: A management structure based on the use of Integrated Product
Teams (IPT) comprised of both civil servants and industry partners in a specific discipline,
t_equently a specific spacecraft subsystem, is needed. The government gains and
maintains insight into contractor efforts through normal IPT interactions by incorporating
civil servants and contractors into a single project team
D) Technology/Tools Recommended: Use early breadboards and technology
demonstrations, and proper incorporation of computer models and analyses. Engineering
models can reduce risk, but only if original designers and manufacturing team remain.
E) Other Observations: Having worked both the DoD and NASA side, it is clear that
NASA works in a more efficient manner and typically employs more aggressive
technology.
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4. Explorers: Small Explorers (SMEX) was managed out of Code 700, Engine_ing
Directorate and Medium Explorers (MIDEX) was managed by Code 400, Flight Projects
Directorate. Each have a very small project office with all discipline support, including system
engineering, matrixed from the appropriate directorates. MIDEX has a project office with a
mission manager and, if the instrument is procured outside the Center, an instrument manager for
each mission that falls under MIDEX. The project office provides overhead functions,
Configuration Management, office support, etc., for each of its missions. Matrixed personnel are
appointed by their home organization and selected by the skills needed for the project.
Each mission has internal meetings as needed with a monthly report provided to the Project
Manager. SMEX had informal weekly reports to the Program Manager at Headquarters until the
latest organization of Headquarters was established. Reporting to Code 400 for MIDEX is
standard at the Center. Within the project, most communication is kept informal.
A) Practice Oriented Ideas: A project plan has no value for these missions. The proposal
responses to the Announcement of Opportunity (AO) have become, in effect, the project
plan in combination with the information in the PDR and the NAR. It was found on the
first two small explorer missions that the project plan was not useful and, in fact, was
signed after the launch, or not at all. A project plan was never written for the third
mission. The consensus was that writing a formal project plan for these small missions
was a waste of time and the same purpose could be served by using the information in the
proposal, the Preliminary Design Review (PDR) and the Non-Advocate Review (NAR).
Therefore, a project plan was considered bad for Fast Track Projects.
• Solar, Anomalous and Magnetospheric Particle Explorer (SAMPEX) - Project
plan signed off one month after launch
• Fast Auroral Snapshot Explorer (FAST) - Project plan never signed off
• Sub Millimeter Wave Astronomy Satellite (SWAS) - No project plan
No pre-Phase A or Phase A studies. The process of developing the proposal could be
considered the equivalent of a Phase A study, with the project immediately entering Phase
B upon proposal selection. Mission performance requirements were developed from
Level One requirements during the definition phase reflected in the PDK. Metrics are in
the form of technical accomplishments, schedule, and cost. A fidl Peformance
Measurement System is not used. In lieu of a fidl formal performance measurement
system, key parameters were chosen for performance measurement assessment. As this
saves time and money, is good for Fast Track Projects.
Areas of risk are identified prior to Phase C/D, and watched closely throughout Phase
C/D. Cost tradeoffs are done continuously and contingencies are created throughout
Phase B. By the end of Phase B, the mission has been descoped as far as it can and should
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B-9
NASA Fast Track Study
be. Formal descope plans are not necessary or valuable, as there isn't time or money to
do deseoping in Phase C/D in fast, low cost missions.
Firm funding commitments are obtained prior to starting the project. Procurement is
completed using the AO process. Contracts are cost reimbursable with cost capped
missions. Mission requirements are defined by performance, but are not totally divorced
from technologies.
The project was not guided by NMI 7120. The documentation and deliverables in the
NMI were considered too burdensome for a small project. Specific items, such as the
timing of the end of Phase B, the funding profile, and some of the reviews, were selected
and followed if appropriate for the project. Project reviews added value, particularly in
getting the team together at key points in the development process.
Share the wisdom. A Fast Track Project should build a team as early as possible to effect
tradeoffs. They should have early agreements on how to work as a team. At the start,
define the project and mission design, have a plan to match the budget, then "go for it."
Early agreements are needed for deciding how to measure performance.
Instruments require special attention. Principle Investigators (PI) generally don't have the
full infrastructure that should be provided to them. Control gates should be the
PDR/NAR followed by a running gate with a cost cap. If the project is expected to
exceed the cost cap, the project manager and PI's should immediately see the Associate
Administrator (AA).
Barriers were overcome by working one-on-one with other Organizations/Directorates.
This has proven to be a long and sometimes painful process. For example, problems with
Flight Assurance took three years to resolve.
B) Policy Related Comments: As currently conducted, independent reviews don't have
value added of inside and outside people in key areas of expertise of the project. Having
input into the selection of a mix would improve the independent reviews.
Regarding management controls by the Center, action items from the institution take away
from the streamlined process and use up resources, particularly stafftime, that is needed
elsewhere.
C) Cultural Changes: Most barriers are due to the Center. For example, the project
manager feels that it is part of his/her job to respond to changes made by Headquarters,
and therefore, does not consider them to be barriers. Barriers have typically been in the
areas of procurement, review process, flight assurance, the cost, and sometimes lack of
engineering support. The environment at the Center has been geared towards large
projects and the tendency is to throw large numbers of people at a project and/or
problems.
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Overcoming barriers is very specific to the people the project deals with, and the
resolutions agreed to by those people are not always supported by their home
organization. Small teams with creative ideas are often shot down by their own
organizations. A Fast Track Project is different from other projects by its lack of
bureaucracy, its approach, and its willingness to be flexible.
D) Technology/Tools Recommended: Use paperless Configuration Management (CM)
with all documents on the Web. The standard CM process is quite involved with large
databases of changes to documents, etc., a great deal of paper required to be filled out,
and a long time is required to get changes approved through formal boards. This generally
requires at least one full time person to manage the effort. The recommendation is to keep
all documents in a location accessible through networks of the Interact, and to handle
change control through electronic means.
E) Other Observations: Full Cost Accounting would not really change the way the
project is managed. It would, however, provide more visibility as to where the money is
spent, particularly for in-house hardware. The project would also pay closer attention to
overhead functions.
The least successful experience was dealing with the technology on SMEX. New
technology and its infusion needs to be visible, with a well understood agreement on its
status. It should be managed separately and kept highly visible.
The most successful part of the project was that missions were ready on time and within
cost. People had a tendency to overwork. Since Explorers are a continuing line,
individuals could endure perhaps two missions, but not a third. Recommendations to
resolve this include:
• Manage time carefully from the beginning of the project and streamlined
processes from the start.
• Do not keep a rolling wave of undone work moving into Integration and Test
(I&T).
• Be willing to pay overtime early, as the hours are expended, then save time
later on.
• Attain depth in understanding the mission as early as possible.
The most innovative aspects were the architecture of the technologies that simplified the
design and were more cost effective.
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The combination of training and experience have been very valuable. The Project
Manager completed a large amount of formal training in addition to experience gained at
GSFC. The additional training was considered valuable for conducting a Fast Track
Project.
Strategic Resources, Inc. (SRI)
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5. Marshall Space Center (MSC) Interviews
a) Optical Transient Detector (OTD): The OTD payload was originally scheduled as a
six month development project with a firm $4.9 million budget and classified as a Class C payload
but was Class D referenced. The OTD slipped to nine months, however, estimates show it should
have been a 12 month project. The project plan stated that the payload had an up to 65 percent
probability of failure.
A) Practice Oriented Ideas: OTD employed some Quality support, but no receiving
inspections. OTD used Project software to develop logic schedule diagrams and it used
critical path methodology. Weekly scheduled reviews were conducted which, eventually,
became daily tag-ups.
Two major reviews were conducted:
• Pre-environmental- considered worthwhile
• Pre-ship - not considered to be value-added
System level specifications were used, but, in retrospect, specifications should have flowed
down to the box level. There was no formal tracking of specification verification, and
only Principle Investigator (PI) acceptance of payload performance. OTD used unreleased
drawings as it was felt that formal Configuration Management/Verification was not
needed for building one of a kind. There was formal approval of the project plan by the
Center and NASA Headquarters.
There is a need for coherent parts procurement and recommend _rongly that a dedicated
materials acquisition specialist track all parts procurements.
B) Policy Related Comments: Recommend eliminating low level procurement requests.
Government credit cards should allow for increased spending limits to expedite small
project-related procurements. Surge capacity is critical. It is felt that Full Cost
Accounting will constrain surge capacity ability.
C) Cultural Changes: The chief engineer role is absolutely critical to motivate the S&E
troops to get the job done.
D) Technology/Tools Recommended: None
E) Other Observations: None
Strategic Resources, Inc. (SRI)
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_[SC Interviews (cont.)
b) AXAF: The AXAF project is cost-driven with recognized and accepted increased risks.
The program has few equipment spares, an avionics engineering breadboard, and the protoflight
model which is being flown. Project cost is $750 million with an operational life expectancy
between five and ten years. The project employs about 200 FTEs in the S&E labs and about 500
FTEs overall, including TRW, Kodak, Ball Aerospace, MIT and SAO.
The project has faced numerous reviews with review teams checking review teams. While there is
a need for external oversight, teams need to keep the same people from start to finish to minimiTe
the learning curve and enhance the ability to streamline reviews.
A) Practice Oriented Ideas: Internal reviews at the Center that used Earned Value and
were led by the Comptroller's Office were considered helpful.
The project plans were not really used other than to get initial commitment, to serve as an
audit trail, and to allow project people to initially get their arms around the project.
Tracking and scheduling were performed by TRW using monthly scheduling and tracking
teleconferences.
While one materials acquisition specialist was used at TRW to track all procurements,
another dedicated specialist is recommended to procure/track the EEE parts.
Requirements must be defined up front. AXAF baselined requirements at the
SRR allowing requirements to change only in response to problems.
The project office maintained configuration control with support from SAIL and tried to
resolve issues below the CCB level.
Used Center Quality Personnel and placed them at the prime contractor site.
No interface with Headquarters except for formal reviews. The Progrmn Management
Council (PMC) is perceived to add to the overhead burden or, at minimum, add another
layer with which to deal.
Risk assessment should be performed in the project office and driven by fiscal reserves
constraints, resulting in risk ratings ofhigh-medittm-low and assigned dollar values.
Audits are performed every six months for every subsystem and Center personnel are
invited to observe. These audits provide a wealth of information for Center people.
B) Policy Related Comments: None
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C) Cultural Changes: Chief Engineer functions could be in the project office itselt_ not
worrying about whether someone is assigned to S&E Directorate or Project Office.
Cost of program was driven by political issues and decisions that forced the use of the
Shuttle as the launch vehicle.
Need dedicated S&E personnel on the project who are co-located and have accountability
regarding the end product.
D) Technology/Tools Recommended: None
E) Other Observations: Lesson learned is not to use universities for science instrument
development.
It is critical to have a strong systems engineer and chief engineer with key people
integrated on the team.
Most successful aspects of the project dealt with the competence of the prime, the
reviews, international agreements/contracts, and tracking.
Least successful aspects dealt with schedule variances caused by university involvement.
Strategic Resources, Inc. (SRI)
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MSC Interviews (cont.)
c) Systems Analysis and Integration Laboratory (SAIL): SAIL handles requirement's
definition, Configuration Management, Systems Engineering, etc., for all Center projects. SAIL
is working with Preliminary Design (PD) Office (Program Development Directorate) to work the
requirements up front. When PD starts work on a new concept/project, SAIL is invited to attend
meetings early on. This really helps to work things on a system level, including requirements.
However, a lot of the PD concepts never work out for whatever reasons (political, funding, etc.)
and cause a manpower drain for SAIL.
A) Practice Oriented Ideas: Many projects fail to identify the requirements up front
(especially in-house projects), so people just start designing with requirements as an
afterthought. Need better Systems Engineering and up front stafl]oading. Need to
strengthen the up front planning and development of a valid schedule.
Need to allow more flexibility in Configuration Management. Advocate the Responsible
Equipment Engineers (REE) role of cradle to grave responsibility.
B) Policy Related Comments: Full Cost Accounting will make matters worse in regard to
Systems Engineering and up front staffloading; people will be assigned only as they are
viewed as adding value to the project.
Each project must have clearly defined systems integration responsibilities. There is now a
push for Design Certifications Reviews (DCRs) which seems to be mmther layer of
overhead.
C) Cultural Changes: There is a general problem of declaring when reviews will be
conducted and then executing the review regardless of whether the team is ready or not.
Responsibility and accountability for project success (or some portion of the project) is
often delegated without the authority to carry it out. There is also a tendency to start
projects without knowing really what is wanted.
There must be communication between laboratories; especially designers with the avionics
and propulsion personnel.
D) Technology/Tools Recommended: None
E) Other Observations: None
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MSC Interviews (cont.)
d) Transient Pressure Test Article (TPTA) Faeili_: The TPTA Facility Fast Track
Project began in January 1987 and ran nine months at an approximate cost of $39 million with up
to 600 personnel and 29 companies plus vendors. USBI performed all procurements. The project
used dedicated co-located Quality personnel. A standard six day workweek was used with work
on Sundays as well. Cost was not a driver since the objective was to get the Shuttle returned to
flight. Requirements definition and facility design were worked concurrently. Critical design
drivers included access and serviceability.
Industrial safety should have been brought in earlier. All design reviews (TRRs, PD1L CDR)
were informal and only action items. Other than weekly briefings to the Center Director, no
outside briefings were conducted. The project enjoyed top priority status throughout the nine
month period.
A) Practice Oriented: The Center Configuration Management system was employed for
the project. All Center personnel were dedicated full-time to the project and were co-
located. There was no formal project management plan. The project's own fidl-time
administrative officer was key to the team
The project often worked to red-lined drawings. They held weekly and sometimes twice-
weekly tag-ups that were usually oral discussions with team leaders.
There was significant customer involvement from the beginning which was sometimes
difficult, but critical for project success.
B) Policy Related Comments: People need to be assigned to the project full-time, rather
than part-time, if the project lasts more than a few months. The personnel should be co-
located.
C) Cultural Changes: Center supervisors need to be willing to give up people for short
range projects and still ensure that their people get credit for their work.
NASA Barriers include:
• NASA Matrix structure (people detailed to project vs. being assigned full-time)
• NASA Site Security had to get a guard out to the compound each time someone
had to go in or out on Saturdays which impacted morale and productivity.
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• Communications problems with various parts of the contractor organization.
• Management oversight (need mlnim.m management involvement).
D) Technology/Tools Recommended: None
E) Other Observations: None
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MSC Interviews (cont.)
e) STABLE: No background information available.
A) Practice Oriented Ideas:
• Total communication.
• Timely decisions.
• Bring all disciplines on board at beginning and describe tasks and schedule.
B) Policy Related Comments:
• No creep in basic requirements.
• Create only the documents required to verify integrity and safety.
• Limit reviews to those absolutely necessary; STABLE had only PDR with no
RIDs and only action items; every meeting was normally a technical review less
than one hour weekly but, sometimes up to three times a week.
• CCB drawing system streamlined by review/signing meetings (one day
turnaround).
• Credit card purchases essential.
C) Cultural Changes:
• Team dedication to end product.
• Technical respect required.
• Must have management priority.
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D)
E)
• Must have a realistic schedule (originally four months allotted was too short;
actually was a nine month project).
• The Fast Track approach needs to be embraced by all Center personnel
Technology/Tools Recommended: None
Other Observations: None
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6. Advanced Solid Rocket Motor (ASRM): ASRM was a Shuttle project canceled by
Congress in late 1993. The Center's responsa'bilities for ASRM were limited to the
design/construction of the test stand, Data Acquisition and Control System (DACS), test stand
activation, and motor testing. Overall project responsibilities resided at another Center. The
ASRM project is a typical example of a large NASA project that followed the dictates of NMI
7120.4 and NHB 7120.5 with all the resulting phases, reviews, and reporting requirements. It
should be noted that the project was canceled during Phase D, Development, prior to entering
Phase E, Operations.
A) Practice Oriented Ideas: Maintaining an accurate cost tracking system is imperative to a
successful project.
Don't micro-manage. Projects Management should be delegated, and budgeted at the lowest
practical level with managers held accountable.
A key component to a successful cost tracking system is a strong resource control manager.
The project manager is primarily involved in the technical aspects, schedules and high level
resource control of a project. The day-to-day cost functions should be delegated to resource
control personnel to allow the project manager to concentrate on the technical and schedule
aspects of the project.
A strong project team is one that is small, co-located and dedicated to the project. Co-
location results in improved team coordination, communication, and decreased distraction
_om the institution.
Environmental permitting processes are di_cult and drawn out. Adequate planning is
imperative to ensure schedule impacts are minimized.
The Earned Value of a sub-contractor must be verified (failure to do so on ASRM resulted in
a cost overrun on the Data Acquisition and Control System (DACS)).
Match contractor capability to the job. Center had a high-technology aerospace company in
charge of brick and mortar construction which led to high cost forecast. NASA made the
decision to cancel the construction part of the contract, brought the construction contract in-
house, and were able to bring the construction back in line for both cost and schedule.
B) Policy Related Comments: As a Space Shuttle Project, ASRM followed all the
requirements outlined in the 7120 series of instructions and handbooks. The National Space
Transportation System (NSTS) 07700 series of controls forces a tremendous amount of paper
on the systen_
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C) C3xlmral Changes: A specific NASA barrier that interferes is the "mind set" or "¢ultuxe"
of middle level NASA managers that are loyal to the infrastructure requirements with resulting
reporting and management requirements. This culture drives a large infi'astructure that is self-
sustaining and serf-justifying.
D)
E)
Technology/Tools Recommended: None
Other Observations:
Non-NASA barriers included:
• Environmental Permitting
• Restricted Air-Space Identification
• Congressional Budgetary Processes
Strategic Resources, Inc. (SRI)
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7. Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV): The EELV is a medium to heavy
payload launch vehicle to replace the Delta, Atlas and Titan launchers. It is a DoD created
program to fulfill the nation's need for a lower-cost, more reliable space launch systenl One of
the potential contractors for EELV is proposing to use the Space Shuttle Main Engine (SSME)
as the engine for the EELV. The SSME would then jettison during flight, parachute for water
recovery, be refurbished and re-used for another launch. The Center's participation, through a
Space Act Reimbursable Agreement with Boeing, is to conduct a SSME drop test and recovery.
Following recovery, the SSME will be test fired.
A) Practice Oriented Ideas: Small co-located teams ensure effective communication and
minimization of outside distractions. Team members must be self-motivated, dedicated,
and committed to the project. Matrix management of the team allows the project manager
to adjust manpower levels to meet the activities' peaks and valleys. A strong project
manager leads by example. It is hard to expect team members to put in extra hours if the
project manager doesn't. Additionally, people need to be allowed to do their jobs, they do
not need micro-management. Let people know what is expected and what they are
responsible for and hold them accountable for results. The project manager should have
final authority in the selection of the team.
If the project team does not have resource control assistance, the project manager should
maintain close contact with the customer, support contractors and Comptroller's Office to
ensure costs are contained.
Small projects should use a simplified project plan that includes the purpose, scheduling,
and issues/concerns. Requirements should be maintained in the Project Requirements
Document (PRD).
B) Policy Related Comments: Under Full Cost Accounting, the proposed overhead rates
applied to civil servants both for Headquarters' overhead and local site's overhead rates,
may exceed the cost of using a contractor. In this case, project managers may choose to
spend scarce project dollars on contractors which could have the opposite effect on
NASA's stated goal of maintaining the core capability, knowledge and experience within
NASA.
C) Cultural Changes: A project manager must be careful concerning the issue of using a
contractor versus government personnel It is felt that, as a general rule contractors will
comply with the project manager's directions, while government personnel are more likely
to challenge or question the project manager's decisions. This makes it imperative that the
contractor team members should be strong individuals that are equal members of the team,
willing to voice their opinions.
Strategic Resources, Inc. (SRI)
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The NASA procurement system is a slow to react, bureaucratic system with many gates,
statusing, and reporting requirements. It is much faster to have the contractor do
procurements and, many times, a contractor is an expediter whose sole fimction is to make
sure the procurement is completed and the product delivered when needed.
The cost reporting system does not adequately status for short projects. Data is at least a
week old and may be as much as a month old.
The biggest barrier to project management, is statusing to senior management. NASA
management needs to be more proactive in finding out what goes on and come to where
the action is.
D) Technology/Tools Recommended: None
E) Other Observations: A Fast Track Project is defined by time flame and not cost. It is
more an aspect of time with respect to complexity and cost is not a factor.
Strategic Resources, Inc. (SRI)
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8. Halogen Occultation Experiment {HALOE): The HALOE project was one of ten
instruments on the Upper Atmosphere Research Satellite (UARS) Platform hunched in
September 1991. HALOE was designed to take polar (northern) region measurements during
two consecutive winter seasons. R was required to operate on orbit for a minimum of two years.
UARS was originally designed as a recoverable platform to operate two years on an orbit
operational lifetime and contained international experiments. Total cost for the UARS mission
was approximately $700 million. The HALOE life cycle schedule was approximately 20 years
from concept to launch.
Technical performance was treated as the number one risk factor required to meet technical
performance at the 100 percent level. Once UARS was identified as the platform then the
HALOE project schedule was fixed and was non-negotiable. Resources were manager
(controlled) to ensure schedule did not slip. Schedule was the driving metric, and could not slip
at any cost.
The HALOE project was originally under contract to TRW, but was brought in-house about eight
years prior to launch and reworked. The Systems Engineering Division of the Systems
Engineering and Operations Directorate provided the project management function.
A) Practice Oriented Ideas: NASA needs to pay more time and attention to the details of
system integration and system testing as part of the planning done during early Phase A.
A NASA integration team was sent to the General Electric Astro
Division in Heightstown, NJ during spacecrat_ integration.
A standup briefing was held between all personnel of the changing shifts;
line workers did most of the talking during the standup briefings.
Clear lines of authority existed, no ambiguity of responsibility.
Leadership was provided, there was no management by consensus. (This
was helpful to this project and would probably be critical to a Fast Track
Project).
To obtain key team personnel, Branch approval was required for a person
within the same Division and Group Director approval was required if'the
desired person was in a different Division.
Strategic Resources, Inc. (SRI)
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• Project Status reporting requirements:
• Weekly status reports on the formal Action kem list
• Monthly reports to the Group Director
• Quarterly Center Director's management meeting
HALOE had a written and approved project plan. (This was helpful
to this project and would probably be critical to a Fast Track
Project).
A formal process operated out of the Project Office was used to
maintain configuration control. Several of the fabrication technicians a
lso served as QA technicians. (Helpful to this project).
Funding and workforce profiles were re-baselined almost annually. The
workforce profile tended to follow the funding profile.
• No form of official risk management was performed.
Launch was controlled by KSC and/or JSC. The instrument due date was
controlled by the Integration Manager at General Electric.
Daily morning stand up information exchanges were very
useful/successful.
Having a written contingency plan for the failure event during
Thermal Vac testing was very successful.
More early discussion and detailed planning of the integration and test
activities would enhance Fast Track management, and reduce the amount
of resources expanded during this time frame.
B) Policy Related Comments: Under Full Cost Accounting, the total life cycle cost of the
project (instrument only) would be about the same.
Recommend no Preshipment Readiness Review (PSRR) for a Fast Track Project. The PSSR
occurs too late in the development to really help identify problems.
C) Cultural Changes: A good project manager has a hard time returning to the line
organization. They become used to the intensity of project work, exercising authority and life
at a faster speed.
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The Integrated Management Team (IMT) was viewed as ineffective. Firm lines of authority
are required to expedite the decision process. (This is critical to a Fast Track Project).
This instrument was built in the era where science requirement creep was expected. If
anything, scope was added not subtracted.
The current relation between NASA and space platforms is in the process of changing just like
the past relationship between NASA and sounding rockets. A fundamental shift is occurring
in the nature of how NASA does space platforms.
D) Technology/Tools Recommended: None were prevalent at the time HALOE was built.
E) Other Observations: HALOE was driven by science requirements, however due to the
extremely long life-time of the project from original concept to flight a lot of technology
driven requirements crept into the mission.
In-house managers (two Deputy Project Managers and two Technical Project Engineers) were
replaced due to advancement. No one was removed due to incompetence.
Strategic Resources, Inc. (SRI)
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9. In Space Technology Experiment Proffram (INSTEPS: Code X Small Flight
Experiments started in 1988. One hundred ninety were proposed to the Announcement of
Opportunity (AO). Thirty experiments were funded for Phase A ($50-100K), six for Phase B,
and four advanced to Phase C/D and flew in space. The total life cycle cost of the project was
approximately $5 million and the total life cycle schedule was 12 months.
Risk was limited to the individual projects. There was not a written and approved project plan
due to the small size of the project. The project lost funding in the last year.
A) Practice Oriented Ideas:
• Quarterly written reports to Headquarters.
• Agency control gates: Request for Proposal (RFP), AO, Non-Advocate
Review (NAR), Flight Experiment Board (FEB), Formal Annual Review.
• Pre-phase A was done on Center funding; Headquarters funded Phase A study.
• Mission Performance Requirements were developed from '_ears of
experience."
• Configuration control managed by individual projects.
• Project status and progress tracked by simple schedule, Assessment by Project
Manager's feeling on cost and expense.
• A barchart of resources was used as a periodic report of costs and fimding.
Funding profile was a classic ramp-up over two to three years for Phase B.
Workforce profile was uncontrolled; management did not know what labor
was needed.
• Procurement process began when funding was received from Headquarters at
the end of Phase/k
• Recommend working with one procurement person for a general standard
contract.
• Technical Division at Center shared approximately $3 million of the $5 million
total cost.
• If using Graduate Students, quality and quantity ofworkforce is variable.
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Fast Track management should get the right people (discipline and experience)
around a table to brainstorm before initiating design, including technical input,
as they know what has worked in the past.
B) Policy Related:
• May have driven some projects over cost if Full Cost Accounting was used.
A realistic schedule to actually build the project should drive the location of
reviews for a Fast Track Project. Magnitude of work should drive the
schedule.
Recommended project control gates for a Fast Track Project; NAIL chaired
by Headquarters, System Requirement Review, and some Design Reviews.
Reviews force a project to stand up and explain all details and to explain why
internal decisions were made. The Systems Requirement. Review is the real
key review. There needs to be a methodical process to decompose goals and
objectives into specifications.
C) Cultural Changes: Overhead of a shuttle or space station (MIR) experiment not well
thought out in the planning phase. Upfront planning is essential for Fast Track Projects.
International projects may be impacted by language barriers and require careful planning.
Finding a Project Manager and Principle Investigator (PM/PI) who wanted the job is a
barrier. Keep pushing on upper-level Center management to reject proposal if no people
are available. Need to ensure that PM's and PI's knowledge, skills, abilities and expertise
match the project's goals and objectives.
D) Technology/Tools Recommended: None
E) Other Observations:
• Most projects were US; concerned about spending US dollars to fund technical
development overseas.
• The most challenging part of the project was finding a competent project
manager at Headquarters to sponsor.
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• Most projects that flew were suocessfuL
• Most significant lessons learned: make processes orderly with reasonable
schedules; not too short and not too long (between phases).
• Most innovative practices: not too rigorous; minimal paperwork; possible
because of low cost ($1 million to $5 million).
Strategic Resources, Inc. (SRI)
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I0. Lidar In-Space Technology Experiment (]Lite Instrument): A totally in-house project
with mostly civil servant workforce with local contract support. Project was shuttle space
experiments with a $25 million Research and Development (R&D) budget, (including civil
servant personnel funding). The total life cycle was ten years and started in January 1985. Post
flight test was in January 1995.
The project management function was performed by the Lite Project Office for five years, moved
to project development for four years; then the project development was reorganized into five
project offices.
Project success was defined by 45 hours Light Direction and Ranging (Lidar) data over many of
different atmospheric conditions (no metric on data quality).
A) Practice Oriented Ideas:
• A written and approved project plan was developed.
• Approval for key personnel was up to Flight Electronic Division (FED) if
within own line or up to Director Level if within Directorate.
• Project Status and Reporting requirements:
• Weekly staffmeetings
• Monthly Mission Information Control (MIC) [no longer used].
• Reporting driven by Center Director.
• Did not use IFFs used classic hierarchy. Project Manager (PM), Assistant
Project Manager (APM), and IM were co-located.
• Center level control gates were not formal. Went through Center Director.
• Agency level control gates: a few presentations in late 1985 and CDR at
Center in January 1986 with visit by Headquarters and approval for year two.
Center sent representative to Headquarters on task to generate job for Center
on laser development. Feasibility study conducted by NASA personnel from
January 1984 to January 1985.
• No formal process to develop Mission Performance Requirements.
Strategic Resources, Inc. (SRI)
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A Product Assurance Plan called for configuration control to start at
instrument integration. Latitude given on eleotronics design up to insmmaent
integration.
• No formal metrics were established. Weekly status staff meeting fostered
environment of open communication where it was okay to state problems.
• Project was re-baselined annually due to fluctuations in funding source. Code
at Headquarters would fund what was left in budget.
• Risk management was not formally addressed.
• Funding profile changed annually. Workforce profile was independent of
funding profile.
* Wrote Laser SOW and Center issued RFP to attract potential mission partners.
Contract was a cost plus fee and Center managed.
• Design requirements: bottom up to build best Lidar possible for available
funding. Should have a technology demonstration.
B) Policy Related Comments:
Near the end of 1993, Mr. Dan Goldin, NASA Administration, imposed
Independent External Independent Readiness Review (EIRR). This was a
waste of time as it came too late in the project (three months prior to launch).
Review panel had no authority.
• Keep the Critical Design Review (CDR), Preliminary Design Review (PDR),
Flight Readiness Review (FRR); but not the E1R1L
Recommended project control gates for a Fast Track Project: Conceptual
Design Review (CODR), PD1L CD1L Preshipment Readiness Review (PSRR),
FRR
C) Cultural Changes:
Under Full Cost Accounting, approximately $50 million for Full Time
Equivalent (FTE) over ten years and $25 million Research and Development
(R&D) funds for instrument development.
• Funding was to be as Level of Effort (LOE), but actual funding varied as
project expanded from five to ten years.
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• Consumed a lot of time and people to prepare and do reviews when they
should have been training for operations.
• Procurement is a problem Barrier is education of procurement people that
space flight parts are not going to be procured the same way as office supplies
are; lots of sole source buy.
• Have to live with barriers and work the problem (Space Tec and other
Centers); contractor taking direction from civil servant at Center and incurring
cost that project office did not budget.
D) Technology/Tools Recommended: None
E) Other Observations:
• Project was not process oriented.
• Most important lessons learned from experience with this project:
• Entire management was school of hard knocks, and no failure resulted
in loss of career potential
• A Fast Track Project must be strictly focused and use readily available
technology; Instrument and Spacecraft, no technical development.
• Recommend a ,not to break" 36 month development Authority to Proceed
(ATP) to hunch for full mission; part of mission for less time.
• If really looking to do Fast Track Projects, PM must have full authority and
resources; PM needs autonomy to do job; if PM fails, fire PM, don't try to
direct the work; and be receptive to request for problem/resolution
suggestions.
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IL Non-Interview Data Gathering
1. Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC) Senior Group Fast Track Brainstorming
Ideas: This is not an interview, but a summary of a Senior Project Manager Group
Brainstorming session conducted July 17, 1996. The group was asked to brainstorm new ideas
on Fast track Project management.
A) Practice Oriented Suggestions:
The Project Organization:
• Should be co-located, a skilled team
• Centralized support office
• Project tailors activities to the mission
Risk Management Approaches:
• Project delivers a risk plan
• Same team does similar missions (product line)
• Low technology requirements
Engineering:
• Choose from a Component Supermarket (Off-the-SheLf)
• Use System Engineers (SE) as architects
• Must provide an early bridge with customer
• Do Concurrent Engineering
Resources:
• Partnering arrangements
• Reinvestment
• Encourage unsolicited proposals
Status Reporting: Limit to chosen metrics
Strategic Resources, Inc. (SRI)
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B) Policy Related Suggestions:
Project Organization:
• Multi-faceted, cross-trained
• Cycle or rotate "doers and watchers"
• Report to a single management level
• Project "contact" with agency
• Put trades in project plan
Risk Management:
• Portfolio of risk (low & high)
• Up front definition of success
• Project does Quality Assurance (QA) oversight
• Minimize Center requirements
• High level acceptance of failure
• Allow for trades
• No added requirements
Engineering: None suggested
Resources:
• Total up front, timeless dollars
s No Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR)
• Liberal interpretation of NASA FAR Supplement
• Unrestricted subcontracting
• Go to fixed funding cap arrangements
• No unfunded mandates
Status Reporting:
• Team self-assessment
• Respond to single customer
• Status problems only
• Limit performance reviews
Strategic Resources, Inc. (SRI)
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C) Cultural Changes:
• Project Organization is an enabled, small team
• Risk Management should be a no fault experiment in the early years of Fast Track
Projects.
• Engineering should make the customer part of SE team
• Management should add incentives for saving money on contracts
• Status Reporting: no suggestions
D) Technology/Tools: Recommend use of electronic status reporting
E) Other Observations: None
Strategic Resources, Inc. (SRI)
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2. GSFC Junior Group Fast Track Brainstormine Ideas: This is not an interview, but a
summary of a NASA/GSFC Junior Project Manager Group Brainstorming session conducted July
25, 1996. The purpose of the session was to brainstorm radical ideas on fast track project
management. Participants were asked "how I would manage my own company" in a Fast Track
Project environment. The results emphasized minimizing paperwork, presentational status
reporting, and duplication of efforts.
A) Practice Oriented Suggestions:
• The Project Organization:
• Teams consist of less than five people each
• Concentrated project team
• Co-located project team, including contractor
• Replace handbooks with cookbooks; (ideas rather than rigid
guidelines)
• Annual internal re-assessment of project
• Risk Management:
• Build Quality Assurance (QA) into design; not an oversight
function
• Benchmarking at start of project
• Risk assessment of new technology
• Bottomline threshold of pain on risk (acceptable impact
assessment)
• Minimize new technology
• Document Lessons Learned for the future
• Resources:
• More cooperative agreements with contractors
• Use contractor's procedures in WBS, minimize scheduling,
Reporting, QA, etc., to avoid duplication
• L_eral interpretation of Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR),
NASA FAR Supplement
• Use past performance as primary means for choosing
suppliers
• Maximize objectives in award fee determinations
• Use blanket travel orders to minimize paperwork
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Status Reporting:
• Daily videoconferencing
• Replace formal reviews with peer reviews
• Eliminate paper documents
• Review hardware and software, not presentations
• Hands on reviews
Miscellaneous:
• Limit specification and requirements documents to less than
six pages
• Build items that are more integrated
• Minimize technical interfaces
• Take advantage of every loophole
• Eliminate redundancy
• Use existing software and ground systems
B) Policy Related Suggestions:
• Project Organization:
• Phases should be fluid and flexible
• Use merit pay to reward accomplishments; negative pay for failures
• Project manager has more authority/responsibility for project
• Government project office located at contractor's plant
• Resources:
• More Commercial OffThe Shelf(COTS) contracts
• Develop penalties to your suppliers for poor performance
• Modify cost sharing in cooperative arrangements
• Up front, timeless funding including reserves
• Shorten, simplify procurement
• No mandatory goals in contracting
• Tie award fee into on-orbit performance
• Utilize cost incentives in contracting
• Miscellaneous: None
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c) Cultural Changes:
• Project Organization:
• Minimize power centers
• Rotate people
• Term limits on management
• Risk Management: Up front risk management philosophy
D)
E)
• Status Reporting:
• Fewer major reviews, less people
• Interactive around the table rather than presentational
• Miscellaneous: think small, fast in all project areas
Technology/Tools:
• Resources: computerized Configuration Management (CM)
• Status Reporting: do electronically
Other Comments: None
Strategic Resources, Inc. (SRI)
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3. Lewis Research Center (LeRC) Pyramid Team (Pare Down sue2estions for NHB
7120.5_: This is not an interview, but a collection of suggestions from LeRC. The team
consisted of three persons, two experienced Space Experiments Dixrision Project Managers, and a
new Aeronautics Program Project Manager who has Reliability/Quality Assurance experience.
They were chartered with using the existing (Nov 1993) version of 7120.5 and paring down the
stated requirements to the core elements necessary to adequately plan and execute a Fast Track
Project. Their output was related back to specific elements of the 7120.5, with appropriate
interpretive comments and ideas. Background discussion output from APM-23 SSG deliberations
on the nature of Fast Track Projects was shared with the group. The group was briefed on the
overall charter, and tasked with a separate focused approach to developing Fast Track guidelines,
and were encouraged to define the nature of a project that could be deemed Fast Track.
A) Practice Oriented Suggestions:
• Each Center should develop a Fast Track implementation plan, consistent with
the types of projects for which they are responsible.
• For a project to go the Fast Track route it must:
State the intent for Fast Track at RDR/NAR (in Phase B) and in the
Project Plan, agreed to by primary stakeholders (project manager,
program manager, principal investigator, industry partners, etc.)
• Receive approval for Phase C/D/E Fast Track at Authority to Proceed
(ATP).
B) Policy Related Suggestions:
* The Fast Track definition applies only to phases C/D/E of the project life cycle:
Not required to pay for the assurance of lowered risk (per risk
definition of NHB 7120.5, 11/95 version, table 6-1), which is
manifested by removing control gates such as formal reviews,
inspections, etc. (safety requirements will not be compromised).
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A project is appropriate for Fast Track when:
• There are no undeveloped technologies necessary for mission
accomplishment.
• Requirements are clearly and completely defined (system design
specifications are complete with no development issues) at RDR/NAR.
The minimum requirements for Fast Track Projects are:
• Phase C Requirements
(NHB 7120.5A, Table 2-3, p. 2-25)
- Validated PCA - annually
- PMC Review Baseline - as necessary
- CDR Specs Baseline - as necessary
• Phase D Requirements
(NHB 7120.5A, Table 2-4, p. 2-29)
- Validated PCA - annually
- PMC Review Baseline - as necessary
- IRK Reports - per PCA
- Operational System- end of Phase D
• Phase C/D Requirements and Reviews
(NHB 7120.5A, Figure 4-I, p. 4-2)
- Omit all IARs
- Omit first IRR review and maintain only second one (at end
of Phase D)
- Have PMC review in Phase C or D only as necessary
- Omit all QSRs
C) Cultural Changes: None
D) Technology/Tools: None
E) Other Comments: None
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4. Lewis "Clean-Sheet" Team: This is not an interview, but a collection of suggestions
from Lewis Research Center. Background discussion output from APM-23 SSG deh'berations
on the nature of Fast Track Projects was shared with the group. The group was briefed on the
overall charter, and tasked with a separate focused approach to developing Fast track guidelines.
They were encouraged to define the nature of a project that could be deemed Fast Track.
Our team spent some time discussing what a Fast Track project should be in terms
of size, schedule, complexity, safety risk, and so forth. We concluded that the
definition of what project should be Fast Tracked was really not critical to the
determination of how the project should be managed flit is to be successful in the
world of "Better, Faster, Cheaper". In fact, we felt that these particular changes to
project management were relevant to all projects around NASA in the interest of
getting them done at whatever rate
Key assumption: The project manager on a Fast Track program must be experienced and
motivated.
A) Practice Oriented Suggestions:
The Fast Track Project manager must have been through the traditional project
development so that he/she is aware of what things are necessary and what are
not. Experience is a must to be able to make the decisions that are required
throughout the project.
The project manager must also believe in the value of the project itsel£
otherwise he/she will not be able to motivate the team.
• There must be a clear agreement on deliverables between project manager and
his/her single point of contact.
Project requirements are agreed upon at the beginning of the project.
• Whatever the nature of the project, the mission goals need to be
explicitly spelled out in the beginning of the project. The project
manager needs to be able to make trade-off decisions during the
development of the project that will effectively get the project
completed but not at the expense of the mission goals.
• Goals are agreed to directly between the project manager and the
customer, whoever that may be.
• Procurement must be streamlined for Fast Track projects.
• Positive incentives should be used to meet schedule and cost.
Strate_lic Resources, Inc. (SRI)
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B) Policy Related Suggestions:
• The project manager needs the freedom to choose his/her own team members
and to change them during the project if necessary.
• The project manager reports to a single person for project progress reviews
• The format of the project progress review would be at the discretion of the
project manager as a way for him/her to best represent the project status.
• The design reviews are for the project manager and are held within the project
team The review process should include reasonable but not burdensome
documentation.
The project manager must have financial and schedule flexibility.
direct access to decision makers, both
c)
• The project manager must have
programmatic and financial.
Cultural Changes:
If a project manager saves money, he/she is usually rewarded with less money
to spend in the future. This system does not encourage practical spending of
money throughout the life-cycle of a project and certainly does not provide for
a management reserve which is imperative in a program
Individual recognition for doing a job well needs to be improved. People work
better when they are appreciated and when their work accomplishes something
that is valuable to someone.
D) Technology/Tools: None
E) Other Comments: None
Strategic Resources, Inc. (SRI)
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Appendix C
SRI Space Programs Interview Compilations
Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL)
1. JPL Reengineering Effort (E. Kane Casani, Michael J. Sander,
Bob Metzgar)
2. Mars Explorer Program (Donna Shirley)
3. New Millennium Program
a. Deep Space 1 Project (David H. Lehman)
b. Mars Microprobe Project (Sarah Gavit)
4. Pluto Express Project (Robert L. Staehle)
5. Clementine I (Dr. Henry B. Garrett)
Applied Physics Laboratory (APL) at Johns Hopkins University
1. Discovery Program, Near Earth Asteroid Rendezvous (NEAR)
Project (Thomas B. Coughlin, A. Santo, Larry Crawford)
Hughes Space and Communications Company
1. Communications Satellite Development
Lockheed-Martin Corporation
1. Iridium Project
Spectrum Astro Corporation
1. New Millennium Program, Deep Space 1 Project (Start Dubyn)
PPMI_
C-5
C-7
C-9
C-11
C-16
C-19
C-21
C-23
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L ,let Propulsion Laboratory (JPL)
1. JPL Reengineeriw, Effort: A 1991-1992 benchmarking study looked at development
process reengineering in industry and divided companies into two categories: Product
Organizations for those with Space oriented products similar to JPL; and Process Organizations if
they had different products but similar development issues and processes. An example of the later
would be an automobile company with the process of developing a new car line.
Documentation had been lost for this study, but contacts from the interviews were made available.
Results showed that success for these organizations was due to about 10-20 percent as a mix of
technology applications, and 80-90 percent as cultural change. JPL has proven these results,
cultural change is what ensures success. This study also interviewed business managers in the
organizations contacted to do a capabilities evaluation and arrived at similar conclusions.
Following this study, the JPL director, adapted the principles of Michael Hammer, Hammer &
Champy (Reengineering the Organization). One of Hammer and Champy's basic tenets, is that
you cannot re-engineer everything, you must be selective. JPL sculpted this selectivity with key
JPL process personnel, focusing on JPL customers and stakeholders. It initially encompassed
four basic JPL processes with a fifth added several months ago. These processes are: 1)
Development of New Products; 2) Growth and Assignment of People; 3) Development and
Management of the Institutional Environment; 4) Business Systems; and 5) Enterprise
Information Systems. These five areas were seen to have the best potential influence along the
lines detailed by the JPL Strategic Plan. While Development of New Products perhaps has the
most influence in this study's areas of interest, it was clear that each of the areas contributed to
the ability to identify beneficial change leading to operation in a "Better, Faster, Cheaper"
environment.
Strategic Resources, Inc. (SRI)
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_trs Man Exuloration Prom'am: Ms. Donna Shirley is the JPL Program Manager for theExploration Program series of missions. The Mars Exploration Program is one of the
pioneering approaches to "Better, Faster, Cheaper" space exploration which will be active at least
over the next ten years and perhaps longer.
The Program's goal is to visit Mars as often as possible within budget constraints with a
"continuous infusion of new technology', t Much of Ms. Shirley's ideas are in her paper, Mars on
$300K A Day, reprinted in Appendix E of this study. In addition to a summary of the overall
Program, there are valuable thoughts on a business analysis approach to the Program, a summary
of the Program Strategic Plan, and Program organization, including industry and science
partnering, and cost containment practices.
A) Practice Oriented Ideas: Donna identified a problem with organization buy-in to
projects by those who hope to buy-in just to be sure to be in on a project. Buy-in has been
a common practice for projects. There is nothing wrong with a company being aggressive
to capture a program and make up for an initial low profit through efficiencies on later
missions. However, buy-in could be a real barrier to long term success in a "Better,
Faster, Cheaper" era. The first mission in a series could achieve goals, but later missions
could become more expensive. It is important to get a good solid bid the first time that
will carry through an entire project. Once on the project, it is very important for project
managers to be able to hold really good cost reviews and descope if necessary to hold
costs. There are several other practice related suggestions in her paper.
B) Policy Related Comments: A very large barrier to cost and schedule management in
any project relates to project requirements. Ms. Shirley's First Law of Project
Management is: "A requirement ain't a requirement until somebody's willing to pay for
it." Ms. Shirley further stated that "This is the key to everything." She even suggested
expunging the word requirement from the NASA Project Management lexicon until we
can get to a better, common understanding of just what we mean when we say
requirement. Requirement should mean that desires and capabilities have been defined,
compared and matched. Once this is competed they can become a contract. When
requirements for a project are agreed to, management must hold firm to that common
definition with respect to cost and schedule objectives until, and unless, a sponsor for
changed requirements steps forward with the ability and willingness to pay for their
addition and accept the schedule impact.
1 =Mars on $300K per Day': The Mars Exploration Program, Donna Shidey
Strategic Resources, Inc. (SRI)
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In addition, the project office, when soliciting participants, nmst learn that in order to keep
costs low we nmst change _om detail specifications of the past to performance
(m_imlli_) specifications. This is analogous to the military's move away _om 1Wditary
Specifications (lVfilSpec) and Mifitary Standards (l__dStd). Other benefits also accrue with
this approach, in simplicity of development and integration.
C) _ Cultural Changes: Ms. Shirley's suggestions here dealt mostly with the need to have a
more business-like approach, including knowing how to relate to your gain (profit) _om
the program and to know your competition. Her paper also addresses these ideas in more
detail
D) Technology/Tools Recommended: None
E) Other Observations: None
Strategic Resources, Inc. (SRI)
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3. New ]Vlillennium 1)ro21-am
a) Deep Space I (DS1) Project. First in a series of New Millemfium Program missions,
DS1 will validate technology for use on fitture space missions into the 21st Century. There is a
list of primary requirements and secondary goal technologies to validate, plus Mission Goals that
are not part of Primary Mission Success Requirements. These Mission Goals include a plan to fly
by one comet and one asteroid, returning imagery and spectral data. The basic Project is capped
at $138.5 million. The Project is managed for JPL by David I-L Lehman as the JPL Flight Lead.
The spacecrait development contractor is Spectrum Astro Corporation, and were interviewed
separately for this study.
A) Practice Oriented Ideas: This project drew much from the JPL geengineering
Process Action Team (PAT) output and these included using a revised parts
development/procurement process and an improved schedule-receivable/deliverable
process system.
Another practice which aided in successful management of a "Better, Faster, Cheaper"
project was in selection of suppliers for the development effort. The project management
team saw that there would be six Integrated Product Development Teams from which
would flow 13 technologies. Requests for Proposal (RFP) were released for each of the
teams, requesting a three to five page proposal. After a down-select process, more detail
was asked from those remaining. This submission was scored and a final selection made.
B) Policy Related Colnments: The management approach which is most responsible
for any success achieved to date is the variable scope and capabilities given by NASA for
this project. This came from the above mentioned definition of primary requirements and
secondary goals for mission success. In the past everything was a requirement, leaving the
project manager with little latitude if part of the development for the mission ran into
di_culty. Reserve may be better applied on just the primary requirements, with secondary
goals not driving cost and schedule
A second area, the result of ongoing efforts within JPL for better management of projects,
is an attempt to limit documentation to only that necessary for the project.
Documentation requirements had been cut by one third between Casini and Mars
Pathfinder. DS 1 has cut that by another hal£ This makes the project more cost effective,
with the team making decisions based on planned management needs during the course of
the project.
C) Cultural Changes: Encouragement of innovation and improvement in processes to
meet firm requirements was a key tool to ensure cutting development time. Previous
missions would have been given, and would have taken, six years from start to launch. It
is now given two years, and the team expects to make it. In other words, everyone works
together as a team on cost, schedule and technical performance to ensure project success.
Strategic Resources, Inc. (SRI)
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D) Technology/Tools Recommended: A good communication system is a big factor in
holding down cost for the project. The key tool in this system is a top of the line video
conferenoing capability, paid for by JPL, both at their end and with their primary partners,
in this case Spectrum Astro. The system was paid for with approximately one month's
savings in travel costs. Time away, travel time and non-productive spin-up/spin-down
time for individuals has also been cut drastically, making for more productive project
activities.
E) Other Observations: A copy of the DS-1 Project Plan is provided in Appendix E of
this study.
Strategic Resources, Inc. (SRI)
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3. New ]Vlillfnninm l_'OE]'am
b) Mars Microprobe Project. Mars Microprobe is one of several experiments planned
for missions to the Planet Mars into the 21st Century.
A) Practice Oriented Ideas: Teamwork is the key to success. Management basics are
reduced for the project manager: 1) getting the right people and keeping them motivated;
2) being the one person who steps and stands back to see the big picture and big
problems; and 3) having a plan and making sure everyone understands it. These are
expanded in order.
Getting the fight people is somewhat subjective and involves knowing the necessary
discipline/fimctional areas to be used, the people in them, and asking for them by name
when the project starts. Motivation involves giving team members real responsibilities on
the project and with the team; "ensuring they all understand that..." which involves
directing team members to write down their plan and schedule, and expecting it to be
followed. This further involves enabling team members to be able to communicate and be
involved with the rest of the team.
Directing things to be done, means getting the team to sit down, deal with the project
from a big picture standpoint and ensure that they understand that they will live with their
plan.
Being the Big Picture person for the team means making sure things make sense overall.
This again involves ensuring "they all understand that..." which involves getting the team
members to understand each other's activities as well as their own.
Having a good plan comes from two management concepts. The first is having and
documenting good requirements. This will include using common terminology that is
thoroughly documented. The second is using this documentation to lead the team in
creating a bottom-line schedule from each of the detailed schedules.
B) Policy Related Comments: Functional and design reviews are team functions, held
when needed, not at a fixed date, and kept as informal as possible. "Better, Faster,
Cheaper" is not an excuse for sloppiness, and documentation of issues and necessary
actions is very important. The project manager must strive for distinction between
excessive formality and making the review process be a good solid comnmnications tooL
Each element of the project (sub-systems, QA, ME/SE, Packaging, etc.,) is required to
have three reviews leading up to corresponding Project Reviews. Reviews at the element
level are in-process peer reviews and are called Conceptual, Interim and Final Reviews, as
are the corresponding Project Reviews. They take the place of the more formal
Preliminary Design Review and Critical Design Review.
Strategic Resources, Inc. (SRI)
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Since these reviews are focused on issues, nmzh of the work is resolved at the dement
level Outside team members are brought in to ensue that the reviews are real team
functions. Action items for these reviews are called advisories and are consolidated and
documented before the meeting ends.
The end objective for the reviews, as for the project, seems to be to have a plan that
everyone understands. This is accomplished by documenting the plan and ensuring that it
is built on good requirements.
C) Cultural Changes: No specific changes were listed, but allowing the project manager
the flexibility to set and manage the project design review process may be something that
would enable Fast Track Projects to move ahead smoothly with minimal disruption.
D) Technology/Tools Recommended: Contract Management is a tool the project
manager must have in order to ensure subcontractors can fully participate as team
members. The project manager must understand FAS.
E) Other Observations: None
Strategic Resources, Inc. (SRI)
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4. lquto Express Proiect. 1lie JPL Ice and Fire Pre-Project Manager, which inc_des Pluto
Express, Europe Orbiter and Solar Probe, is Mr. Robert Staelde. Several times Pluto Express
was mentioned by others in the past few months as an icon for "Better, Faster, Cheaper" projects.
Pluto Express is an effort which _ launch two sciencecrafls to explore Pluto and its moon
Charon at the end of a 10-13 year set of trajectories. The idea of a Science, craft approach
identifies "scientists and engineers working together with a high degree of communication, from
the beginning." 2
A) Practice Oriented Ideas: A large part of Mr. StaeMe's focus for success in "Better,
Faster, Cheaper" is on Design-to-Cost (DTC) as a way of managing. The design process
also considers Test and Operation requirements. It is easier to ask questions related to
these areas in the design phase, and to make necessary changes based on objective
conclusions, than it is to determine problems and issues later in order to resolve negative
impacts. The approach that allows this to occur naturally is to form teams based on Cross
Functional Integration, including the Flight System Design Team, mission assurance,
software, mission operations, launch systems, radioisotope approval, procurement, etc.
Team member co-location was not possible on this project, so Mr. Staehle said that he
considered it important to get the team together frequently, in lieu of co-location.
B) Policy Related Comments: Mr. Staehle had no specific recommendations for policy
related changes, but provided a list of process improvement initiatives developed for Pluto
Express by the team. This list is in Appendix E of this study. One item, commonly
discussed by other organizations meeting with some success in reengineering development
processes, and present in this program, is minimal formal documentation to help hold
down costs. Examples given for areas being looked at currently include on-line
documentation; requirement documents no more than one page; and, documenting new
designs by as-built next-earlier generation documentation, plus deltas.
C) Cultural Changes: Mr. Staelde said that as Pre-project Manager he wanted to move
from a normal mode of periodic operation to one of continuous operation. This refers to
managing team members from all areas continuously, rather than as a series of short and
periodic project involvement. This has implications for dedication of matrixed personnel
from the line organizations, and translates to a project goal of maintaining equal to or
greater than 0.90 dedicated personnel time, supplemented by equal to or under 0.20
consultant time, referring to ratios of Full Time Equivalent personnel. It is also very
important to carry as many Pre-project personnel into the project as dedicated personnel
as possible. In this part of the discussion he referred to Robert Townsend's U__ the
Organization as a source of ideas for this approach.
2 JPL Pluto Express Brochure, version 1.1,616/96
Strategic Resources, Inc. ({JR/)
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D) Tedmology/To0ls Recommended: A Cost Analysis Tool, PCAT is recommended by
Mr. Staehle that allows everybody to do Design Analysis and Cost Impact Analysis
together. It is a simple spreadsheet tool developed at JPL that allows each area to
separately develop Work Breakdown Structures based on cost estimates that roll up into a
total project cost analysis. A related project trade-off model allows quick assessment of
end-to-end cost impacts of proposed mission and design changes.
E) Other Observations: None
Strate_/ic Resources, Inc. (SRI)
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5. Clemcntine I Prelect: Clementine I was a Ballistic hfts_e Defense Organization (BMDO)
sponsored program l_om the Naval Research Laboratory (NRL), performed in conjunction with
Lawrence Livermore Labs and NASA. Science objectives led to methodology which included a
lunar fly-by and asteroid rendezvous. The project was characterized by a very short, tight
schedule and a very limited, capped budget.
A) Practice Oriented Ideas: Clementine I used a less conservative approach to this
project than other space projects. There was more of a willingness to try new, untried
approaches to meet cost, schedule and science objectives. The severe budget and schedule
constraints forced the team to constantly consider different, innovative ways to solve
management problems.
Also, there was a very streamlined Program and Project Management structure with a
definite lack of management layering. This enabled decisions to be made quickly and their
implementation to happen quickly.
In addition, ACT Corporation, hired to do imagery data management and daily archiving
of science and engineering data, were responsive and innovative. ACT Corporation used
a PC based system versus a main_ame, handling up to 25,000 images per day, and
managing the daily archiving of data with only three people. They implemented their
approach in a very short time, and did it at one quarter to one tenth the usual cost for such
a mission.
A pro-active, hands-on approach used by the Clementine BMDO Program Manager was
effective in creating the team approach which characterized Clementine, and in managing
cost and schedule parameters. The teamwork importance was also recognized in
comments made by both men about the importance of 'cradle-to-grave' assignment of
engineering team members and the effectiveness of training and co-location of team
members.
It is important to closely monitor cost and schedule data.
B) Policy Related Comments: The project management limited the number of standard
reviews. This was found extremely effective from an efficiency standpoint. Keviews were
primarily to satisfy issue resolution held, and was an effective methodology for staying on
schedule.
Strategic Resources, Inc. (SRI)
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C) Cultural Changes: Clememine embodied many approaches useful for "Better, Faster,
Cheaper" projects. NASA should consider adopting these successful approaohes, but they
will involve significant cultural changes.
D) Technology/Tools Recommended: None mentioned outside of comments referenced
above regarding the role ACT Corporation played. This indicated that standard
approaches using computer technology may need to be revisited as capabilities within such
tools as PCs become more sophisticated.
E) Other Observations: See attached view-graphs from Dr. Garrett's Personal
Perspective and Recommendations for future "Faster, Better, Cheaper" projects.
Strategic Resources, Inc. (SRI)
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IL Applied Physics Laboratory (APL) at John Hopkins University
1. Discovery Program, Near Earth Asteroid Rendezvous (NEAR): NEAR is the
first of a series of missions under the Discovery Program which are designed to explore space
from the moon out to Mars and the Asteroid belt. NEAR was awarded to APL in the late fall of
1993, with a total cost to launch of $150 million. NEAR achieved their success at under $112
million. It is designed for rendezvous to orbit with the large near-earth asteroid, Eros in January
1999.
A) Practice Oriented Ideas: It is important to receive and understand fixed project
objectives. 'Tile objectives at the start must be those you finish with." The project must
maintain focus. These are not only the Level I technical objectives but the cost and
schedule objectives as well. One key to success is having support, not oversight, from the
NASA Program Manager. The program office maintained a single point of contact
approach on all matters, keeping interruptions down to a minimum_
It is important to understand the cost and schedule driven nature of "Better, Faster,
Cheaper". A Design-to-Cost (DTC) and Design-to-Schedule (DTS) focus was evident
throughout all discussions which translated to delivering project products. A true DTC
approach requires a technical design that recognizes performance as the dependent
variable with the design being changed to meet cost objectives. Design margin is critical
to success. Should any requirement changes be contemplated, cost and schedule impact
questions must be answered. Because of this, it must be understood that the first three
months are the most important part of the project. In the first three months the project
management team for NEAR:
1. Set policy (DTC/DTS, team environment, communication),
2. Picked partners properly (a most important step), and
3. Set philosophy of simplicity in the project plan.
Picking partners properly was stressed. The corporate flexibility for a partner to work in
the planned environment is critical. Flexibility must be evident at least one level above the
partner project manager to ensure the team leader will be able to do what is needed. This
is critical because of the flatness of the project management team structure and the need to
create a badgeless commamity. During the project, team members develop an allegiance to
each other and to the project manager, based on trust.
The APL approach to the structure of the project team was to use a lead engineer concept
over an entire subsystem, working under the Project System Engineer. Scope was defined
with the lead engineer who was held to it. The subsystem team leader was also a worker
and had ownership of the problems and the problem solutions.
The team environment extended to ensuring that all those working on and affecting the
project were made part of the team as early as possible. The contracting officer was
Strategic Resources, Inc. (SRI)
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assigned to the team. Manufa_uing and purchasing were brought in early, atteuding
davy meetings, discussing problems, and developing on the spot solutions. The extra
insight and belief in the schedule gained by manufacturing and fabrication was deemed
invaluable. Other team members also gained appreciation for involvement and overtime
impact of schedule decisions.
Throughout the process, extra hours worked came as a result of commitment to other
team members. Prior experience had seen commitment to the boss versus the team,
Having short term goals, such as fixed delivery dates, hardware-on-the-floor dates, etc.
became team rallying objectives. People believed in the objectives and in achieving them.
Team communication was also stressed. Person-to-person communication was used
wherever poss_le. Low-level design reviews were used to build in quality and to
communicate.
In the cost and schedule constrained environment of NEAR, this depended on being able
to leverage people with a track record of experience. (It is mentioned as a concern that a
more standard process on some projects should be available to teach newer people, in
order to be able to provide those with experienced track records in the future.)
B) Policy Kelated Comments: The low level design reviews worked into scheduled
Project Reviews. The Project Manager worked with NASA to schedule mandatory
NASA reviews (NARS) in conjunction with the Project Reviews to minimize disruption.
The NAR panel was asked to attend the Project Reviews with a day added to address
remaining NAR objectives. The NAR panel's willingness to fit into a different format
provided for a less intrusive, less costly approach.
C) Cultural Changes: Although the DTC focus has been mentioned, all stressed that this
is truly different from past practice in these types of projects. Performance margin must
be designed in. Buying the 90 percent version gains you wiggle room in the development
process.
It must be accepted up front that performance optimization will be limited and perhaps not
possible. The project manager uses margin gains in one subsystem to help relieve another
team member. This was aided by 50 percent use of the shell equipment.
From the beginning, the approach used on NEAR stressed the need to be able to use
simplicity, standards and cleverness to solve problems in lieu of a more expensive high
technology solution. "What made this program go was keeping it simple." An example
given was that the analysis of space craft geometry at the asteroid with respect to the earth
and sun allowed use of less costly, less complex fixed solar panel arrays and
communications antennae.
Strategic Resources, Inc. (SRI)
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Another cost and time saving innovation was the use of standard aerospace 1553 data bus
architecture for the first time on such a craft. Designing to an existing standard that
people are used to saved time over designing a unique interface. This saved an estimated
month of test and integration time.
D) Technology/Tools Keoommended: While use of tools was not stressed, the use of
CAD/CAM tools is standard at APE
E) Other Observations: Appendix E contains the paper, Cost Estimation and Modefing
for Space Missions at APL/JHU
Strate_lic Resources, Inc. (SRI)
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HL Hughes Electrgni_ Snace pnd Communications Comnanv
1. Communications Satellite Mgnufaeture and Launch: Hughes has re-
engineered their design-to-launch cycle for oonmamications satellites to stay competitive in the
world market. Past practice took as long as five years from contract to launch date and Hughes is
now working toward a 12 month cycle.
A) Practice Oriented Ideas: There is a great value in consolidation and co-location in the
space craR development and delivery process. Hughes has moved from a development,
assembly and test process using several buildings and locations to a single facility large
enough to accommodate co-location of people and functions. While the program manager
provides customer interface and budget management, the design engineering team, using a
work-cell, or production line approach, moves with the space craft as it develops. More
and better dialogue with the government customer regarding cost-containment practices is
recommended.
The continuous improvement approach in the evaluation of Hughes' completion of
spacecraft to launch process has allowed them to advertise a ship and shoot time of 31
days. This has encompassed the entire launch integration and processing focus. They
have tightened their hunch team requirements to a team of only 15 people. This came by
examining all costs and functions with a view to reducing cycle time. Shipping,
decontamination, fueling, etc. have all been examined and reduced in time and cost where
possible. Launch operations achieved a reduction from 38 days to 17 days in fueling the
spacecraft. A 33 percent reduction had been achieved just by looking at the model of the
process cycle time. Savings have also been achieved by going to off-the- shelf resources
as well For instance, a commercially available stainless steel container used in the dairy
industry was found adequate for use in' the process at a significant savings.
B) Policy Related Comments: The government should examine the procurement
turnaround time which is currently cumbersome and costly for the commercial provider.
Allowance for more creativity in the type of contract offered with an eye to the
possibilities allowed in the FAR is also important in a "Better, Faster, Cheaper"
environment.
C) Cultural Changes: No specific areas were mentioned, except to note that as
government tightens its belt, industry is also tightening its belt. Corporations such as
Hughes are looking at partioipation more and more in terms of return on net investment
and feel they can contribute on that basis with their cost reduction efforts.
D) Technology/Tools Recommended: None
IVo
E) Other Observations: None
Lockheed Martin Corporation
Strategic Resources,
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1. lltmIUM Global Cellular Satellite Prom'am: Lockheed Martin is a
subcontractor to Motorola on the IRIDIUM Global Cellular Satellite Network The founder
company for IRIDIUM has designed the network to consist of multiple satellites in low earth
orbit. Each satellite will be able to be produced t_om scratch in five days and put into orbit eight
days later. It is designed to allow phones of only six ounces to communicate with any other
phone on the network anywhere on earth.
A) Practice Oriented Ideas: Earned Value management is a practice that promotes cost
control. This grew out of a need to be more competitive, and seems to drive down all
costs. The concept began by performing a comparison between military and commercial
practices, benehmarking commercial practices and comparing them to MILSTAIL The
resulting approach focuses on identifying indicators that will be standardized on a set of
those things Senior Management will look at; the things everyone must do.
Two most important concepts which are part of this approach are:
1. Emphasis on insight versus oversight; answering the question, "Is
the management system doing what it is supposed to do?"
2. Replacing rule-based Cost/Schedule Control Systems Criteria (C/SCSC)
with analysis and judgment.
The benchmarking effort examined what was working, and identified those best practices
that, for example, combined management of cost, schedule and technical performance.
Lockheed Martin's approach is to use Integrated Product Teams (lIrI ") and keep project
manager reviews to one and a half hours using charts that communicate information, but
are not expensive or time consuming to produce. The charts being used to brief the
program should be the variance charts/reports that are used by the project team. The
chart should show trends, indexes, and other necessary data and provide an opportunity
for the team leader to say 'Tiffs is what I need to fix this problem" MILSTAR has
accepted the commercial practices identified. The president of Lockheed Martin refers to
this as '_.he basic block-and-tackling of management."
B) Policy Related Comments: The way NASA funds accruals with the 533 system and
mitigates the benefits of using Earned Value. This is at least partly because NASA is not
funded for termination liability. Actuals differ for the two systems.
C) Cultural Changes: First NASA should recognize that the practices described above
differ l_om past practices. Second, these new practices will require education for these
practices to be standardized.
D) Technology/Tool Recommended: None
Strategic Resources, Inc. (SRI)
C-20
NASA Fast Track*Study
E) Other Obm=)'ations: None
Strategic Resources, Inc. (SRI)
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V. Spectrum-Astro Corporation
1. New Millennium Program_ Deep Space One Project: Spectrum Astro is the
Prime Contractor to the Jet Propulsion Laboratory for Spacecraft development on the Deep
Space One (DSI) mission (see earlier description of DS1 under JPL).
A) Practice Oriented Ideas: As a small company, Spectrum Astro examined practices and
organization structure of larger competitors. They saw that in the past, 20 percent of the
people on such programs did 80 percent of the work and added 80 percent of the value.
Spectrum wanted to try to structure its involvement so that they could get that 20 percent
number to be 100 percent. They used inherently smart people, that could take on end-to-
end responsibilities. In addition, the organization adopted a work as a skunk works
organization model, encouraged innovation and rninimiTed outside interference. This was
supported by the JPL Project Management team
Cost and schedule need to be treated as main drivers. The project manager must control
creeping requirements. "Anything impacting cost and schedule goes through a Spanish
Inquisition; it is very painful to add new things."
There is also a need to treat design in the same way. Spectrum Astro uses a flexible bus
architecture to accommodate the various technologies which are to be part of the mission.
Once the Integrated Product Development Teams baseline specific technology
demonstrations, the specific accommodation to the spacecraft can be rapidly evaluated and
resolved
Although, the interfaces provided by Spectrum Astro as integrator needed to be flexible,
the project manager moved the participants forward and allowed interfaces to be frozen at
a reasonable time. The key is early flexibility, with the realization of a set time for freezing
design.
Spectrum Astro realizes that innovative ways must be found to control cost and schedule.
Their spacecraft design is a proven, low risk architecture that allows accommodation of a
variety of technologies on a variety of missions, allowing for accommodation of DS 1 's
rather high risk, and high pay-offapproach to science.
Management of the team recognized the need to have sprit division of responsibilities
between Spectrum Astro and JPL, but end-item responsibilities must be given to one.
This decision is based on company or organizational strengths and discrete responsibilities
are assigned.
B) Policy Related Comments: None
C) Cultural Changes: In keeping with the search for innovative ways to save costs,
Spectrum Astro heartily endorses JPL's investment in video teleconferencing (VTC)
Strategic Resources, Inc. (SRI)
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capability as a way to maintain momentum and to avoid unnecessary disruption. While
Spectrum Astro is located in Phoenix and only one hour away by air _om JPL, such travel
can still be disruptive.
Using VTC, team members can have daily meetings, including small team or working
group meetings of one to two hours, while only planned all-day meetings require team
members to travel to a single site.
D) Technology/Tools Recommended: For data and information communica-
tion/dissemination, a system using a collaborative file server checked on each end is used.
The system resides on a Web site and includes Level I, II and HI Requirements, a daily
project calendar, phone list, PDR/CDR documents, etc. The system is working and allows
Spectrum Astro and JPL to do project management as part of daily business.
E) Other Observations: None
Strategic Res_
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Appendix D
SRI Non-Space Industry Interview Compilations
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U.S. Air Force/Office of the Secretary of Defense
1. Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM)
(Terry 1L Little, Diane M. Wright)
U. S. Army/Natick Laboratories
1. Soldier-System Science and Technology Program
Motorola
1. Soldier-System Science and Technology Program
Boeing Vertol (of Bell-Boeing V-22 Team)
1. V-22 Vertical Takeoffand Landing Aircraft (Stuart Dodge)
Boeing
1. Boeing Laboratory Reinvention (Rick Becker)
Texas Instruments
1. Factory Improvement (Dave McDearmont)
D-2
D-5
D-7
D-9
D-11
D-12
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L U.S. Air Force/Office of Secretary of Defense
1. Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAM)/ Joint Aid-to-Surface Standoff
Missile (JASSM): Both are developmental programs jointly managed by the U.S. Air Force
and the U.S. Navy. Mr. Terry Little was government program manager for JDAM during a
critical period and is now government program manager for JASSM. JDAM is considered a
success within DOD for its use of new management approaches. These approaches are being
refined by Mr. Little for JASSM.
A) Practice Oriented Ideas: Mr. Little's view of project management is that the
government should have a very limited role, which includes: stating requirements;
choosing the contractor able to do the job; facilitating; expediting; and working interfaces.
It is the contractor's role to figure out the 'how -to' and then to do it. It is the primary
role of the government program office to help the contractor be successful. The
government can almost totally leave the how-to to the contractor. The only exception to
this is in identifying and helping to manage safety issues.
A significant factor in proposal selection criteria on JDAM, expanded to 50 percent of the
selection criteria in choosing the fight contractor for the job on JASSM, is use of past
performance. The contractor proposal is used only to present the design and technical
issues. Past performance was used as the exclusive (or sole) means to evaluate contractor
processes. This is done by examining past on-time development and technical
performance. As will be seen, there is a true atmosphere of trust in the contractor, but the
basis for trust is primarily past performance.
Contractor management capabilities are examined to determine:
1. The ability to manage cost and schedule,
2. Responsiveness to problem resolution actions, and
3. The extent the contractor has required past government
intervention.
In short, the government must look for proven ability to meet cost, schedule and
performance objectives. Also critical to success of Mr. Little's approach is that the
government and the contractor team operate as a team, Because of this there was initial
training, provided by the contractors through an external source, followed by
reinforcements at six to nine months into the effort. Mr. Little's office also provided a
facilitator to help spend time with the team to "define one or two goals which could be
measured to determine progress and value added."
Mr. Little indicated that this approach works for him because he is comfortable with
delegation and with trusting those on the team to make decisions. He indicated that with
Strategic Resources, Inc. (SRI)
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both those above him and those working for him, the atmosphere is one of creating
expectations and then trusting people to live with those expectations and to rise to them
B) Policy Related Comments: Because the JDAM program was being managed in an
atmosphere of acquisition reform, still on-going in JASSM, Mr. Little was given broad
policy waiver authority. Some of the waivers are being examined to see if they make
sense for broader application to other programs. The key factor, as seen in other
interviews, is the need to minimize activities and functions that add cost or time to a
program by looking at the value they add.
One of the unique (for DoD) actions taken was to not require formal design reviews. The
review process was put in the contractor's hands. Design reviews were run as peer
reviews. There was no government requirement of contractor satisfaction of action items.
This is in keeping with allowing the contractor to be responsible for the how-to.
There is a recognition within OSD of the need to streamline documentation. For instance,
there is a tailored Defense Acquisition Executive Summary (DAES) and the monthly
Acquisition Report, a single bulleted page.
Also, while there is still a requirement for a quarterly program review, it is much more
informal and cognizant of the IPT structure. There is more trust and less looking for
problems. There is also a recognition of a need to manage "By the Budget" as provided
by Congress through the services.
C) Cultural Changes: Mr. Little mentioned that to achieve real teaming the government
roles mentioned above needed to be reaL This was done by significantly reducing the size
of the government program office. The current JASSM office is one fourth the size of a
previous attempt at a conventional cruise missile program. Program office members are
grouped on one of the three team alignments, consisting of Helpers, Interfaeers and
Resourcers.
Each group has a charter which specifically excludes responsibility for oversight of the
contractor. They truly are there to help. The Helpers are integrated into contractor IPTs
and their role is to assist the contractor in fulfilling obligations. They take directions from
the contractor program manager and input from him/her is a major input on that Helper's
annual performance review. Interfacers help the contractor deal with problems outside the
contractor's control. The gesourcers work issues of money and facilities, etc.
Because this is such a change from prior relationships with contractors and a reformed
style of management, those not comfortable with this approach are moved to other more
traditionally managed offÉces. Mr. Little believes however, that this is the management
approach of the future and raises the issue of the need to educate people on this new
approach and to reexamine the way program/project managers are selected.
Strategic Resources, Inc. (SRI)
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It was also noted that the program made those with traditional oversight or inspector roles
part of the team The OSD oversight team developed more of a stakeholder mentality and
attitude. Mr. Little fostered the attitude that it is every members' job to make this
program successful with the result of the OSD team moving from oversight and inspection
to a helping hand approach.
The difference that this management style makes was seen clearly in comparison to a
traditionally-structured progran_ The same OSD team that was fully integrated under
JDAM, was not integrated on the team of another progran_ They filled the traditional
inspection/oversight role with that program and became adversaries rather than advocates.
Mr. Little has clearly demonstrated that trusting your team and valuing their opinions
yields good results.
D) Technology_ and Tools recommended: None
E) Other Observations: Further information about JDAM is in Appendix E.
Strate_lic Resources, Inc. (SRI)
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IL Natick U.S. Army Laboratories
1. Soldier System Science and Technoloev Development Proeram: A concept
program which treats the U.S. Army soldier as the system, the objective is to design the soldier's
clothing and equipment that acts in concert to both protect and enhance warfighting capabilities,
including communication. This effort is analogous to the technical challenge of many NASA
missions where several different science and technology applications must be separately developed
and integrated within a constrained schedule and a limited budget.
A) Practice Oriented Ideas: The most critical aspect for success is team structure and
buy-in to that structure. It is also the most difficult aspect to get up front, especially
making the user part of the teanx Many users in DoD are accustomed to 'q_elling the
developer what we want, then coming back at the end of the effort and telling the
developer how bad they did." Making a way for the user to be involved throughout the
effort is a challenge.
The philosophy of trust in those chosen to be on the team to perfoma a necessary
management function is evident. We should refuse to pay for something twice. There
was no government duplication of contractor positions. This allowed for a smaller than
usual government staff and more reliance than usual on the contractor to assist in such
things as cost management.
Due to the nature of the need to develop science and to manage cost and schedule closely,
there were six Contracting Officer Technical Representatives (COTR) versus the usual
one, each assigned to an IPT. This allowed each team to make decisions quickly that
made sense, and still be responsible for cost, schedule and performance.
Reviews were managed as internal project tools for the benefit of the teams. Outsider
involvement and input at these reviews was carefully limited. Major reviews were
opportunities for IPTs to share information. In this project management approach, one is
either part of the team or is an outsider.
Contractor selection is seen as very important also. Selection is based on choosing
someone with a proven history of managing multiple subteams, system integration and an
approach to Integrated Product Teams/ Integrated Product and Process Development
(IPT/IPPD). How well the contractor has worked with sub-contractor in a team
environment was examined (Was the best person selected to lead a team, or were teams
always led by the prime?).
Once a contractor is selected, it takes time to get IPTs working well together, perhaps as
much as six months. All of the teams are taught the tools to be used (Metric
Measurement, Design for Manufacturing, Six Sigma, Quality Function Deployment, etc.,)
as well as team building/team formation. A new set of management/personnel _ is
Strate i__Resources, Inc. (SR 0
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needed to be successful in this environment, including consensus building, team leading
and others. While the special skills were not explicitly provided in training for the IPT
leaders, they probably would be in similar future projects. While it takes longer to build
team consensus and to work in IFFs than in a leader-directed environment, the decision
achieved is better and restarts are significantly reduced. In addition, late discovery of
integration problems are also greatly reduced. This moderated the fact that 70 percent of
downstream cost is cemented in the design phase.
As mentioned, the teams are responsible for managing their cost, schedule and
performance. This was facilitated by requiting each IPT to develop at least eight metrics
to be tracked, four each for performance (weight, power, etc.) and four more which
addressed such items as cost, management reserve, estimated spend rate versus actual,
software reuse rate, etc. The management functions for the project also developed four
performance and four cost metrics for the overall project, as well as a project risk
mitigation plan. Risk mitigation was addressed at each review.
The project also analyzed how well the IPTs seemed to be doing in general by examining
qualitative metrics, including team turn over rate, and how issues and action items are
closed/handled, etc. This type of metric may be used to identify problem areas early
without micro-managing.
B) Policy Related Comments: None
C) Cultural Changes: The entire area of close teamwork with the contractor, as well as
inclusion of the user as part of the process, can be cultural change for many. Recognizing
this and addressing it early in the project's life can help. Underlying the success of
teamwork is the issue of trust. It takes time to develop and it is easy to break. The bearer
of bad news must be given consideration and the information treated fairly.
D) Teclmology/Tools Recommended: None
E) Other Observations: None
Strategic Resources, Inc. (SRI)
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HL Motorola
1. Soldier-System Science and Technology Development Program: The program
is described in the previous interview compilation. Motorola is the prime contractor for this
effort.
A) Practice Oriented Ideas: Motorola echoed the thoughts of the government Project
Manager, in that teamwork is a key to the success of this project. The objectives in this
are to be cross-functional/cross disciplinary wherever possible so that people talk with
each other. Teamwork removes walls. To this end, the project manager must foster
communications and either convert skeptics or remove them
Motorola backs this both internally and on the projects they manage. Internally Motorola
provides up to four weeks of training yearly to employees on teamwork, quality and
related material. On projects, time is invested up front, on training in project management
tools to be used and team building. This is done for each product IPT, including
contractor, subcontractor and government team members.
In general, the Motorola philosophy is to push down the decision making process to the
lowest level. It is both a privilege and a responsibility designed to empower the managers.
In other words, it is done deliberately to develop managerial capability. The objective,
beyond human development, is to have distributed versus centralized control and
management. On this project in particular, the situation of the project forced distributed
control. There were several technologies for which Motorola did not have all the organic
technical capabilities required.
It is valuable to include the user on the project team This allowed significant involvement
of the user at the practical level, ensuring that specifications really represented operational
requirements. For one example, a subcontractor identified a specification which was
proving to be a significant recurring cost driver. By working closely with the
user/customer to gain a better understanding of minimum requirements, the cost was
better contained.
One way that teams worked to manage the limits was to develop effective metrics. These
metrics are not things you measure because you can quantify them, but things you measure
that will make a difference; those which will tell the manager there is a problem on the
horizon. Since the design of this system was soldier-driven, not all of the performance
metrics were easily quantifiable. As mentioned by the government project manager, each
team was tasked with metrics that were drivers for the project that needed monitoring. As
the project progressed, the manager/team was able to propose changes to metrics chosen
due to program dynamics, or if the chosen metrics proved to be ineffective. Choosing
which project drivers to watch was an output of good Systems Engineering and Risk
Management practices. Each team also developed a risk chart or table to depict
Strategic Resources, Inc. (SRI)
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probability of risk and impact as High, Medium, or Low, and planned risk mitigation
strategies.
Management of reviews was very important. The IPTs were allowed to manage quite
freely, holding their own reviews that took the place of pre_reviews for larger, inclusive
reviews. The larger design and management reviews were developed to address '_dae
white spaces" between the IPT boundaries, including interface and integration issues.
Even the larger design reviews at the project level including the government project
manager, were active discussions about the white space issues, an interactive design
interchange versus a military briefing. As seen in several other Fast Track Projects, the
reviews are held for the project management team rather than for oversight purposes.
A Motorola initiative to shorten the developmental cycle by using incremental
development was also successfully used on this project. It is a more piecemeal approach
and can be more difficult to manage, but also saves time. This includes incremental design
reviews, held in a cross-functionaL user influenced environment, rather than
comprehensive reviews. This approach also provided the user pieces/parts to test
throughout the process which, in turn, provided the developers early useful feedback when
change was easier to manage.
B) Policy Related Comments: None
C) Cultural Changes: While there was none mentioned explicitly, it is important to note
that Motorola has established a climate which includes teamwork, a focus on quality
(continuous improvement) and acceptance of change. This is brought into the project
environment through training and the corporate structure.
D) Technology/Tools Recommended: None
E) Other Observations: None
Strategic Resources, Inc. (SRI)
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IV. Boeing Vertol
1. V-22 Vertical Take-off and Landing Aircraft Program: The V-22 is in the
DoD Engineering and ManufaeaLfng Development (EMD) Phase of development, which
corresponds to NASA Phases C/D of the Life Cycle Development process. The management
approaches applied on this program have resulted in significant cost and schedule control with a
proven track record of meeting or exceeding most design objectives. The objectives here were
not to constrain the schedule, but to contain and reduce costs on the final product.
A) Practice Oriented Ideas: Boeing has applied many of the lessons learned from their
commercial aircraft experience with the 777 aircraft. The concept of the 777 Design-
Build Teams has translated well to Integrated Product Teams in use on V-22. One of the
lessons learned t_om 777 experience was a need to provide a way to bring separate team
activities together. On the V-22 this is done with Analysis and Integration Teams (AIT).
Older, experienced 'gray-beards' are brought in for short periods to help work integration
issues. This concept is carried forward to the air-vehicle Integrated Product Team
Commtmication between contractor components and between contractor and government
was obviously important in a team environment. Close contact is important and can be
provided by video teleconference capability. There were periods where the team used
video teleconferencing up to six hours per day with the government. Tiffs is especially
important in the team environment of the V-22 effort where both contractor and
government are committed to sharing information with each other as soon as possible.
Design-to-Cost (DTC) plays a significant role in the ability to provide a final design which
comes in at or under the program cost target. As mentioned earlier, the goal of the V-22
team was to reduce final production and other lifecycle costs of the V-22. As such, their
approach is applicable to any team based engineering-design effort. In this approach each
IPT set their own targets for cost reduction from initial estimates and were also given
discrete performance improvement targets, such as weight reduction, part unit reduction,
etc. This was based on analysis of data provided by the IPT. As the project progressed,
in some cases goals could be re-allocated where needed.
B) Policy Related Comments: To create the team environment, the type of contract in
place should be examined. A Firm Fixed Price type of contract tends to develop an
adversarial, non-stakeholder atmosphere. The Cost Plus Award Fee contract provides
more incentive to a team.
Strate_lic Resources, Inc. (SRI)
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C) Cultural Changes: In addition to the proper contracting vehicle and the enabling
communication technology, it takes time and effort to create and sustain a team attitude
between government and contractor, and between fimctional disciplines. A change in
culture is worth the effort because the payoffis significant.
D) Technology/Tools Kecommended: A Boeing tool with value derived from their
experience with the 777 is an enhanced CAD/CAM capability. Drawing on an engineering
database, it allows designers and producers on the team to see the product in a three
dimensional moving presentation. Interfaces are displayed for multiple teams to examine
simultaneously. The tool is programmable to highlight tolerance problems. As with team
related cultural changes the cost of implementing this tool was more than paid back in
savings of both cost and schedule. There were significant reductions in error, change and
rework, as well as elimination of the need for several costly, standard machine modeling
approaches and mockups. This tool became the central design hub of all IFF activities.
E) Other Observations: None
Strategic Resources, Inc. (SRI)
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V. Boeing Laboratories
1. General Downsizin_: While not directly tied to Fast Track projects, several
comments were considered worth including with regard to reengineering and cultural change.
In 1989-1990, Boeing examined its laboratory structure and recognized a larger, broader
structure was present than necessary to support its needs (456 separate laboratory organizations).
In 1991, all labs were centralized under one head, which is now Boeing Defense & Space Group
Laboratory Operations. The problem was how to move faster in process change in support of
Boeing's corporate mission. In the process of consolidation the lab structure was reduced to 128
laboratories over a four year period. At the same time, Boeing tried to maintain the level of
scientists and scientific capability (i.e., The goal was better management, not reduction in
technical personnel).
In evaluating the structure, everything was put up against the corporate strategic plan. Anything
not connected to the mission and goals identified in the plan was considered for consolidation.
Part of this structural examination was to examine the customer's definition of requirements and
criteria. This is part of an overall process of walking through consolidation corporation wide.
Boeing has developed this process to a high level of detail. The exact details were not shared
because they are considered competition sensitive.
There have been many lessons learned from the success of Boeing 777 effort. Process change
was a big focus for that venture. In this area of embracing process change, care must be taken to
evaluate impact and to keep the number of process changes manageable. It is easy for the impacts
of several on-going changes to be compounded and very difficult, if not impossible, to manage.
There were three or four major process changes associated with the 777 effort. There are now
three to four dozen candidate process changes identified that could cause loss of the ability to
control the overall change.
Strate_]ic Resources, Inc. (SRI)
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VL Texas lnsU'uments CI'1)
1. Single Process Initiative/Common Process Factory: With the move in the
military to adopt commercial practices versus MilStds/MilSpecs, TI has seen an opportunity to
provide significant savings to its customers and to itself.. This falls under the title of Single
Process Initiative. This describes an attempt to arrive at single acceptable commercial processes
for several customers replacing multiple approaches of the past. In doing this they have replaced
65 versions of 38 Mil Specs with just eight Commercial Specifications. TI has done a block
modification to implement this on 770 separate DoD contracts. They are now extending this
concept to those companies for which TI is a subcontractor, to either do block modifications or
some other implementation of this idea.
They are also working with the DoD as a designated Keinvention Lab and they include the
Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA) as a team member. They are working with the
U.S. Navy on an effort termed Alpha Acquisition which is working toward a highly streamlined
cost estimation.
Strategic Resources, Inc. (SRI)
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"MARS ON $300K A DAY'*: THE MARS EXPLORATION PROGRAM
Second IAA International Conference on Low-Cost Planetary IVfissions
Donna L. Shirley
Manager, Mars Exploration Program
Jet Propulsion Laboratory/California Institute of Tedmology
4800 Oak Grove Drive
Pasadena, CA 91109
Fax 818-393-6800
E-Mail: dshirloy_c_aiLjpLnasa.gov
ABSTRACT
The Mars Exploration Program is pioneering a series of'_etter, faster, cheaper" missions to Mars
over at least the next 10 years, and possibly well into the 21st century. The overall cost of the
program is somewhat over $100M per year, including hunch vehicles and operations, for two
launches every 26 months. (This works out to about $300K per day.) A programmatic strategy
has been developed involving selection of a science theme for the program, a long-term industrial
partnerd_ for spacecraft development, continuous infusion of new tedmology, and integration of
the individual projects into an overall program so that synergy between projects can be
maximized. A number of process improvements have been made in procurement, concurrent
engineering, rapid prototyping, and integrated payload selection, among others.
INTRODUCTION AND PROGRAM DESCRIPTION
The Mars Exploration Program Office was formed at the Jet Propulsion Laboratory in July 1994
to integrate the robotic exploration of Mars. The two major elements of the program are Mars
Pathfinder (one of the first two Discovery missions) and the Mars Surveyor Program (a program
to send missions to Mars every opportunity within severe cost constraints). The Mars Surveyor
Program was established in the wake of the loss of Mars Observer in 1993. The first of its
missions, Mars Global Surveyor, w_l carry six of the eight Mars Observer insmunents, and the
other two instruments are planned to be flown in 1998 and 2001. The contemt and
implementation strategy of the Mars Exploration Program are described in Reference 1.
The Mars Exploration Program will continue the investigation of the red planet by robotic
spacecr_ that began in 1965. The new U.S. program of exploration will begin with launches in
late 1996 of the Mars Global Surveyor and Mars Pathfinder missions and extemd through at least
2005. And studies are under way for activities leading up to a human mission to Mars as early as
2018. The focus of the first 10 years of the Mars Exploration Program is on building up
knowledge steadily and incrementally to a thorough characterization of the planet in terms of life,
climate, and resources.
Mars Pathfinder will be the second mission in the Discovery Program of planetary exploration. It
will launch in December 1996 on a McDonnell Douglas Delta 7925 rocket, and land on July 4,
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1997. It will imagethe terrain in 14 differmt spectra,monitor the weather, and deploy a small
rover to explore the region around the lander and measure the composition of the surface.
Mars Global Surveyor, which will launch in December 1996 (also on a Delta 7925), will go into
orbit around Mars in September 1997 and, after aerobraking into a circular polar orbit, wiU scan
the surface of Mars for a full Martian year (about two Earth years) using six of the eight
instruments that were o "nginally flown on Mars Observer (which was lost in 1993---4he first
planetary spacecraI_ failure in 27 years).
After Mars Global Surveyor, the Mars Surveyor program will fly two missions to Mars every
opportunity (about every 26 months) and, with Pathfinder, is pioneering the "oetter, faster,
cheape_' approach to planetary missions. In late 1998 Mars Surveyor 1998 will launch m orbiter
and a lander on a Delta 7325 hunch vehicle (at a savings over a Delta H). The orbiter will carry
an infrared spectrometer to survey the atmosphere over a yearly cycle. The lander will place a
payload near the south pole to search for volatile elements such as water.
The final element of the lost Mars Observer payload (a gamma ray spectrometer) is being
considered to search for water in 2001 on the Mars Surveyor 01 orbiter, and another lander
payload is planned to have a rover investigate an ancient highland lake bed to study the climate
history of the planet. One of the 2001 missions may be conducted in partnership with the
Russians. For the 2003 opportunity the Mars Surveyor program is exploring a partnership
(InterMarsNet) with the European Space Agency to place three landers on the surface. And the
Mars Surveyor 2005 mission will be part of an attempt to return a sample from the Martian
surface.
Over the next 10 years the Mars Exploration Program will result in a detailed understanding of
Mars, which is of interest not only to Mars scientists but _ help in understanding more about
the Earth's environment, and can eventually provide the basis for human exploration of Mars. The
entire program will be conducted for about one-third the cost of the V'ddng missions, which
orbited and landed on Mars 20 years ago. Each mission costs about the same as a major motion
picture, and the total cost of 10 missions to Mars is about the same as that of a single major
Figure I graphically illustrates the program--including a U.S.-only mission set (on the bottom)--
which can be augmented by international partnerships (on the top). Each launch year is shown
across the top from 1996 through 2005.
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Figure 1. Mars Exploration Program Strategy
The funding available for each mission is shown in the boxes in real-year dollars: the first number
is development cost, the second is hunch vehicle cost. (The assumption here is that Delta 7325s
cost only $36M each, but this may not be the case when the 'WIed-Lite" contract is finally
negotiated.) For Pathfinder, a $14M operations cost is shown for the 7-month cruise and a year
of surface operations. For the Mars Surveyor Program, a project has been formed to operate all
the missions, and there is $20M per year available for this (not inoluding traoking and data
acquisition costs of the Deep Space Network).
STRATEGIC PI.ANNINCr--THINKING LIKE A BUSINESS
Because the new Mars exploration missionswere to be, conducted at only a fraction of the cost of
previous missions, cost became the major driver--with performance and risk being the dependent
variables--a major paradigm shift for NASA missions. Consequently, it was decided to approach
planning for the program as though it were a business. This approach was based on a
methodology for business planning desor_ed in Reference 2. A diagram of the approach is shown
in Figure 2, mapped as a series of questions.
Since Mars Global Surveyor and Pathfinder (including the rover technology experiment being
funded by lqASA's technology program) were in existence when the Mars Exploration Program
was formed, they were our "current business." Businesses of the future were the remainder of the
U.S. Mars Surveyor Program, plus international missions that could augment Surveyor. We
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What Business AreWe In'?
• _(xluotS?
•Servloes?
• Customers?
What Business Should
We Be In?
Mars
Surveyor
Program
Mars
InterMarsNet
MGS96
Pathfinder
Rover
Align With Strategy:
• Systems
• Processes
• People
• Organization
Figure 2. Mars Exploration Program Strategic "Business" Planning Process
investigated several '_ousinesses" which we must be in to conduct a program of Mars exploration
in today's environment, and arrived at five: knowledge gemeration, exploration, education,
inspiration, and technology development/transfer. For each business we identified the customers
and the specific products and services we would be providing these customers. We identified
how we were currently meeting the needs of these customers; that is, what our current business
strategy is. Then we identified what our business strategy shoed be to meet the customer's
needs. We selected which businesses should be our primary focus, and which should be primarily
carried out by '_)artner" organizations at JPL. We identified the systems, technology, and
processes needed to carry out our business strategy. Then we staffed the program office, and,
finally, we evolved an organization to conduct the selected businesses.
Table 1 shows the selected '_ousinesses" with their descriptive information (summarized).
This business analysis showed us that the "knowledge" and "exploration" businesses are very
similar in terms of the missions needed to produce the knowledge products. These knowledge
products (an understanding of Mars, plus knowledge about the technology and processes of
conducting missions to Mars) could be produced synergistically by currmt and fimue Mars
Exploration Program missions, provided the missions are conducted properly. If the information
received _om the missions can be synthesized and translated into products suitable for the
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classroom, the needs of the "education" business can be met. And if the information is presented
in a clear and exciting way, the Mars Exploration Program can provide "inspiration" to the public.
Since the only way to conduct a series of Mars missions on the very low budgets allocated is to
use new techniques, processes, and technologies, the "technology" business becomes a by-
product of the knowledge and exploration businesses. The step of transferring technology
developed or transformed by the Mars Exploration Program is needed to infuse that technology
into other applications (preferably commercial). We decided to focus on the knowledge and
exploration businesses as primary, with education, inspiration, and technology as secondary
businesses. We then began developing a strategic plan to conduct our '°ousinesses." The
following is from a draft of this plan.
Table 1. Mars Exploration Program Business Analysis (Summary)
Bnsiness
Knowledge
Exploration
Education
Inspkation
Technology
Development
& Transfer
Product Technology in
Product
Information
about Mars
Information
about Mars
Educational
products
Inspiring
information
Advanced
technology
Information
management
Information
management
Information
presentation
Information
presentation
Technology
itself
Technology
to Produce
Product
]V[ars
Missions
Mar8
_tssions
Translation
of knowledge
Computer
graphics, etc
Techniques for
technology
production
Features of
Product
Understandable
information
Synthesized
information
In currioula
Customers
Scientists,
everyone
NASA
Educators,
students
Exciting
Cost-
effective
The Public
Missions,
industry
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MARS EXPLORATION PKOGRAM STRATEGIC PLAN
Mars Extdoration ]ProEram (MEP) Vision
To Know Mars
MEP Mission
Explore Mars to understand it in terms of life, climate, and resources.
Provide a first step in the search for life beyond Earth.
Better understand the processes that shape the solar system, including the Earth.
Pave the way for human exploration of Mars.
MEP Goals
1. Pave the way for human exploration of Mars.
2. Find evidence of past or present life (or find evidence that life never existed on Mars) to
understand the potential for life elsewhere in the universe.
3. Better understand the climato--4he weather, processes, and history--in order to understand
the relationship to Earth's climate change processes.
4. Identify and learn to utilize the resources available on Mars--understand the solid planet, how
it evolved, and what resources it provides for future exploration.
5. Identify and characterize safe, interesting, and productive sites for human landings.
6. Find and learn to use water and other resources.
7. Characterize Mars' atmosphere, surface environment, and other factors that bear on the design
of human missions.
8. Pioneer technologies for low-cost, high-return planetary exploration_
MEP Strategies
Strategies are specific actions and approaches we will take to guide the Mars Program toward our
customers' goals.
• MEP will operate in the manner of a business, determining the needs of our customers and
developing "contracts" with them for meeting those needs.
• Our primary products are knowledge and exploration_ Our secondm7 products--tedmology,
education, and inspiration--will be produced in partnership with other elements of JPL.
• We will employ best business practices and will create technical and managerial innovations to
manage our projects within the terms of the "contracts."
• We will implement our projects with common processes and support operations to minimiz_
costs.
• We will partner with NASA, industry, the science comnnmity, the educational community,
and other elements of JPL to accomplish our goals.
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• International partioipafion will be sought for each MEP mission within the program
oonmmt_
Top-level Program strategies are supported by specific thematic emphases in knowledge,
exploration, technology, education, and inspiration.
Knowled2e Strate_
• Build a progressively deeper knowledge of Mars by implementing a series of missions that
build on the knowledge gained by previous missions.
• Partner with other countries to acquire and analyze information.
• Maintain a global compendium ofthe state ofknowledge of Mars.
• Provide a steady stream of new Mars informational and educational products that summarize
the state of knowledge and the remaining unanswered questions about Mars.
Extdoration Strateev
• Implement a series of missions focused on discovery.
• Use new instnunents and instrument deployment techniques.
• l.amd at different sites.
• Investigate more of the Martian surface and more aspects of the atmosphere over longer
periods of time with more capable sensors as the MEP progresses.
• Ketum samples to the Earth.
• Tailor investigations to support future human exploration of Mars.
Technolosy Strate2v
• Utilize new technology at every opportunity.
• Promote cost-effectiveness by integrating MEP technology needs with the needs of other JPL
flight projects.
• Partner with the JPL Technology and Applications Program (TAP) OtEce to develop
technology products tailored to MEP needs.
• Partner with industry to develop and demonstrate technology and infuse it into our projects.
• Support TAP in the transfer of our technology outside JPL.
Edugation S_at¢_
• Transform our knowledge of Mars into educational products.
• Partner with universities to disseminate these products and to train educators to understand
and use them
• Partner with the JPL Public Education Office to insert these products into curricula.
Inspiration Str_teev
• Share the exoitement and knowledge generated by discoveries about Mars with the world.
• Partner with JPL Public A/Fairs OtEce and with nmsemns, NASA Centers, and other
organizations to disseminate our information products widely and in innovative ways.
• Partner with industry to develop oommeroial products based on our progran_
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OKGANIZING TO CONDUCT OUR BUSINESSES
Figure 3 shows the Mars Exploration Program Otiice organization that has evolved over the last
20 months. Before the JPL reorganization that created the office, preprojects were in one
organization, ongoing projects in another. Now the preprojects and flight projects have been
brought together so that there can be maximum benefit to the new projects by close association
with the old projects. There is considerable personnel sharing. At the program level, the Business
Operations and Outreach offices were created to allow resource sharing between the projects.
The program office staff is very small, and this has enabled our overhead to be reduced from
about 15% of the project business base to under 6%, of which less than 1% is program office
overheacL (The rest supports the JPL teohnical infrastructure.)
The Mars Pathfin¢ler spacecraft is being developed by JPL in a subsystem mode. All Mars
Surveyor spacecraft will be system contracted. Mars Global Surveyor selected Martin Marietta
Astronautics in Denver as its spacecraft system contractor, and Martin Marietta also won the
contract to build both Mars Surveyor 98 spacecraft. JPL and (the now) Lookheed Martin
Astronautics (LMA). are thus in a long-term partnership. We are working to "mirror" our
organizations to facilitate teaming and communication. Spacecraft design and operations are to
be conducted at LMA, with mission design and operations being at JPL.
Payloads for the spacecraft are procured through the announcement of opportunity process from
NASA Headquarters, with support from the projects in defining the allowable envelopes for
accommodation of the payloads.
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Figure 3. Mars Exploration Program Organization Chart
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As personnelroll off PathfinderandMars Global Surveyor,somearegoing to Mars Surveyor98
and Mars Preprojects, while others are transferring their knowledge of'°oetter, faster, cheaper" to
other programs. For example, the project manager of the first New lVfillemnium mission was
formerly the task manager for the Pathfinder Attitude and Information Management subsysten_
Because of the relatively short development times for Mars projects, this training and knowledge
diffusion can be effidently done.
PARTNERSHIP WITH INDUSTRY
The Mars Surveyor Program is built around an industry partnership for the spacecraft (both
orbiters and landers). Payloads are procured through an announcement of opportunity process,
except for the reflight of the Mars Observer instruments on Mars Global Surveyor and the 1998
and 2001 orbiters. So not only has the overall cost of Mars exploration declined drastically, but
there has been a major shift from in-house JPL spacecraft workforce to contractor workforce. In
real-year dollars, Mars Observer (not counting launch vehicle and operations) cost about $460M,
of which 54% was spent in industry (mostly through a system contract). Mars Global Surveyor,
carrying six of the eight Mars Observer instruments, costs $154M, with 69% going to industry.
Mars Surveyor 1998 has $187M for two missions, and 83% of the money is spent by industry.
Figure 4 shows the continuing decline in overall funds for the follow-on missions, and the
continued trend to spend the lion's share of the money with industry.
The Pathfinder spacecraR is being built in subsystem mode and assembled at JPL. LMA is the
contractor for both the MGS and Mars Surveyor 1998 spacecraft. These were two separate
procurements, with the second being for both the orbiter and lander. Under the terms of the Mars
Surveyor 98 contract, LMA can be selected as the contractor for follow-on missions, provided
their performance is adequate for Mars Surveyor 98. JPL and LMA are developing a teaming
relationship. The JPI.A.bIA partnership entails a division of labor rather than oversight of the
contractor by JPL. For instance, on Mars Surveyor 98, JPL personnel are located in Denver as
part of the Lockheed Martin spaoecraR team, where JPL skills can augment LMA skills. This
enables a very small JPL project office. The LMA spaceorafL team will operate the Mars
Surveyor 98 spaceoraR from Denver, while JPL will operate the mission.
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U_ of commcneiAI products. A commercial computer, the IBM (now Loral) RS6000 has bern
flight qualified for Pathfinder. This computer is now the basis for not only future Mars programs,
but for Discovery missions, New Millennium missions, and other projects being planned well into
the next century. A commercial operating system is being used by Pathfinder, and the Pathfinder
flight soRware developed at JPL is being transferred to Lockheed Martin for use by Mars
Surveyor 98. Commercial products used in the Pathfinder rover (Sojourner) include motors,
radio modems, and power converters. Use of commercial electronics has required new processes
for determining how to flight qualify then_
Standard b_siness practices and technio_ues. The formation of the Business Operations Office has
allowed us to standardize financial and reporting formats and scheduling tools and techniques, and
to integrate an electronic library for the progran_
Partnering. As described above, the program is providing JPL '_vorkers" to LMA. The
possibility for long-term partnering with LMA also allows an evolutionary approach to---and is
key to---keeping the costs down for future missions. This reduces procurement cogs, enables the
project to be done on 26-month centers, and increases efficiency of long-term planning.
New technology infusiom Mars Global Surveyor will be the first planetary spacecraft to utilize a
composite structure. Pathfinder is using the RS6000 computer and has developed a new
approach to entry, descent, and landing. Sojourner, the rover, is a technology demonstration to
prove that small rovers can operate on the surface of Mars. Mars Surveyor 1998 is improving the
RS6000 -based computer system and is introducing a robotic arm as part of the lander payload.
For 2001 and beyond, technology infusion is absolutely required to reduce the mass of the
spacecraft (because the launch energy requirements are higher in 2001 than in 1998) and to allow
more payload percentage. LMA and JPL have developed a joint plan for _ technology
developed with LMA IRAD funds, for infusing New Millennium technologies such as advanced
electronic packaging, and for developing technologies such as the Small Deep Space Transponder
(SDST) currently being built by Motorola. The SDST is being funded by a consortium of future
flight projects, including Mars, New lVfillenninm, Discovery, and Pluto Express.
Partnering with universities for outreach. The Outreach Program has a series of small contracts
with universities to develop and apply educational products in their states. They utilize graduate
and undergraduate students for outreach to schools and comnmnities, and they train teachers in
understanding Mars information, how to use the Internet, and other skills. All this is done at a
fi'action of the cost of other methods of providing these services.
SUMMAKYANDCONCLUSIONS
The Mars Exploration Program is pioneering the use of'_oetter, faster, cheaper" techniques within
a program structure to achieve a steady advance in knowledge within an extremely limited budget.
We have made great strides in streamlining, partnering, improving our processes, empowering our
colleagues. However, much remains to be done. In particular, things still needed to protect the
vlab'dity of the program include:
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Figure 4. Mars Exploration Program Workforce
PARTNERING WITH SCIENTISTS
Science instruments are procured through the announcement of opportunity process, but are then
managed by the projects. In some cases JPL is also partnered with the scientists to develop
payload elements. For example, the Mars Surveyor 98 lander payload includes an integrated
instrument/robot arm suite where the arm is being developed at JPL and the payload is being
integrated by JPL, while the instruments are developed outside JPL. The principal investigator
for the integrated payload is at a university. In these cases the announcement of opportunity
proposals that involve JPL are kept carefu_ segregated within JPL _om the Mars Exploration
Program Office or any of its projects.
SOME COST CONTAINING PRACTICES
The Mars Exploration Program is pioneering several practices required to contain costs while still
conducting rewarding missions. These include the following (with a few examples):
Rapid, goal-based procurement. We have reduced the lead-time for spa_ proctweme_t by a
factor of four, from ten to twelve months for previous flight system proeuremeats to ten weeks
for Mars Surveyor 98 and twelve weeks for MGS. New procmmneat strategies have been
introduced for one-day turnaround for small commercial items, and for drastically reducing the
procurement time for electronic parts, etc.
Concurrent engineering. Pathfinder pioneered concurrent engineering of the ground and flight
systems. The new Mars Surveyor Operations Project is supporting all aspects of the project
development cycle so that this concurrent engineering can continue throughout the program
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• Adhermce to a steady, inoremeata], evolutionary set of miss/ons w/thin a stable program
structure, inoluding a long-term indum3, partnership.
• Access to low-cost launch services.
• A stable base of support for evolutionary tedmology developmmt and infusion_
• Establishment of a minimal set of requiremeets for the program, i.e., "achieve the m_x-inmm
knowledge within the cost constraints."
• Clear and stable programmatic priorities betweee knowledge aoquisition, foreign policy,
commercialization, sdeace, education, small Imsiness objectives, etc.
• Continuous improvement in JPL and contractor support services for the projects ; e.g.,
financial services, tedmical infi_stmcture, streamlined managemmt processes.
• A process for information synthesis and translation into layperson's language and educational -_
products_
W_nh the two initial launches of the Mars Exploration Program this fall and winter, a new and
exciting era or" planetary exploration will emme. We plan to land on Mars on
July4, 1997 and orbit in September 1997, and thee we will visit Mars every 26-months or so for
at least the next decade. There are many risks because of the minimal fimds available, and
because of the need to do things that have never been done before, on 26-month centers. These
risks are being mitigated by creative new processes in management, engineering, and soieece. The
jury is out on the eventual success of the program, but we befieve that we have started welL
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Section I
Introduction •
1.0 Introduction
The Deep Space One (DS 1)mission is the first in a series of New Millennium Program (NMP)
missions. The NMP will enable 2 lst-century space and Earth-science missions through the
identification, development, and flight validation of key technologies. Breakthrough
technologies are selected from the existing technology "pipeline" - consisting of ongoing NASA
technology programs, other government agencies, industry, nonprofit organizations, and
academia - and are developed in partnership with these organizations. These technologies will be
flight validated so that future science missions can take advantage of them without assuming the
risks inherent in their first use. NMP technology-validation flights are to be launched during
fiscal years 1998 and beyond. While these flights are essentially for technology validation they
will also provide meaningful science.
In addition to developing and validating key enabling technologies, NMP will pioneer new ways
of partnering with industry, nonprofit organizations, and academic institutions. Further, the
development and implementation of NMP's innovative management practices will advance the
competitive edge for NASA and other high-technology organizations. An overview of the DS I
team approach to implementing the project has been documented in a memorandum of
agreement which is provided as Figure 1-1.
1.1 Purpose
This document defines requirements accepted by the DS 1 mission (See Section 3.0) from NMP.
This plan also defmes the management and technical approach to be used by the NMP DS 1
project team. It includes an overview of the plans to manage the development of the flight,
ground, and mission operations systems.
1.2 Scope
The requirements in this document pertain to the DS 1 project objectives, technical approach,
budgetary and schedule constraints, and certain institutional and management relationships
between DS 1 and NMP. It represents the understanding between NMP and the DS 1 Project and
spans the entire project life cycle.
1.3 Governing Doeumeats
This document is governed by NASA guidelines and JPL institutional policies and practices, and
shall be implemented "maccordance with them, recognizing that NMP flights are technology
validation flights as opposed to science driven missions.
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1.4. Organization of the Plan
This plan is composed of 5 sections in addition to the Introduction. Section 2 discusses
documents governing, and applicable to the conduct of the project. Section 3 details the Level 1
guidelines for DS 1 from the program office. The technical and mm_ement approaches are
described in Sections 4 and 5, respectively. Section 6 describes the resources necessary to
implement DS I.
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Figure 1-1 DS 1 Memorandum of Agreement
JETPP.OPUI_ONLABORATORY INI1BROI_OZMlZMO_UM
DS l-DHL-96-012
May 24. 1996
TO: CharlesElachi
FROM: E. Kane Casani and David ELLehman
SUBJECT:. Deep Space One Memorandum of Agreement
We have agreed that DSI will have the following _cs:
_.aunch date:
]VJissiontvvc:
l..aunch vehicle:
onor before 31 July 1998
Cometand A_uoid Piyby
Delta 7326 (or TaurusXL/AUS-$1 with noCoazt flyby)
Technoloqy
IPS
SCARLEt
SDST
MICAS
RA
AUTONAV
3DS
PEPE
PASM
L.vEX
BMOX
KAX
NSTAR Ion Propulsion System
Advanced Solar Array
Small Deep-Space Transponder
Miniature Integrated Camera And Spectrometer
Autonomy - Remote Agent Architecture
Autonomy - Onboard Optical Navigation
3D-Stack Processor
Plasma Experiment forPlanetary Environments
Power Actuation and Switching Module
Low Power Eleetronim
Autonomy- Beacon Monitor Operations _-
Ka Band Solid State Amplifier
The funding required to seppoa DSI h as shown in Table 1.
T_ZcZDSZZ_,xU_e,cquC,uncm
DS1 Life Cycle Costs
OSl
Reselve8
D81 Lemeh sewloee
Total I)Sl Fm'dn 9 Needs
FY96
S3,SS0
0
ss,sso
(3
:m,s_
FY97
SK
SS,SS0
6,000
S9,650
0
SS.SS0
FY'98
SK.
17,020
4.000
el,O_0
• s2,oo_
6S.0_
I:Y99
$K
s_oo
0
s_oo
©
:3.90O
FYO0
$K
2,1(X
0
2,100
O
2,100
Total
SK
90,100
10.000
100,10U
• _.,oou
lS2,1oo
• Sl)ST cmuxeem fead_ md m_tve im_ded m dmiled in the SD,_ Cmmceum Pinn-
• IPS provided at m cha_e to DSI _. dettUed hi _e NSTARIi_! MOU.
• SCARLErpmvidedbyBMDOatttochaqptoDSl _delalledinzheBMDO/DSI MOU.
• Multi-miu/on elccu/cal OSB andion ddve 0ow thrust)missiondedlPn_mu,vigadon, andtrajectorycontrol
mftware provided by/PL institutional funding.
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Figure 1-1 DSI Memorandum of Agreement (Cont'd)
- *._t
• MS11 imrdware provided by BMDO m m chtrge to JRL(includes Ixtuery & m_ ny _).
• PandingforlhegaBmtdSSPAw/UbepmvldedbyC. ElachlmttlinjgS300KspUtasfolIows: $330Kin
FY'96, $120K In PY'97 ma/S20K in FY'98.
• Mlssioaopmutom funding, in 1:Y'99 tnd !_00 oniy includes funds tocollax dmfa'Udmolo_
validation; it does not _ funding for technology valldetio 9 and mud351s. The rmpomibllity for this
work is with the WDT co..k_ls and sepam_ funding for the anal3nds will be provided to the co-leads from
the program offl_. Fimdly, mission operations funds in FY'99 and FY'00 are very WeHndnm7 estimates
(allocations that do not even include project management) 8nd are subject to change as the design evolves.
• i_ launoh services, it is assumed that any co_ increase to the abovo allocation will be co_ by _
off'tee and/or NASA.
• IPDT co-leads will deliver their specified technologies in accordance with the agreed upon funding from the
project. Needs for additional funds and/or attendant descopes will be the responstbtl/ty of _e IPDT co-
leads. Descopes that impact the system design must have the concurrence of the prbject. This approach to
covering the funding needs is not common and results in high risk to the project - it is being done because
of low funding to rite project. _fore, if funding is not available from this approach, and desco_ options
prove to be fruitless and the _es of DS! are insufficient, JPL management will work to provide
alternate sources of funding.
• Funds to cover NEPA compliance will be paid for by the program office.
Management:
• Program office is responsible for NASA headquarters interface funedons. Program office will work
with the DSI team and NASA headquarters to close on the definition of the DSl launch services
approach. This issue needs to be resolved now.
• Program office is responsible for all TAP interfa_ functions.
• DSI project manager will have full authority to manage the budget noted above (including Code X
funds). TheDS ! project manager will be provided and have full control of the reserves noted above,
he will have full authority to use them at his discretion to ensure a suecessful projecL A formal
reserves usage plan (request and usage) will be developed that ensures that reserve usage is
minimized to the extent feasible. The NMP program office will not be in series with the approval of
DSI reserve usage.
• DSI project manager manages the DSI mission including the IPDT technologies (budgets, schedule
and risk) - program office will not "end ran" hisdecisions. Any decisions or direction on DS I from
the program office must be discussed with and agreed to by thc DSl project manager bcfote thcy can
be considered to be in effect.
• Mouthly pmject reviews will be conducted by the DSl pmjeetmanagerwhendnthepmgramoffice
WIll be invited to attend. At these meetings technical pm_ w,hedule, cost _d use oflxojeet
reserv_ will be_ No etber mviews are required except those authodzed bytheDSl project
manager (e.g. DDC, pre-ddp 8ridinternal peer reviews).
•Thc DSl lgojeet manager will work with his team members to develop a.descopc plan htohllohttng
_ suvings that 8re available vs. time. Once developed he will have full mthodty to lmplemem
the plan. He will make a dillgeat effort to find suvtngs in the cwtutt plan to pay for et_t pewth m
they oecur. However, oece the reua'ves usage has beaxne _ 0menne epptmch is alw_ to
have a minimum of 11_ resorv_ with respect to the current cost to otuplete), the desoepe plan will
be tmptmnmte o=e fet=d torote thetbove0ec tom. there, Upmmmserwm fuUymppm the
DSt pmJecgmmm . of.dnn=d teetmotogtmwm be Lqer t Up mmm 
Iresbeeainfesmed of the mmmm fer the clmage tmthe teehnolou _
• C omemofDStpmmnetof4$peoptewmbeanomu tuteUeiq301. Am=0mm t0of
these pe6ple will occulW the "Design Hub." Themove mustooeurialbe Juaetime frame. Moalm
for the move will oeme ftmn ntm_$1 funds.
• ADS I msuagemeat coeasel will b6 formed to provide sdviee and eoumel to the DS I wojeet
manager. This group will meet on a mgulsr basis (monthly or _y) and report its flnd_ to
the program manager.
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Figure I-I DSI Memorandum of Agreement (Cont'd)
• XDSllT,_aCcpmmswill_hlredtoasslstinmanagiugthepmjem. Insdditloa.theresU/cfionsoa'
the splxoval e4e_ forDS! by theprogramoffice will he ndmd from _'K to $1000K.
• Bffecl/ve and I/meJy executloa of DSI in • "I)¢_, faster, _ mode will be employed.
• DSI will work with indusuy to build effective pmnetsldps and Ixoducdve technology mmsfer.
Kane Casan/
ConculTcncc:
Distribution:
B. Wilson
R.Me_g_
IPDT co-leads
DS 1 team members
DS I management counsel (M. Sander, J.Savino, and T. Spear)
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Section 2
Governing Documents
2.1 Project Documents
The document tree detailing the project documents for DS 1 are shown in Figure 2-1. The
definition of the documents are shown in Table 2-1.
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Table 2-1
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Section 3
Level One Requirements, Goals and Mission Success Criteria
The following two pages provide the DS 1 level one requirements, goals, and mission
success criteria. The requirements and goals listed have been agreed to and signed off by NASA
headquarters, the NMP office, and DS I personnel. The primary difference between the
requirements and the goals listed on the first page is that changes (descopes or deletions) to the
goals do not require headquarters approval. The mission success criteria has not been fmalized,
though its contents have been tentatively approved by NASA as a working document. It is not
required to be finalized until one week prior to the launch of DS 1.
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GOALS - .=--_,
Requlremmts
I. Validate the following prime technologies through space flight
Solar electric propulsion as primary propulsion
Advanced sohlr array
Autonomous navigation as primary navigation
3-D stack computer as the flight computer
Miniature imaging camera spectrometer
It is expected that other advanced technologies vital for 21st century science missions will also
be validated on DS1 to the greatest extent possible within the approved funding (see goals
below).
2. Launch by the end of July 1998.
3. Obtain validation data for the technologiesdemonstrated on DS I within 2 years of launch.
. Complete the Project within a Project cost cap of $138.5M. This cost cap includes funding
from the Office of Space Science, the Office of Space Access and Technology, and all costs
for launch services funded by the Expendable Launch Vehicle Program. Contributions from
separately funded technology programs, such as NASA's NSTAR and BMDO's SCARLET
Programs, are not capped.
Goals
o Fly by one asteroid and one comet and return images and spectra. Monitor solar wind
throughout the mission and measure the interaction of the solar wind with the targets during
the flybys.
2. Validate the following additional technologies through space flight:
Small deep:space transponder
Autonomy - remote agent architecture
Miniature ion and electron spectrometer
Autonomy - beacon monitor operations
Ka-band solid state power amplifier
Low power electromcs experiment
Multi-functional structure
Power actuation and switching module
P p.dby_ 'J
DavidH. Lehman,FlightTeam Manager
DeepSp_One
E.KeneOmmi,PrognenManager
New MllleenlmnPmgram "
David A.Gtlman, _ _ve
omee ofspaceseteeee
Mission & Payload Development Division
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Section 4
Technical Plan
4.1 Introduction
This section provides a top-level description of the spacecraft, the technologies to
be incorporated, and the technical implementation strategy to be used by the DS 1 project. The
technical plan will be implemented by a team that is described in more detail in the Management
Section (5) of this plan. The DS 1 flight team is composed of the following elements:
4.1.1 JPL Flight Team
The JPL flight team has primary responsibility for the detailed mission and
system design, system integration and test, launch integration, and mission operations.
4.1.2 Industry Partner Flight Team
An industry partner has been selected competitively and is a member of the flight
team. A general approach is that the industry partner provides all spacecraft hardware (and
software) except those that are part of the advanced technology payload.
4.1.3 Integrated Product Development Teams
The NMP advanced technology Integrated Product Development Teams fIPDTs)
score the advanced technologies to be flight validated by NMP missions. Once an advanced
technology is selected, a hardware and/or software cognizant engineer, technicalmanager or
project element manager is selected to lead the development." This leader is appointed by the
IPDT co-lead and concreted upon by the DS 1 flight lead. The technology development leader
and his/her temn are also members of the DS 1 flight team.
4.2 System Description
4.2.1 Advanced Technology Payload
Through validation on NMP missions, the risk associated with key enabling technologies will be
reduced sufficiently to facilitate rapid (and affordable) incorporation into future missions. The
new technologies employed by DS1 have gone through the NMP selection process, and the
selection has been conctm'ed upon by NASA. The list of technologies to be flight validated on
DS I are as follows:
IPS
SCARIEr
SDST
MICAS
RA
AUTONAV
NSTAR Ion PropuMon System
Advanced Solar Array
SmanVeep-Spa Transponder
Miniature Integrated Camera And Speclrome_r
Autonomy - Remote Agent Architecture
Autonomy - Onboard Optical Navigation
I
I
I
rl
II
II
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3DS 3D-Stack Processor H
PEPE Plasma Experiment for Planetary Environments In
PASM Power Actuation and Switching Module In
LPEX Low Power Electronics Experiment HI
BMOX Autonomy- Beacon Monitor Operations III
KAX Ka Band Solid State Amplifier HI
MFS Multi-Functional Structure HI
Note that the MFS shown above has been added to the payload since the MOA shown in Figure
I-I was signed off. All advanced technology payload items noted above must demonstrate
readiness through a series of technology readiness gates as defmed in the New Millennium
Program Technology Selection Process Plan (JPL D-13361).
4.2.2 Spacecraft Overview
Instrument Payload: Miniature Integrated Camera Spectrometer (MICAS)
Plasma Experiment for Planetary Environments (PEPE)
Attitude Control: 3-axis spacecraft with:
Spacecraft-mounted HGA
Solar array gimbaled in one axis
Spacecraft-mounted science instruments
NSTAR SEP thruster gimbaled in 2 axes.
- Slew rate requirements consistent with comet/asteroid flyby for
technology validation of the science instruments.
Power:. SCARLET solarconcentratorfrom BMDO which produces 2600 W (at1
AU) for both SEP engine and s/cloads.
Propulsion: Solar electric propulsion (using NSTAR supplied components) and a
hydrazine chemical propulsion system for attitude control.
Telecommunications: X Band using the SDST and the Mars Pathfinder lander antenna. Ka band
down link communication using the Ka band SSPA.
Lifetime: 24 months (excludes extended mission)
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4.2.3 Launch Vehicle
The launch vehicle for DS 1 is a Delta 7326 which will be provided through
NASA Goddard's Orbital Launch Services office. The DS1 performance requiremont at a
Declination of Launch Asymptote (DLA) of 28 degrees is 437 kg to a C 3 of 0 km2/s '. Note that
the costs listed in the MOA of Figure l- l have since been updated (see Table 6- l) to reflect the
cost of the Delta - the prior estimate was based on a Taurus launch vehicle.
4.2.4 Mission Operations System and Ground Data System (Ground Segment)
The approach for the ground segment for DS 1 is to utilize the Mars Patht'mder and
MGS ground data systems and baseline and upgrade them to support the mission. The main
difference between these projects and DS I is the incorporation of autonomy for the mission.
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Section 5
Management Plan
5.1 Management Philosophy
This project must be conducted efficiently and economicafiy in order to meet cost
and schedul e requirements. There are several guiding principles that will be employed to
facilitate this outcome:
Select the right people for the job and empower them to do it. Encourage
team members to stretch beyond their capabilities.
Make agreements simple and interface designs robust
Project leaders will strive to facilitate the execution of tasks given team
members by giving them what they need to get their jobs done faster, better
and cheaper.
Fmd new ways of doing business; the DS 1 team will support new ideas,
processes and practices that have the potential to improve productivity and
have acceptable risk..
Attack multi-discipline problems by using concurrent engineering
- Encourage open communication among team members.
We will also develop and foster for our team members a "DS 1 mind set." This
mind set will include the following thoughts:
Design to cost - and the recognition that we must maintain our schedule to-
maintain our cost.
Capability driven mission - recognition that the project will be dynamic
because of our extensive use of concurrent enginee "ring and because we are
flight validating breakthrough technologies.
Everyone must be a system engineer - we must all look at the big picture.
People must feel that they are empowered to solved there own problems -
and they aren't waiting for others to get their job done
- Work to create a "can-do attitude" through out the team
$.1.1 Low-Cost, (_hflck-Reactfon Approach
Table 5-1 contains an overall approach intended to be used by the project to meet
the objectives of developing a high quafity product at low cost and short schedule.
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Table 5-1. Quick-Reaction, Low-Cost Project Implementation Mode
NMP DS 1 Quick-Reaction, Low-Cost Project Implementation Mode
JPL and its industry partner will establish and support a DS I team motivated to do more for
less. This team will:
Work closely with, be responsive to the customer, achieve up front agreements which
cannot change
Establish a clear set of mission objectives that are understood by ali parties
Strive to do more for less, walk line between over enthusiasm and ultra conservatism
Be projectized, make use of and be co-located near the JPL flight system testbed
Include in team dedicated finance, procurement, product assurance personnel
Use a mix of scarred old timers and bright energetic youth, give them responsibility. Trust
tbun
Focus application of resources to mission objectives, avoid unnecessary institutional
charges, work around unneeded bureaucracy, minimize external interfaces
Sensitize team members to cost, give engineers cost, _hedule and technical responsibility
Move technical planners to designers to testers to operators: womb to tomb
Establish a thorough WBS, cost cap major WBS items, accomplish thorough cost
estimates, track actual costs vs. plan monthly, maintain adequate reserves
Accomplish IDC early in project. Hit the street with p_urements as early as possible
Establish and maintain an integrated project schedule and control milestones, track
performance weekly
Use streamlined product assurance, less documentation, fewer independent checks, more
reliance on irnplementors, more reliance on extensive system test prior to launch
Go to best sources, use their methods, use expert consultants and peer reviews
- Be aware of the status of the JPL re-engineering teams. Serve as a proto-type for their
concepts where appropriate.
Achieve adequate margins, robust designs
Do up front planning, analysis and design, but assemble quickly and test thoroughly
Start rapid prototyping testbed activities at project start for the flight system & GDS.
Demo new concepts ASAP, such as autonomy, MICAS and SEP in simulated environment
Accomplish concurrent engineering, push to get necessary funding profile for this
• Emphasize up front mission and system engineering
Design mission, system, flight, and ground segments, including instruments.
Accomplish integrated fright and ground system S/W de.v.e.l.oTnnent teams ks
• Establish incremental deliveries with demonstrable capabilities for progress chec
• Clearly communicate status,plans, problems, solutions on a weekly basis
GDS = Ground Data System IDC = Interim Design Concurrence Review
H/W = Hardware S/Wffi Software
MOS ffi Mission Operations System WBS = Work Breakdown Structure
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$.2 Program RelatlonslMps and Respons/bflitles
$.2.1 Program Office
The agreement between the NMP manager and the DS 1 flight lead on how they
will work together is documented in a memorandum of agreement (see Figure 1-1).
5.2.2 Integrated Product Development Teams (IPDTs)
The IPDTs provide advanced technology road maps and candidate technologies
for the mission. The NMP program office, IPDT co-leads, and the DS 1 flight team work
together to select recommended technologies which are presented to NASA for a decision (see
JPL D-13361, "The NMP Technology Selection Plan").
A closely integrated, working, non-adversarial relationship between the flight
team and the IPDTs will be fostered. This approach is needed for the following reasons:
The flight team must ensure that candidate technologies from each of the
IPDTs are compatible and can be successfully integrated into the first flight.
Technical and integration issues must be addressed early in the design
process.
- It is consistent with concurrent engineering and a teaming environment.
NMP's tight cost and schedule constraints will not allow a "throw it over the
wall" approach.
- It fosters a "team concept" for future missions.
Selected technology providers will become part of the Flight Team while
maintaining membership on their IPDTs. This approach is needed to ensure successful
integration of the technology in the flight system. The relationship between the IPDT Cog. E
and the Flight Team will be one of supplier and customer.
5.2.3 Flight Team
An industrial partner, Spectrum Astro, Inc. (SAD, has been selected as a DS 1
flight team member wofldng as a true partner with JPL. The flight team (industry partner and
JPL) will identify, define, develop, and document a detailed mission and spaeeerafl" system
design. The flight team, including SAL will perform the following tasks:
(1) ComPlete and document, with other flight team members, the DS 1 detailed
mission and system design.
(2) Define, with flight team members, the following spacecraft capabilities and
design:
(a) Details of _e spacecraft system design, functions, interfaces,
subsystems, assemblies, flight software, and advanceA technology
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hardware and software. Advanced technology hardware and software
will be identified and delivered to the flight team members from the
IPDTs
(b) Long-lead items with required procurement dates
(c) Spares philosophy and approach
(d) Spacecraft advanced technology and payload interfaces, including but
not limited to, the following:
(i) Mechanical interface descriptions
(ii) Electrical interface descriptions
(iii) Command and data interfaces
(iv) Environmental descriptions, including thermal envelope, static and
dynamic loads, and electromagnetic fields
(v) Cruise performance for onboard cruise autonomy
(e) Spacecraft metrics including, but not limited to, the following:
(i) Mass at launch
(ii) Power and thermal margins at launch
(3) Participate, as a flight team member, in the following meetings:
(a) System Requirements Review
(b) Mission Interim Design Concurrence (IDC) Review
(c) Mission Detailed Design ConcmTence (DDC) Review
(e) Sage Review
(0 Pre-Ship Review
(g) Launch Readiness Review
A contractual relationship with SAI will be established to facilitate and encourage a good
teaming arrangement. The goal is to have a "badgeless" environment, with clear
communications of and buy-in to project goals, and minimal formal documentation. In addition,
high speed data links and video communications will be established between SAI and JPL.
It is understood that the industry partner's role will contihue to grow in scope and responsibility,
with the intent that they become long term suppliers of deep space spacecraft for science
missions of the 21st century.
5.3 Organization and Work Breakdown Structure
5.3.1 DSl Team Composition
Figure 5-1 shows the project flight team composition. The roles for the lead
individuals on the team are as follows:
night Lead (JPL)
Flight Lead (SAT)
Responsible fo/achieving DS1 mission requirements and the planning,
implementation and control of the DS 1.
Respons_le for overall planning, control and direction of the SAI team.
Project manager for all SAI work. Assistant to the JPL flight lead.
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System Architect
Flight Segment
Manager
Deputy Flight Segment
Manager
Chief Mission
Engineer
Chief Mission
Operations Engr
Procurement Lead
Finance & Schedule
Lead
Science _ad
Responsible for the overall mission and systems technical design "and the
achievement of the DS 1 technical requirements.
Responsible for the flight segment (including spacecraft and launch
vehicle integration) and the overall planning and control of the effort.
Deputy to the Flight Segment Manager. Has full authority as the Flight
Segment Manager
Responsible for the mission design development for DS 1 mission
engineering and navigation planning, and the overall planning and
control of the effort
Responsible for the mission operations development and
mission operations for DS 1 and the overall planning and control
of the effort
Responsible for the overall management of all DS 1 procurements
Responsible for development of budgets and schedules for DS 1
Responsible for DS 1 science
The above team leaders will work together and form sub-groups (or teams) to
implement the mission. The DS 1 working groups are shown in Figure 5-2. The charters of the
groups are defined in Table 5-2. As the project evolves it is expected that the charters of the
groups will change to fit the needs of the development cycle.
5.3.2 Work Breakdown Structure
The major Work Breakdown Structure (W'BS) for DS 1 is shown in Table 5-3
below.
WBS Item
Pro_ect Office
S_stem Architecture
sp,ce=.ft
Tom
Oround Se[gment Development
13round Selgment Operations
LaunehV_de
_Reserve
_OD
Table 5-3 Project Work Breakdown Structure (WBS)
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5.4 Resom'ce Ks'Umation, Allocation, and Reserve/Descope Strategies
5.4.1 Resource Estimation and Allocation
At least once each fiscal year, or as directed by the Flight Lead or designee, each
person responsible for a DS 1 work breakdown structure (WBS) element shall:
1. Estimate the element's resource needs to complete the work.
2. Negotiate a resource budget with the element's funding source.
$.4.2 Reserve Strategy/Descope Plan
Because of the tight budget reserve for the project a detailed reserve
strategy/descope (or risk management) plan has been developed. This plan highlights the uses of
the reserves for-theproject and where they can be applied. In addition, the plan shows how
descopes in the implementation plan will be made vs. time as reserves are used up throughout the
life of the project. (see JPL IOM DS1-DHL-96-016A, dated 7/25/96).
5.4.3 Resource Transfers and Fiscal Year Carryover
Resource wansfers may be traded among different WBS elements.
Individual WBS elements with unused budgetary allocation at the end of a fiscal
year, based on the concurrence of the Flight Lead or his designee, may carry the allocation
forward into the next year.
It is the responsibility of the NMP office to ensure that sufficient total funds are
carried over at the end of each _ year to provide funding for DS 1 until the new fiscal year
funding from NASA is on contract at JPL and available to the Project.
Funds aLlocated for a future year cannot be advanced to an earlier year without the
approval of the NMP manager.
$.q Project Control
$.S.1 Work Package Agreements
At the start of each fiscal year, each team element (cost acxount) leader will
prepare a Work Package Agreement (WPA) using standard JPL format. The WPA will be
negotiated with the Flight Lead, or designee,and will establish the cost account budgets, key
delivembles, and schedule for the task. -WPAs can be revised and a new WPA generated with
written concurrence from both parties.
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Project reporting will be kept to the minimum level required to track
progress, assess problems, and inform project, program, Laboratory, and NASA management.
The reporting plan includes the following elements.
S.5.2.1 NASA
Weekly reports of significant events will be provided to NAS A management
personnel via the program office.
Weekly teleconferences with NASA Headquarters covering the Flight Lead's
assessment of project status, accomplishments, issues and concerns will be conducted.
Inputs will be provided to the NASA's Program Operating Han as requested.
5.5.2.2 JPL
Weekly reports of significant events will be provided to $PL management
personnel.
The DS 1 Flight Leads will have weekly quiet hours with the NMP manager
to discuss the status of the project.
Monthly Management Reviews (MMRs) will be held at the project level by
the flight lead wherein the NMP manager is invited to attend. Topics tq be addressed include
accomplishments, goals for next month, cost status, cost to complete analysis, reserve status,
staffing status, schedule status, and issues and concerns (plus resolution plans).
ADS 1 management counsel will be formed to provide advice and counsel to
the DS 1 project manager. This group will meet on a regular basis (monthly or quarterly) and
report its findings to the program manager.
¸5.5.2.3 Technical Reporting
' The system architect, with the support of the DS 1 system element leads will
prepare a "state-of-DS 1" memorandum on a monthly basis. This memo will detail the stares of
the mission design and current margins for key parameters and metrics defining the mission.
5.5.2.4 Administrative
Weekly tracking of labor will be made by the flight lead, finance & schedule
lead, and chief engineers. In addition, informal Monthly Management Reviews (MMRs) will be
held for each mission element and/or spacecraft subsystem. At these meetings, the following
general items will be covered:
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-Accomplishments of last period
-Goals for next period
-Schedule status
-Cost and work force status
-Cost to complete analysis
-Issues and recommended closure plan
-Help needed from flight team leads
5.5.3 Schedule
Schedule control will be achieved as a result of the weekly schedule reporting
meetings. Figure 5-3 shows the overall schedule for DS 1. The level 1 milestones are as follows:
a) Project start [October 1995]
b) Complete DSI Mission and Systems Interim Design
Concurrence (IDC) Review
[December 1995]
c) Complete Sage Review [May 1996]
d) Complete DS1 Mission and Systems Detailed Design
Concurrence (DDC) Review & Sage Review
[September 1996]
e) Complete Sage Review [May 1997]
f) Deriver P/trtial Bus from SAI to JPL. Commence
Assembly, Test and Launch Operations (ATLO)
[August 1997]
g) Complete system tests & ship toKSC [April 1998]
h) Launch Commitment to NASA
i)Complete advanced technology flight validation
j) End of Primary Mission
[July 1998]
[January 1999]
[July 2000]
At a detailed level, each system lead will develop and coordinate REC/DELs for all inter-
subsystem and key ifitra-subsystem milestones. The Finance/Schedule I.ead will coordinate this
system and provide a weeHy status report to DS1 team leaders
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Section 6
Resource Plan
6.1
DSI.
Funding Plan
See Table 6-1 which shows the cost plan for each major work element of
Major costing assumptions for this table are shown below:
DS1 Fundin_ Assumptions
i
Re-engineering team support
SDST funding per Consortium Agreement
FY'96
IPDT funds for DS1 data/analysis & science
77O
40O
_('97
4926
1100
FY'98
1325
FY'98
330
FY'99 Total
7351
1500
Ka Band SSPA funds from Dr. Elachi 140 160 10 310
Multi-functional structure from E. K. Casani 6 90 18 18 6 138
Low power expedrnent from L Alkalai TBD iBD TBD i uD TBD
1000 1000 2000
The difference between the costs shown in Table 6-1 and that provided in the
MOA of Figure 1-1 is as follows:
Cut'rent estimate includes updated costs for launch services.
Current estimate shows revised assumptions for support from the JPL re-engineering team.
6.2 Facilities
NMP has developed a co-location plan (JPL D-13425). As part of that plan,
DSI will co-locate in building 301 by July 1996. The initial parts of that plan have been
executed with the core team in place. In addition, the following support is needed and is
described in the following documents:
PDC/DS 1 Support Plan, IOM by C. Briggs dated 16 Feb. 1996
FST/DS 1 Support Plan, IOM by P. Gluck dated 16 Feb. 1996
TMOD/DS1 Support Plan (D-13548, dated 3 July 1996)
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Detailed Design Concurrence (DDC) Review
_ Systems or Subsystems shall conduct DDCs at the time detailed
designs/drawings are ready for release and before fabrication begins.
Minimize coverage of areas known to be in good shape.
- Minimal overview tutorial, including configuration and/or block
diagram
- Dominant Level-2, 3, and 4 functional requirements/capabilities
driving System or SIS
- Major external and internal interfaces affecting design
- Details of design (and analysis, if appropriate)
- Solutions to major problems from IDC (functional and interface)
- Applicable test data
- Design/resource margins (timing, memory, torque margins, etc.)
- Drawing status
- QA document/aids/test plan/safety status
- Key schedule items/schedule problems
- Issues/planned actions
- Cost and W/F summary for board's "gut level" assessment
NOTE 1: Any requirement not being met (formal. or informal) shall be
a review item
_ NOTE 2: The DDC is not met to be a decision point for a go-ahead for
procurements.
Table 5-7 DS 1 System or Subsystem Detailed Design Conctmence (DDC) Review
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Interim Design Concurrence (IDC) Review
IDCs shall be conducted after design concepts are established and
detailed design is beginning. As little time as possible shall be spent
on routine description of areas that are in good shape. The agenda
shall emphasize items selected from new, controversial, or problem
items including the following areas, as appropriate:
- Minimal overview tutorial
_ Major task description
_ Configuration and/or block diagram
_Major design options considered
- Dominant Level-2, 3, and 4 functional requirements/capabilities
driving System or S/S
- Major external and internal interfaces affecting design
_ Inheritance review of h/w & s/w as appropriate
- Design details/description
- Safety design approach
- Proof-of-concept test results (as appropriate)
- Schedule
- Issues/planned actions
- Cost and W/F summary for board's "'gut level" assessment
NOTE: Any violation of Project Requirements (PDs, FRs, etc.) or
other requirements not being achieved will be a review item
Table 5-6 DS 1 Interim Design Concurrence (IDC) Review
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Review Process
_ Utilize a series of system or subsystem-level peer reviews for IDCs and
DDCs
- Reviews are chartered under the Flight Lead (system reviews) or
Chief Engineer (subsystem review) and conducted by the system
or subsystem lead (as appropriate)
- All reviews are attended by a core board selected by the Chief
Engineer and chaired by a senior JPL engineer outside the project
- Attendance will be limited to a small set of:
_ Technical specialists and peers from the System or SIS being
reviewed
_ Representatives of the flight team and key interfaces
- Attendance shall be limited to JPLgmdustry partner personnel,
except where special outside expertise is required. Non-team
attendees to be approved by YPL lead.
- All attendees are members of the "board" and expected to
contribute
_ Review board responsibilities:
- Probe technical approach and schedule for adequacy and
practicality
- Bring experience from past programs to identify potential problem
areas
- Recommend areas for special attention
- Recommend on the continuation of the effort to the next phase
_ Review secretary (e.g., Review chairman or System or SIS Lead) will
capture all action items, advisories, and comments in a running memo
during the meeting (no RFAs)
- To be reviewed at and issued after the review
- Focus should be on identifying potential problems and potential
solutions
Table 5-5 DS 1 System or Subsystem Review Process
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5.5.4 Review Plan
Consistent with the NMP policy of minimizing cost and expediting schedule
performance, project reviews will be held to a minimum. All reviews are in accordance with
NMP requirements. The following reviews are planned.
m
D
Initial Technology and
System Requirements Review
Mission and System Interim Design
Concurrence(IDC) Peer Review
Sage Review
Mission and System Detailed Design
Concurrence(DDC) Peer & Sage Review
Sage Review
Spacecraft Pre-Ship Review
Launch Readiness Review
[October 1995]
[December 1995]
[May 1996]
[September 1996]
[April 1997]
[April 1998]
[June 1998]
DS 1 reviews at the system level and below will be peer reviews, with the
major objective to help engineers get their job done. They are not intended to be status reviews
for management. The summary purpose of the reviews are as follows:
Review
Requirements and
Design Reviews
Sage Reviews:
Technology Readiness
Review Gates:
Spacecrafter=-Ship
Review
Launch Readiness
Review
purpose
Peer review of the design
Sage review of mission implementation plan
Reviews to assess development status of a technology product and to
determine the likelihood that the product will meet its objectives
Assess readiness status to ship the DS 1 spacecraft to KSC
Assess readiness status to launch the DS 1 spacecraft
The IDC and DDC reviews will be conducted in accordance with the objectives and approach
shown in Tables 5-4, 5-5, 5-6, and 5-7. Technology readiness gates for all new developments
will be conducted in accordance with NMP JPL D-13361.
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Design Review Objectives
_ Detailed, "shirtsleeves," hands-on peer review of a system, subsystem
(S/S) or part of a SIS. Not a push up for management. These reviews
are to help engineers
_ Demonstrate technical definition consistent with the phase of
development
- IDC
_ Complete system SIS architecture (block diagram,
configuration, flowchart, etc.)
_ Preliminary designs (layouts, circuits, algorithms, procurement
specifications, ICD's, eU_.)
Inheritance review of h/w & s/w as. appropriate
- DDC
_ Complete system or S/S designs, ready for fabrication/coding
(drawings, data flow & state transition diagrams, proto code,
etc.)
_ Design analysis, failure modes & effects analysis, error
detection and recovery
_ Demonstrate adequatedefinition and understanding of driving
requirements, interfaces & capabilities, and verification method
_ Demonstrate adequacy of margins
_ Demonstrate understanding of driving technical risks, means for
handling risks & safety
_ First-order "gut feel" assessment by core board of whether designs and
pr0blem/risk areas are consistent with planned work force, budget, and
reserves
- Following technical, schezlule, and issues, a one-page budget
summary will be presented by the Cog E
- Core board will be asked to react with nothing more than "looks
OK" or "I think you've got a problem"
Table 5-4. DS 1 System or Subsystem Review Objectives.
E-50
!
s:p
| i
o <> |
I_ EO
o li
FO ¢ O ! !
O O
° ! i
_! |
_ Y
° !
I I I I t f I liliR_'_lllltlilit!l,.,,iIi1!iiI_
I I I _t I l J,lil_Iil i iI'_,1;i;I! It ii
i
s s s s • s s s • • s!! s s s sli_z,_ii t z
I F
li
l>
I:>
!
s
I:>
.
" : .ll _ !SlIt!!! _)!!!_'!_ _'ii_ iii,,:, !i':':l lira: ,
I II,iI Irii 'ii' i lsi'Jl lJ ,I i ii ,' ' I
....... i
I#1#11 ltl I!! I| I!!
E-51
II
I !
I:!
|
0|
! |,,
i
I ...................... i
!
It
l!!lltlllil!!!! !I
i
t1111IIt1_111'_it
! !_+I_!II _I I_t_l'tit I It l+i I*Iii_I!I'l Iii !litil_! I I I!I i I
tS ill _ i ,.+"_"-_t' I ;!t l il,,, ++ .-:
i !ii"i':+"i.,i,,,ill+ :,,
I=I,I.I.I,I=I=
E-52
i
1
Ii
NMP IlSl Prelect Pilm ....
Design Review Objectives
_ Detailed, "shirtsleeves," hands-on peer review of a system, subsystem
(S/S) or part of a S/S. Not a push up for management. These reviews
are to help engineers
_ Demonstrate technical definition consistent with the phase of
development
- IDC
_ Complete system S/S architecture (block diagram,
configuration, flowchart, etc.)
_Preliminary designs (layouts, circuits, algorithms, procurement
specifications, ICD's, etc.)
Inheritance review of h/w & s/w as appropriate
- DDC
_ Complete system or S/S designs, ready for fabrication/coding
(drawings, data flow & state transition diagrams, proto code,
etc.)
_ Design analysis, failure modes & effects analysis, error
detection and recovery
_ Demonstrate adequate definition and understanding of driving
requirements, interfaees & capabilities, and verification method
_ Demonstrate adequacy of margins
_ Demonstrate understanding of driving technical risks, means for
handling risks & safety
_ First-order "gut feel" assessment by core board of whether designs and
problem/risk areas are consistent with planned work force, budget, and
reserves
- Following technical, schedule, and issues, a one-page budget
Summary will be presented by the Cog E
- Core board will be asked to react with nothing more than "looks
OK" or "I think you've got a problem"
I I
Table 5-4. DS I System or Subsystem Review Objectives.
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5.5.4 Review Plan
Consistent with the NMP policy of minimizing cost and expediting schedule
performance, project reviews will be held to a minimum. All reviews are in accordance with
NMP requirements. The foUowing reviews are planned.
_ Initial Technology and
System Requirements Review
_ Mission and System Interim Design
Concurrence(IDC) Peer Review
_ Sage Review
_ Mission and System Detailed Design
Concurrence(DDC) Peer & Sage Review
_ Sage Review
_ Spacecraft Pre-Ship Review
Launch Readiness Review
[October 1995]
[December 1995]
[May 1996]
[September 1996]
[April 1997]
[April 1998]
[June 1998]
DS 1 reviews at the system level and below will be peer reviews, with the
major objective to help engineers get their job done. They are not intended to be status reviews
for management. The sunmmry purpose of the reviews are as follows:
Review
Requirements and
Design Reviews
Sage Reviews:
Technology Readiness
Review Gates:
Spacecraft Pre-Ship
Review
Launch Readiness
Review
PUrD_Ose
Peer review of the design
Sage review of mission implementation plan
Reviews to assess development status of a technology product and to
determine the likelihood that the product will meet its objectives
Assess readiness status to ship the DS 1 spacecraft to KSC
Assess readiness status to launch the DS 1 spacecraft
The IDC and DDC reviews will be conducted in accordance with the objectives and approach
shown in Tables 5-4, 5-5, 5-6, and 5-7. Technology readiness gates for all new developments
will be conducted in accordance with NMP JPL D-13361.
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Review Process
_ Utilize a series of system or subsystem-level peer reviews for IDCs and
DDCs
- Reviews are chartered under the Fright _ (system reviews) or
Chief Engineer (subsystem review) and conducted by the system
or subsystem lead (as appropriate)
- All reviews are attended by a core board selected by the Chief
Engineer and chaired by a senior JPL engineer outside the project
- Attendance will be limited to a small set of:
_ Technical specialists and peers from the System or S/S being
reviewed
_Representatives of the flight team and key interfaces
- Attendance shall be limited to JPL.rmdustry partner personnel,
except where special outside expertise is required. Non-team
attendees to be approved by JPL lead.
- All attendees are members of the "board" and expected to
contribute
_ Review board responsibilities:
- Probe technical approach and schedule for adequacy and
practicality
- Bring experience from past programs to identify potential problem
areas
- Recommend areas for special attention
- Recommend on the continuation of the effort to the next phase
_ Review secretary (e.g., Review chairman or System or S/S Lead) will
capture all action items, advisories, and comments in a running memo
during the meeting (no RFAs)
- To be reviewed at and issued after the review
- Focus should be on identifying potential problems andpotential
solutions
Table 5-5 DS 1 System or Subsystem Review Process
E-55
DSI Project Plan
Interim Design Concurrence _) Review
_ IDCs shall be conducted after design concepts are established and
detailed design is beginning. As little time as possible shall be spent
on routine description of areas that are in good shape. The agenda
shah emphasize items selected from new, controversial, or problem
items including the following areas, as appropriate:
- Minimal overview tutorial
_ Major task description
_ Configuration and/or block diagram
_ Major design options considered
- Dominant Level-2, 3, and 4 functional requirements/capabilities
driving System or S/S
- Major external and internal interfaces affecting design
_ Inheritance review of h/w & s/w as appropriate
- Design details/description
- Safety design approach
- Proof-of-concept test results (as appropriate)
- Schedule
- Issues/planned actions
- Cost and W/F summary for board's "gut level" assessment
NOTE: Any violation of Project Requirements (PDs, FRs, etc.) or
other requirements not being achieved will be a review item
Table 5-6 DS 1 Interim Design Concurrence 0DC) Review
E-56
NMPi_I_-oJmFI_
Detailed Design Concurrence (DDC) Review
_ Systems or Subsystems shall conduct DDCs at the time detailed
designs/drawings are ready for release and before fabrication begins.
Minimize coverage of areas known to be in good shape.
.- Minimal overview tutorial, including configuration and/or block
diagram
- Dominant Level-2, 3, and 4 functional requirements/capabilities
driving System or S/S
- Major external and internal interfaces affecting design
- Details of design (and analysis, if appropriate)
- Solutions to major problems from IDC (functional and interface)
- Applicable test data
- Design/resource margins (timing, memory, torque margins, etc.)
- Drawing status
- QA document/aids/test plan/safety status
- Key schedule items/schedule problems
- Issues/planned actions
- Cost and W/F summary for board's "gut level" assessment
NOTE 1: Any requirement not being met (formal or informal) shall be
a review item
_ NOTE 2: The DDC is not met to be a decision point for a go-ahead for
procurements.
Table 5-7 DS 1 System or Subsystem Detailed Design Concurrence (DDC) Review
E-57
NMP DSI Project Plan
Section 6
Resource Plan
6.1
DSI.
Pending Plan
See Table 6-1 which shows the cost plan for each major work element of
Major costing assumptions for this table are shown below:
DS1 Funding Assumptions
R_-engineedng team support
SDST funding per Consortium Agreernent
Ka Band SSPA funds from Dr. Elachi
FY'96
IPDT funds for DS1 data/analysis & science
770
400
140
FY'97
4926
1100
160
FY_J8
1325
10
FY'98
330
FY'99
7351
Total
6
TBD
1000
1500
310
Multi-functional structure from E. K. Casanl 6 90 18 18 TBD 138Low power experiment from L Alkalai TBD ITBD TBD
1000 2000
The difference between the costs shown in Table 6-1 and that provided in the
MOA of Figure 1-1 is as follows:
Current estimate includes updated costs for launch services.
Current estimate shows revised assumptions for support from the JPL re-engineering team.
6.2 Facilities
NMP has developed a co-location plan (JPL D- 13425). As part of that plan,
DS1 will co-locate in building 301 by July 1996. The initial parts of that plan have been
executed with the core team in place. In addition, the following support is needed and is
described in the following documents:
PDC/DS 1 Suppon Plan, IOMby C. Briggs dated 16 Feb. 1996
FST/DS 1 Support Plan, IOM by P. Gluck dated 16 Feb. 1996
TMOD/DS1 Support Plan (D-13548, dated 3 July 1996)
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Pluto Proems lmurovement Initiatives (select list 93/10/4)
key a) already implemented or included with baseline
b)/n progress or planned
c) possible under consideration
How We Do Business
Worldorce Cap
Tight Team development
Sciencecraft implementation of intemmted science and eng'g, teams
Skunk Works TM collocation and management style
allpeople. >0.9 (near full time) or <0.15 (consulting only) FTE
I.&ILQ,..S.bJ_, _ Ops & Contractors as Full Partners
Groupware
All project meetings avail by telecon or in person
multimission applications
Make/buy based on cost
"Rat" Organizational slxucture
Concurrent development team from start
Clear aeeountability_ for WBS elements
Less hierarchy-->te0_ m members comfortable suggesting improvements to peers
and for Project as a whole
Within-co_t, history of meeting all deliverables from start
Earned valfue, up-to-date accounting; product-based WBS
Responsive to redirection as environment changes: ATI, NMP Coordination, Life
Cyele cost
Should stick to plan from here forward
Difficult ob_iectives-->Conservative estimates->often exceed performance
Minimum documentation
All documentation on-line, maintained by WBS.elethent Cog
No >1 page Requirements Does; proceed direct to draft interface specs
and equipment descriptions/designs
Document new design by As-built next-earlier generation plus deltas
Team Life Cycle Cognizance
Now until data returned (attitude: new people "'carry the mantle" of
predecessors on infrequent attrition)
ComaiT_ant, individuals resoonsible for their element's reliability_
Co-__iT_nee by individual, not line organization
Build early to work out interfaces, find flaws
Design to Test ltlll[_QW.Ial_
Rapid prototyping of hardware and software
Sim-->prototype_ -->flight units in testbed
Processlmprovlnitiatives RLS 960710
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facilitates alliance between industrial technology develovers and
JPL equipment and o_Derations designers
Science Teams
. Minimal Pluto science team durin_ cruise
Compete added encounter team slots E-2 yrs for final encounter plan
No-Nonsense contractin_
Set difficult spas where they count: _OSt, m_s, power
Not over-specified where unim_nortant
Hardware & software: not desit, ns & studies
Select best bid from qualified source, not last mi.q_ion incumbent
Limit cost with conviction: No ATI overnm_ _0 far
Firm fixed price development contracts and cost-capped contr'0ct_
Minimum RFP addenda
No contract mods without Prepro_iect ram'. permission: none so far
Streamlined university_ contracting: latest @ 2 pg + coy letter
Use contractor product assurance to meet lifetime spec.
Use contractor reporting format
Frequent informal cost & schedule status discussions between JPL &
Communicate im_tmrtance of cost performance tO CEOs
Solicit ideas on commercial awlications, comnetitiveness,
educational benefits. _Lr_dways JPL & b/ASA can help amplify.
Compete next prototype w/ option for flight; keep ATI/NMP incumbent if
best.
Active promotion of small business. SDB, and HBCU/MI involvement.
Simple contract cost schedule monitoring & management tools
frequent informal reporting
JPL contract technical monitors & negotiators work closely
Wide contracting and geom'aphic involvem.ent [see PlutoParticipants Map]
We have gone for best. rather than chosen location; we will continue
to select the best.
Lower burden (went from 2.1 to 1.8 x salary_ FY95 > FY96), or recycle burden to augment
development where available
Among first users of JPL flight system testbed, project design center.
PCAT. PTM
Young. mixed tea_,
Mix of JPL workforee
Creative and innovative
Balanced with senior exnerienfe (more to be recruited)
Clearly defined, highest priority_ science objectives: nothing else drives df._it)n)
TOM-driven emtmwerment and awareness
Focus off customer need._
Primary_ accountable team members, eo_tmiz.a!3__tengineers, accountable _
Processlmprovlnitiatives RLS 960710
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(__ _r. _ and b_m_r as everyday desire1 metrics.
Senior JPL rnanRm__meat ]ist_nin_and helt)ing
Processlmprovlnitiatives RLS 960710
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Draft Generic Instructions to Project or Task Managers
INSTRUCTIONS FOR LEADING THIS PROJECT
lo You are responm'ble for successful execution ofthe mission on time and within
budget, i
2. You may not go back to the welL
. You nmst be ready to launch on yy/mm/dd. Successful integration with the launch
vehicle is your responsibility.
. You may recruit and dismiss personnel to and from your project at wilL (This
amounts to authorizing use of one of your charge numbers.)
5. You must provide technical, financial, and schedule visibility into your project at
any time, but only to (N) designated individuals. You may use tools and service
organizations at your discretion to assist with this.
. You nmst maintain explicit schedule and budget margins. You may use up to
(X%) of any margin without prior management approval
o You may alter the performance of your system in order to meet schedule and
budget constraints. Your performance will be evaluated in part based on how
much performance your system delivers. If the customer is dissatisfied with the
performance ofyour system, you may be reassigned or dimnisse_
, You are responsible for operating within the laws and regulations applicable to
JPL and its employees. The Lab will make available to you, for use at your
discretion, skilled personnel to assist with procurement, safety, product assurance,
media relations, launch approvaL...
. System performance requirements will be given to you on one page, and will not
be altered after yy/mm/dd without an opportunity to revisit schedule and budget
commitments.
10. The Laboratory _ stand behind the implementation plan agreed to between you
and your ALD, and w_ not re-assign the personnel or fatalities needed by your
project until the release dates in your approved implementation plan.
Among the three variables, schedule, performance, and cost, two may be fixed. These instructions are
based on fixing cost and schedule, based largely on you reports of what Headquarters managers are calling
for. Other activities, such as technology development, may call for a performance objective on a go-as-
you-pay basis, leaving schedule as the dependent variable.
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11. Upon the su_ oompletion of various phases of your project, you will be
provided with promotion and associated raises as agreed in a memorandum of
agreemem betwee_ you and your ALD.
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COST ESTIMATION AND MODELING FOR SPACE MISSIONS AT
APL/JHU
•L. J. Crawford, T. B. Coughlin, W. L. Ebert
Applied Physics Laboratory
The Johns Hopkins University
Johns Hopkins Road
Laurel, MD 20"123-6099 U. S. A.
ABSTRACr
Cost estimation of space science missions
at APL over the past two decades has
been singularly successful in arriving at
program costs that are within a few
percen t of the actual costs at program
completion. The most recent example is
the Near Earth Asteroid Rendezvous
(blEAR) mission which was estimated at
approximately 112 million FY-92 dollars
and came m at approximately three
percent under the estimated cost. This
demonstrated performance has been
achieved without the benefit of a formal
cost model, such as those used in
government and industry (GSFC,
MSFC, SAIC, etc.). In light of this
performance,/t is important to understand
the parameters that are used in the cost
estimating process in an effort to quantify
those elements in a program that arc most
impoRant to the final cost. Wehave
identified a number of areas which
contribute to eventual cost performance;
these inclu&: (a) _ and mission
complexity; Co) use of aLready-developed
(facility-class) iusmm_ents versus ',to be
develo._" new insUmnents; (c)
syaergzsm among programs being
implored conctLrrently; (d) program
implementation length; (e) design-to-cost
practice for all major subsystems and
instrumentswithout contingency; (0 lead
engineer responsibility throughout
design, layout,, fabrication, test,
integration,and initialflightopczations;
(g) dcsigned-4n qualityand testabilityto
minimDe rework; 01) inooIporsfiOn of
reliability and quality assurance
engineering within the program stmoaLr¢;
(i) minimization of documentation and
encouragement of oral and electronic
communication as required. We have
found that gross pammeUization of costs
such as the traditional weight, power, and
length of the program commonly included
in typical models do not reliably predict
acuml costs. A methodology will be
presented, whereby, the elements
identified above plus others are used to
describe the process implemented by APL
in previous missions to generate cost
estimatesand tocontrolcosts.Actual data
over severalmissions during the past two
decades will also be presented that
illustrate APL's cost performance while
utilizing this methodology.
INTRODUCTION
In today's funding-constrained
environment, governments are searching
for solutions that permit the current
robust national and international -space
programs to continue while their science
and technology budgets decline. To
reduce the cost of space science missions,
and thus to allow more. missions to be
conducted for the same dollars, they are
demanding that space hardwaro and
software be produced faster, cheaper
and with equal or better oapabilities. All
of these goals are to be accomplisbed
through technology insom'on with
acceptable risk (read this as low riskl)
and through improved design,
fabrication, testing and other procedures
that are more efficient. NASA's
Discovery Program was established in
1992 to implement this faster,, cheaper
and better process for future planetary
space missions. The Near Earth Asteroid
Rendezvous (NEAR) Project being
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conducted by the MU/APL is the first of
the NASA Discovery Program missions.
With the spacecraft successfully launct_
on a Delta II rocket on 17 February 1996,
it began its journey to a rendezvous with
the asteroid Eros. To date, the NEAR
Project has exceeded all Discovery
Program cost, schedule and performance
goals.
The extreme pressure placed on meeting
cost goals for space science missions has
resulted in a search by private and public
organizations to fmd ways of reducing
the costs of space systems, of predicting
these costs and of actually achieving the
originally estimated costs at the end of the
project A few papers are beginning to
appear in the literauue that attempt to
address cost reduction via small satellite
development and technology insertion
and that discuss the associated
relationships needed for cost estimating.
Very little attention has been given in the
literature, however, to cost control. Cost
control is perhaps the most important
element in this regard since, in the end, it
is the magnitude of the cost and its
comparison to the initial estimate that
ultimately matters in today' s
environment. In an attempt to arrive at
simple cost_g relationships for
small satellites, previous efforts have
focused on relating a few technical
parameters such as schedule, dry bus
mass, pointing accuracy, data storage,
average powerand others to development
costs. While these simple relationships
are instructive and _taJnly have some
value, we believe that they are not very
good estimators of cost for the general
case. Each project is unique and,
therefore, has its own cost drivers that
differ from cost drivers for other projects.
With a very large number of possible cost
elements and with each project having its
own unique •constraints, simple
relationships between costs and a few
technicfl patamete_ have not proven to
be very useful in predicting costs of space
science missions conducted at APL.
Consequently, no formal cost estimating
formulas are currently used at APL.
This paper will mt cost estimation Of
space science missions at APL. We will
discuss the system el_ts involved in
establishing and controlling the costs of
our space systems, we will identify many
of the important cost drivers and we will
discuss cost control techniques. A
methodology will be presented, "whereby,
the elements identified above plus others
are used to describe the process
implemented by APL to generate cost
estimates and to control costs for
previous missions. Actual data over
several missions during the past two
decades will also be presented that
illustrate APL's cost performance while
utilizing this methodology.
SYSTEM ELEMENTS AND COST
CENTERS
In discussing cost estimates and cost
control, for space science missions, it is
important to capture all of the major cost
centers and all of the major external
factors that either influence cost or affect
cost control. Our view of this system of
cost centers and external factors is shown
in Figure 1. Besides capturing the
traditional spacecraft bus and payload
systems, our system view includes
Government Furnished Equipment
(GFE), the APL management system
element and the customer driven e_
enviro_t system elements. These
three entities, the Project, consisting of
the spacecraft bus, payload systems, and
the GFE interface, the APL organizational
unit and the customer interact from a cost
perspective. They are principally
responsible for the magnitude of the
initial cost estimate and the subsequent
actual cost at Project completion. Each of
these will be discussed separately below.
The work breakdown structure (WBS)
and cost centers shown below are the
ones typically used at APL, and are
similar to those used by other apace
systems development organizations (also
see Reference 5, Figure 9). They are also
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many years ago, APL has developed a
way of doing business that minimizes the
organization's impact in those areas. In
this regard, some of the important
attributes of our culture that minimize cost
impacts
1. Foster quick program
execution with short overall development
schedules (< 36 months).
2. Enforce design-to-c_st
practice for all major subsystems and
instruments without cost contingency.
3. Empower lead engineers
with responsibility throughout design,
layout, fabrication, test, integration, and
initial fright operations (proposal to post-
launch.)
4. Practice designing - in
quality and testability to minimize rework
and the associated cost and schedule
impacts.
5. Incorporate a reliability
and quality assurance engineer within the
Project structure as a team player rather
than an outside adversary.
6. Minimize written
documentation required by the APL
organization and encourage oral and
electronic forms of communications.
7. Empower Project Manager
with complete responsibility and authority
to execute all aspects of the project.
8. Recognize the synergism
among programs being implemented
concurrently and the consequent cost-
savings potential for customers.
9.  rmimize Projectreportmg
requirements to upper management and
oversight requirements by upper
management.
I0. Attempt to establish a
single customer interface with minimnm
customer imposed docaunentation,
oversight and other extra cost-generating
requirements.
I 1. Reduce Project
Management overhead - a typical project
office sm_cture would include a project
manager, a system engineer, and a part-
time secretary.
12. Provide a stable work
environment to reduce annual staff
turnover and permit giving a large portion
of a job to a single person.
Customer
This system element is not a cost center
per se either. However, the customer can
significantly affect cost estimation and
control at his own organization and at the
contractor's organization through the
customer's policies, procedures and
practices. Listed below are some of the
important attributes of some of our
customers that have helped to minimize
cost impacts in the past.
1. Establishment of clear and
achievable Project cost, schedule and
performance requirements and goals.
2. Ability to stay focused on
achieving the project goals and remain
committed to them in the face of a
changing environment.
3. Management of APL by
the sponsor with a single person interface
and practice a hands-on-lightly
management approach to minimiTe
imposed documentation, oversight and
other extra cost-generating requirements.
4. Creation of a problem-
solving, Wust-me atmosphere with APL
to promote open communications and to
create an environment where the customer
helps in arriving at solutions.
METHODOLOGY
Our performance record during the past
two decades will be presented later after
discussing here the formal methodology
utilized to manage it. At APL, our
principal focus is to manage the end
product of a project which involves
delivering a specific technical product, for
a specific cost and within a specific
schedule, rather than solely managing
cost-for cost sake. This focus begins
early in the project life cycle during which
an initial cost estimate is ge_ that
meets project cost, schedule and
goals. The same focus continues
throughout the life of the project until the
technical products are delivered, within
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Figure 2 Cost Estimation Methodology
the cost and schedule goals. The
difference in the initial cost estimate and
the actual incurred cost is then one figure
of merit used for evaluating project
performance. We will present next, our
formal methodology for generating our
initial cost estimate followed by a
discussion of the methodology utilized to
control those costs during project
execution. This methodology, shown in
Figure 2, will be presented in the context
of the system elements discussed above
and involves assessing the impact that the
project, the APL organizational unit and
the customer have on both cost estimation
and cost control.
Cm l imati a
Cost estimation of space science missions
at APL is a proofs that _ m|n|mum
use of cost-estimating relationships
genet_od by statistical regressions of
industry-wide or even company-wide
actual space systems cost data. The
process involves interactions among the
project, the APL organiz_onal unit and
the customer, draws on our historical data
base and utilizes the experience of our
technical staff acquired over decades of
functioning in a stable work environment.
The process consists of executing the
following five steps; (a) Identify
Customer Requirements; (b) Cmnorate
Project Rough-Order-of-Magnitude
(ROM) Cost Estimate; (c) Gemram
Bottom-Up Cost Estimate; (d) C_nemm
Top-Down Cost Estimate and (e)
Generate Initial APL Cost Estimate. The
first four of these focus on a cost risk
(and schedule and performance risk) as a
design driver. Thus the initial cost
estimate is supported by a risk
management approach.
1. Identify Customer Requirements
The first step is to establish open and
frequent comrrmn|c-qfiorm with
customer at both the APL Project Office
level and at the APL organizational
management level. The outputs from this
step provide the answers to three key
questions that drive the initial magnitude
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Figure 1 APL Spacecraft Development System View Point
similar to those found in the literature for
typical satellite programs 4
° Spacecraft Bus Cost Center
(a) Program Management and System
Engineering; Co) Mechanical; (c)
Telecommunications; (d) Power and
Thermal; (e) Attitude; (f) Ground Support
Bquipmont; (g) Integration, Test and
Launch; (h) RF System (Antennas &
Transmitters); (i) Reliability and Quality
Assurance (R&QA); (j) Propulsion.
2. Payload Cost Center
3. GFE Government Furnished
Equipment Interface Cost Centers
The Project staffs role in the estimating
proems for the initial costs is to ensure
the lowest possible project cost is
developed consistent with the Project's
cost, schedule and pc_forman_ goals.
During the execution phase, the Project
•staff is the front line of defense for APL
in controlling the actual cost incurred.
The Project Managex implements APL's
an.a
described m the section oelow during me
execution of the Project. Additionally,
the Project practices the following
gnidelin_ to _ impacts to cost:
I. Focus the team's effort on
delivering the end product of the Project
which involves delivering a specific
technical product, for a specific cost and
within a specific sehedule.
2. Design for simplicity. We
have found that perhaps the biggest single
factor that drives space systems cost and
our ability to control cost is spacecraft
and mission complexity.
3. Where possible, we use
already-developed instrmnents (facility-
class) and components versus "to-be-
developed" new systems.
4. Immediate placement and
fight technical monitoring of subcontracts
and use of incentive-based controls.
5. Tight techmcal monitoring
of GFE. A separate interface engineer is
assigned to each GIVE component for the
purpose of ensuring that the GFE is
delivered on time and that. it's fit, form
and function are consistent with the
spacecraft bus development.
APL _iT_fi_onR! Unit
This system element is not a cost center
per se, but through an orgai_afion's
business policies, procedures and cost
accounting pra_o¢_, it could
significantly affect cost estimation and
control. Having recognized this point
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of our cost estimate and ultimately our
ability to control the actual project costs.
These questions (cost drivers) are: (a)
What is the customer really trying to
accomplish as reflected in the stated
project technical, cost and schedule
parameters7 It is important to establish,
particularly at this early stage in the
project life cycle, which customer desires
are hard and fixed requirements and
which customer desires can be treated as
goals. (b) How does the customer intend
to manage APL during the execution of
the project? We always attempt to
establish a single customer interface with
minimum customer-imposed
documentation, oversight and other extra
cost-generating requirements. We believe
that our organization functions best under
these conditions as reflected in our past
performance and that this approach
results in lower overall cost to the
customer. (c) Is the customer's attitude,
commitment and/or will strong enough to
stay the course in holding the line on
project requirements and goals?
Although the answer to this question is
subjective, the commitment or, more
importantly, the lack of commitment of
the customer's will, significantly affects
our ability to control actual project cost.
2. Generate Project Rough-Order-of-
Magnitude (ROM) Cost F__timate
A small technicalteam led by a Project
Manager empowered with complete
responsibilityand anthofityto execute all
aspe_ of the project, develops a
conceptual solution that satisfiesthe
customer,s technical,cost and schedule
desires. This is the point where the
system engineering practice of designing
a system that is good enough rather than
Attempti. "ng to find the perfect or optimal
solution is employed. The goal at this
stage of the system definition is, to
develop at least one acceptable conceptual
solution and to identify any possible
show-stoppers. This solution includes a
functional block diagram, a ROM cost
estimate, a ROM schedule and a list of
assumptions, key cost and risk drivers
and other project level constraints and
guidelines. In arriving at this solution,
lead engineers use a design-to-cost
approach without identifying any
contingency.
3. Generate Bottom-Up Cost
Estimate
Next, the Project-derived preliminary
concept definition as de_ribed in step 2
above is presented to skill center line
supervisors in APL's
organization. The line supervisors,
working with their technical staffs, then
generate a separate detailed cost estimate
for each technical area. In generatin__g
their cost estimates, the line supervisors
and the technical staff draw heavily upon
their past experience and upon our 40
year historical space systems performance
data base as they analyze the preliminary
concept. The most recent history carries
the most weight. Comparisons are made
between the current mission requirements
and those of previous space missions
conducted at APL. Analysis of these
differences is a critical component in
establishing initial cost estimates and in
establishing mission feasibility. Each of
these cost estimates is then reviewed
separately with the project staff to ensure
consistencywith the project direction and
to ensure the lowest possible cost
estimate has been obtained. The Project
Manager then sums all cost center
estimates to obtain a bottom-up project
cost estimate.
4. Generate Top-Down Cost
Estimate
In a manner similar to the bottom-up cost
estimation process described above, an
independent estimate is generated by a
few senior technical staff members and a
few senior managers. Using p_concept definition along with _e
level consu'aints and guidelines and using
the relevant aspects of our historical data
base, they generate a separate cost
estimate. This estimate is called a top-
down cost estimate. It is generated by the
top level managers and technical staff
having analyzed the proposed space
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TABLE 1
PROGRAM
MAGSAT
_AMPTE
GEOSAT.A
POLAR BEAR
DELTA 180
DELTA 181
DELTA 183
NEAR
RECENT JHU/APL SPACECRAFT BUS COST HISTORY
SPONSOR
NASA
NASA
NAVY
USAF
SDIO
SO_
SDK)
NASAJHQ
WEIGHT
BUS (LBS)
349
343
1198
208
713
2384
558
946
LAUNCH
DATE
1979
1984
1985
1986
1986
1988
1989
1996
PR_
DURATION
IMONTHS)
24
36
37
24
12
17
13
26
RELATIVE
COST*
1.3
1.3
1.6
0.9
1.0
5.6
1.1
3.8
* Cost in constant year dollars relative to cost of Delta 180 (as 1.0) at project
completion (Launch +30 days)
"* Percent cost growth from initial cost estimate at start of Phase C/D
COST
GROWTH**
%
8
0
7
-5
-3
-1
8
-3
Table 2
Spacecraft Bus Cost by WBS Element. (% of Total Bus. Cost)
WBS COST CENTER
Program Management & System Eng.
Mechanical
AMPTE GEOSAT POLAR BEAR
i|
12 12 13
NEAR
4
11 9 11 6
Telecommunications/RF 13 14 19 25
Power & Thermal 13 15 13 8
Attitude & Propulsion 13 13 12 30
Doppler Beacon 4
Ground Support Equipment 7 9 3 11
Integration & Test 17 14 20 4
Reliability & Quality Assurance 1014 9 12
Figure 3 Spacecraft Relative Cost vs. Weight
6,0
5.0
_o4-0
03.0
2.0 •
_.1,0 • •
0.0 I ' I I I
0 500 1000 1500 2000 2500
Weight (LBS)
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months, and relative costs vai'ying from
one to about six.
Table 2 shows the cost breakdown for
four previous APL missions (AMPTE,
GEOSAT, POLAR BEAR and NEAR)
according to the WBS mentioned earlier.
The data are presented as a percentage of
the total spacecraft bus cost. While
instructive, it is clear from examination of
this data that additional information is
required to interpret the obvious
variances. For example, NEAR is the
only deep space mission listed in Table 2.
Consequently, the NEAR propulsion,
attitude, telecommunication and RF
mission requirements were unique among
this set of APL missions and represent
significant cost drivers relative to our
previous experience. This situation is an
example of how mission unique
requirements or complexities can
dominate total mission costs and can
render useless cost estimates derived
from overly simple cost estimating
formulas.
Shown in Figure 3, is a graph of
spacecraft bus relative cost versus
weight. Again, while instructive, there
can be significant variances from the
indicated trendline for a SlX_ific mission.
It is clear, however, that there is a definite
dependence of spacecraft bus cost on the
bus weight.
COST PERFORMANCE RESULTS
Included in Table 1 is the cost growth of
various Projects experienced during
spacecraft development through launch
plus 30 days. Cost growth is defined as
the difference between the initial cost
estimate as deteamined by the
methodology described above and the
actual inctm_ cost following launch plus
30 days. This cost growth is used as a
parameter to characterize our cost
performance on each Project. As can be
seen, within the experience base listed in
Table 1 and by applying the methodology
described in this paper, APL has a very
good demonstrated performance record.
We are as likely to return money to the
customer as we are to ask for ad/litional
money. The range of cost growth is
between -5% and + 8%.
GENERAL COMMENTS
CONCLUSIONS
AND
In developing space science" mission
hardware and software in today's
environment of limited funding, the most
important element to focus on is the final
cost at project completion, defined here as
the time period ending at launch plus 30
days. Initial cost estimates matter only if
costs can be controlled during project
execution allowing favorable actual costs
to be realized at project completion. We
have tried to highlight the key features
associated with APL's spacecraft
development history extending over 40
years. These feature are: (1) recognizing
that the customer and the performing
contractor's organizational unit, as well
as the project goals effect initial cost
estimates and the ability to control cost,
(2) having a process in place that
supports the generation of accurate initial
project cost estimates and finally, (3)
being able to control cost during project
execution leading to minimal overall
project cost growth. Key parameters to
note are simple hardware and software
systems designs, favorable business
policies, procedures and practicesatboth
the executing contractor and the customer
and a focus and dedication by the project
staff, the executing contractor and the
customer to delivering specified technical
products or schedule and within cost in
the face of a changing environment.
Specific details on these topics have been
presented reflecting APL's extremely
good performance in the past 20 years of
conducting space science missions for
several govemme, nt agencies.
REFERENC'ES
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mission at a gross level concentrating on
analysis of the similarities and differences
with previous missions conducted at
APL. It can occasionally result in
management decisions to make major
changes in the concept or approach and
require a revised step three. This
approach could be characterized as
looking at the forest rather than looking at
the trees.
5. Generate Initial APL Cost
Estimate
The final step in APL's cost estimating
methodology is accomplished in a short
meeting between the Project staff, the
skill center supervisors and a few of the
senior technical staff members and
managers. The purpose of this mee_g
is to determine APL's official cost
estimate by reconeiling differences among
the Project generated ROM cost estimate,
the bottom-up cost estimate and the top-
down cost estimate. This estimate may
be adjusted by management, depending
on the requirements of the customer. The
estimate obtained from this process is
called our initial Project cost estimate.
Cost Control
As the customer, the APL organizational
unit and the Project staff execute the
program, they each have a role to play in
controlling costs. Having set the project
technical, cost and schedule goals, they
must never lose focus on achieving them
in light of the coustanfly changing internal
and external environments. Open and
frequent communications with the
customer are essential to controlling
costs. The customer must keep the funds
flowing into the project and resist the
_on to involve other organizations
that would provide tmn_ and
unproductive oversight.
For APL's management part, we
empower a Project Manager to deliver the
desired products on time, within budget
and to satisfy all technical requirements.
The Project Manager is completely
responsible for all deliverables and is
given the corresponding authority to
exercise this responsibility. This
situation allows for quick and low cost
solutions to problems by solving them
on-the-floor. Additionally, a reliability
and quality assurance engineer is
integrated directly into the Project as a
team player. The engineer is empowered
to find ways to "get it done" as reliably
and as economically as possible rather
than operate in an adversarial and usually
more costly role.
Projects usually function as small teams,
holding weekly team meetings, often in
the presence of the customer.
Managen_nt of technical subcontracts
and Government Furnished Equipment
(GFE) require special attention in order to
manage costs. They are tightly monitored
by a single APL technical person and
interfaces are designed to be as simple as
possible to minimize problems during
integration. This approach reduces the
risk of cost overruns and helps assure
that projected costs can be achieved.
APL HISTORICAL DATA BASE
In APL's forty year history of developing
space mission system hardware and
software, we have delivered 55 spacecraft
and over I00 instruments with a
reliability record exceeding 95%. Our
most recent history is summarized in
Table 1 which lists spacecraft data for the
last twenty years. This time period was
chosen as being the most relevant to
today's missions. The data are
parameterized according to a few key cost
drivers. These are program sponsor,
project duration through launch plus 30
days, spacecraft weight, and spacecraft
relative cost at completion in constant
year dollars. Spacecraft currently under
development at APL will be added to this
table after they have been launched. As
the data indicate, our recent exporience
extends over several government
customers (NASA, USN, SDIO/BMIX),
USAF), with spacecraft weights varying
from about 200 pounds to about 2,500
pounds, development schedules through
launch plus 30 days of 12 months to 36
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JDAM- The Value of Acquisition Streamlining
PURPOSE:
The purpose of this paper is to briefly describe some of the successful JDAM acquisition reform
approaches applied over the past 18 months. Specifically, this paper presents some of the contributors to
getting the price from $40,000 dollars per round m the 40,000 unit, to McDonnell's price of $18,000 per
round at the very first unit.
BACKGROUND:
The JDAM program has evolved substantially since the Milestone I DAB. The primary reasons have been
the designation of the JDAM as a Defense Acquisition Pilot Program in the 1994 Federal Acquisition
Streamlining Act (FASA) and the extraordinary support from the Undersecretary of Defense" for
Acquisition. This support has more than any other factor, allowed us to break down traditional barriers by
asking "why does it have to be this way---why can't we accomplish the task using commercial
approaches?" Our focus is to reduce acquisition management costs--costs related specifically to the way
the Government does business rather than to the nature of the product the Government is buying,
PROGRAM DESCRIPTION:
* Joint Air Force/Navy program to develop a very affordable, adverse weather, and accurate guidance
kit for 1000 and 2000 pound bombs currently in inventory
• INS/GPS guidance kit attaches to the bomb and uses controlled tail fin movements to direct bomb to
the target
• JDAMisplannedforintegrafiononB-1,B-2, B-52, F-15,F-16, F/A-18, F-22andAV-8
• Designated as DoD Pilot Program by Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act (FASA) of 1994
PROGRAM STATUS:
• Two 18 month EMD- 1 contracts awarded to Lockheed Martin and McDonnell Douglas in Apr 94
• _ 1 emphasis on lowering average unit cost and manufacturing risk
• Downselected to one contractor (McDonnell Douglas) occurred on 11 Oft 95
• EMD-2 will complete development and emphasis development and operational testing
• EMD-2 is scheduled for 40 months; Lot I Production begins delivery in FY98
• Contract types
• Cust plus fixed fee for FAVID-1
• Cost plus award fee for EMD-2
• Firm fixed price for initial production
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HOW HAS JDAM STREAMLINED ITS ACQUISITION PROCESS?
The number one reason JDAM has been able to successfully implement acquisRion streamlining is
A'f'YITUDEI
• JDAM asks "why can't we do it another way'" a "cheaper/fz_r way?" instead of complying with "the
way its always done" EVERY RESULT IS A SYMPTOM OF THIS ATYITUDE
• JDAM compares itself with an analogy of an individual building a house, how would that individual
react?
• Most of the initiatives implemented by JDAM were in the realm of common sense, i.e., things that
could always be done before but the environment and culture were not right to allow execution of the
ideas
• The number one objective of JDAM's first development phase was acquisition reform
• The contractor is responsible for his design
• The number one objective of JDAM's second development phase is to help MDA beat schedule
• The number one objective of JDAM's production is to help the contractor maximize his profit,
GIVEN
• MDA delivers JDAM at the price he has projected to the Government
Contracts
Selecting the "Right" Contractor
• Selection of smart contractors with known commercial buying experience
• Developed a "Rolling Downselect" process
• Provided feedback along the way - helped the contractor work his weak areas
• Used common sense - A parent wants his student to receive continuous feedback to ensure student
does his/her best
• Helped ensure the Government would have a "tough" final decision between two viable contractors
• Reduced timeline to final downselect
• Reduced chance of protest - contractors knew where they stood
Statutory- Regulatory Relief
• Statutory - the most significant relief provided by FASA was allowance to use commercial practices
• From a regulatory standpoint, JDAM requested waivers for 25 FARs and 13 DFARS; OSD granted
wa/ver approval for 15 FARs and II DFARs
• No n_ntl_l use of military specs or standards, although the conUactors elected to use a few rail
where no commercial equivalents were available interface with the Warfighter
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Oversight
• Streamlined oversight of both the program and the contractors including little audit and DCMC
involvement with the contractors
• Minimal--Contractor responsible for his desigu--Government works the interfaces
Warranty
• Use of a commercial type warranty which guarantees the contractor will repair or replace any
defective item; any warranty costs are included in the price
Dispute Resolution
• Avoid the costs and timeline normally associated with resolving Government/Contractor conflicts
• Allowance for Alternate Dispute Resolution instead of the normal legal means of solving disputes
(EMD 2 and later)
• Impanel independent 3 person team (1 nominated by KR, I by Government, 1 selected by other two)
Management Process
Personnel
• Critical use of Integrated Program Teams (IPTs) including the actual inclusion of government people
as part of the contractor's team at their facilities
• JOB I for each Government IPT during I" phase of JDAM EMD was to help his contractor WIN
• Decreased overhead accounts---use multi-faceted direct charge talent both in Government and MDA
Manufacturing
• Heavy use of Manufacturing Development Initiative, meaning concentration of the actual
manufacture of hardware very early in the development cycle and the allowance of tradeoffs within
the design cycle for manufacturing and cost
• Emphasis on a long term relationship with the primes and their subcontractors
• Management at a higher level---the systems specification only, no sub-tier specs
• Contractor formats for critical design reviews and PRRs---held during 1't 18 months
Data/Conflg
• Significantly reduced data requirements---support system safety and flight clearance organizations
mainly
• Use of earned value reporting from the contractors in their own format
• At the beginning of EMD-2, configuration control is being given to the contractor for all Class II
changes
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TECHNICAL Interface with the Warflghter
• TRADITIONAL: An unfortunate aspect of military acquisition is "requirements creep." When the
dollars aren't yours, human nature is to want more. The Air Force recognized this trend several years
ago and instituted a "4-Star Summit" process 4-Star Summit helped control this costly aspect, but
extremely painful and demands huge resources.
• JDAM: JDAM wanted to capture the benefits of the 4-Star Summit process and eliminate the burden
• JDAM instituted an "0-6 Requirements Review Council" consisting of 0-6s from ACC, N88, PMA-
201, and the JDAM program orifice
• JDAM contractors told to b_g any requirements/$ trades or questions for clarification to council
• RESULTS: Both JDAM contractors took advantage of this forum---reducing unit costs of their design
• EXAMPLES:
• McDonnell asked for reduction of low altitude captive carriage time in "worst case ops scenario"
• Warfighters approved and plastic encapsulated parts became baseline---Saved $535 per
• Lockheed Martin presented a trade offering $250 per round savings for trades using DSU-33 fuze
Aircraft Interface
• TRADITIONAL: Smart Weapons create their own interface with their aircraft using MI].,-STD- 1760
• Hire a weapon contractor to create their own implementation with each aircraft
• Time consuming, and expensive - new learning curve each time
• JDAM: Hired some aircraft interface support during JDAM original source selection to create
strawman
• Capitalized on TSSAM and JSOW existing interfaces with thc_e aircra_ in common with JDAM
• Supported commonality working group with JSOW and WCMD programs
• Reduced costs to prepare and execute aircraft interface
• Test Warranty motivates contractor to move reliability growth to the left providing a production
representative weapon earlier in program
• Characterization of weapon and any problems earlier in the program
• True combined DT/OT
• Worked with AForI'EC and COMOPTEVFOR to achieve extremely close working relationship
• OT will help plan DT mimions---DT data will feed and help reduce OF mrties---less cost
• "N_ with related programs (e.& Joint Programmable Fuze) to _k testing
• Results in reduced costs for JDAM and the other programs
• Learn from past _ more operationally representative missions early
• Get away from rote traditional DT test cards early---wring the weapon out in warfighter environment
• Use warfighter to provide "rapid Wototyping" feedback while developer has chance to fix
• Helps warflghter develop tactics and helps developer streamline training
• Base testing requirements on whole program, not piece parts
• AF using Navy FA-18 results to reduce (not e"luninate) required sorties on AF aircraft
• Tests feeds composite, integrated test matrix
• Warfighter requirements in JORD---DT testing normally oriented to specification
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Motivation
• Milestone billings will also be allowed to improve the cash flow of the contractor in later phases of
the program
• Innovative use of "price based negotiation": allows the use of price rather than cost as a basis for
negotiation; also allows the use of rewards and punishment for a contractor's commitment for first
five lots of production price
• "Carrots and Sticks"
• Carrots (Contractor price meets or is better than their commitments to the Government)
• Contractor submit a price-no need for cost data as long as contractor meets price commitments
• Contractor has configuration control--as Long as changed does not affect system specification
• No in-plant, in-process oversight of prime or his subs
• Government will heLp prime reduce his costs--not his price
• Contractor will receive an incentive fee if lfis units' reliability is met or bettered
• Long term commitment_rnment will not recompete if contractor meets his commitments
• Sticks (Contractor price is greater than the commitments made to the Government)
• Contractor must deliver certified cost and pricing data
• Configuration control reverts to the Government
• Contractor must develop a qualified 2"_ source at no cost to the Government
• Government may place in-plant, in-process oversight
• Incentive fee goes away
"Measures of Effectiveness"
MIL STDS/SPECS
SOW PAGES
CDRLS
PERF SPEC
WARRANTY
AUPR ($93)
SPO S 173_
DEVELOPMENTS
DEVELOPMENT
TIME
PRODUCTION
TIME
87
137
243
YES YES
5YRS 5YRS
68K 48K
7070
$380M
46 MOS
15 YRS
8O 0
100 10
250 85
YES
PRODUCrION 0 0 0
SAVINGS
DEVELOPMENT
PRODUCTION NO LIMIT
PROPOSAL
DOWNSELECT 3 MOS
DURATION
20 YRS
40K
70
SOO-2
29
YES
20YRS
<20K
63(96/1_-44) (96/4)
$310M
30 MOS
IIYRS
$1.5B
15 PAGES
6 WEEKS
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• JDAM combined DT/OT considers JORD early and up front
• Eliminate oversight and checking the checkers
• Contractor is responsible for his design---Govermnent fly's the aircraft, but
• Contractor is customer for results
• Emphasize "margin "testing.up front
• Find out where design breaks, not just that design performs to spec
• Significant testing to break design and characterize performance early in program
• Treat DT/OT and OSD as partners
• Developed partnership with all TEMP organizations
• TEMP is continually updated for program changes--not signed and ignored until next milestone
• SUMMARY: The first phase of the JDAM development program met with many successes and some
failures--some ideas did not pan out. However, the concepts that did work fostered an environment
for the contractors to reduce costs. We've seen for the first time contractors who never before would
bid a Government contract submit bids. We've seen significant prime/subcontractor teaming
relationships in a "selfless manner" where a member may propose a change which decreases his
profit, but reduces system cost and price.
We are not able to quantify a cost savings with each of the initiatives and new ways of doing business that
JDAM pursued. In the aggregate though, the change in attitude, the change in paradigm, has allowed the
JDAM team to reduce unit cost by approximately 60% below the JORD requirement. There also have been
attendant savings in development which allowed the JDAM program to free FY97 and 98 funding to
accelerate the JDAM program and provide funding for earlier capability on the B-1 and B-52 bomber
aircraft.
In summary, JDAM is experiencing lower development costs/faster schedules, lower production
costs/faster schedules, and lower unit costs.
There remain some barriers to acquisition reform---some of which are outlined below.
Barriers to Acquisition Reform
• Chief among these barriers are:
• Continued functional (engineers, procurement specialists, etc) resistance to change
• Risk adversity, mistrust by both the government and contractors to wide scale changes
• Substitution of templates for innovation; people want a checklist on how to do a task--quick/easy
• Some people don't recognize the need to change attitudes--to tailor new ideas to their own program
"personalities'"
• Too much consensus decision making and conservatism, especially on the part of the government
• Increased inspection/audit for Pilot Programs since it is "new'"
• Strong senior DoD leadership, but continued mistrust by staffs
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